Nuclear Facilities as Targets of Military Attack

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has centred concerns on the threat that militaries pose to nuclear installations. While Ukraine’s situation is unique, the threat of military strikes on nuclear facilities predates the war in Ukraine, with military force having been used – or seriously considered – against and in the vicinity of nuclear installations on multiple occasions before that. As more countries become interested in pursuing nuclear energy as a source of clean and sustainable power, and as non-proliferation norms are increasingly challenged, the probability that nuclear installations will find themselves the targets – or unintentional victims – of the use of military force could increase. Such military activity should not be normalised; however, political and military leadership must be ready to anticipate, mitigate and respond to potential future military attacks on nuclear installations.

This paper aims to understand the operational and strategic logic of why states may use military force against nuclear installations, as well as the consequences of such attacks, with the intention of identifying approaches for reducing related risks. It presents five contexts in which military force may be used or threatened to be used against nuclear installations. These are: as a counterproliferation tool; for energy disruption purposes; for area denial; to generate escalatory, deterrent or coercive effects; and when a nuclear site is encountered on an axis of advance or during a broader military operation.

Military force has been used or seriously considered against nuclear installations on numerous occasions in the pursuit of counterproliferation aims. This is despite historical cases pointing to significant limitations of military attacks as an effective counterproliferation tool. The use of military force in a counterproliferation context may seek to achieve a range of objectives – from the elimination of an adversary’s programme altogether, to limiting its progress, or simply as a way of sending a signal of displeasure and resolve to counter the perceived threat. Depending on the proliferation pathway a state may be pursuing, counterproliferation strikes may be carried out against a range of installations across the nuclear fuel cycle, each presenting unique risks to civilian populations and the environment.

Russia’s military advance on and occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, in contrast, appear to have been driven, at least in part, by an intention to disrupt and eventually co-opt the energy generating capacity of the plant. The targeting of enemy energy generation and distribution infrastructure is well established in the military doctrine of many alliances and states – including those of NATO, Russia and China. The expected growth of the importance of nuclear power in the global energy mix in the coming decades may increase the likelihood that future armed conflict will see greater targeting of nuclear energy infrastructure. This may not necessarily entail direct attacks on nuclear reactors but rather assaults on auxiliary systems – such as water and electricity supply to nuclear power plants – under the erroneous assumption that such attacks carry limited risk to nuclear safety.

Attacks on nuclear facilities may also be carried out with the express intention of releasing radioactive or other toxic material as an area denial strategy. Radiological or chemical contamination of territory complicates and delays an adversary’s military operations in the affected area. However, most militaries have at least some ability to shield against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) hazards and to continue operations in a contaminated environment – particularly if a mission is critical. As such, ultimately, the effectiveness of radiological or chemical contamination for area denial is likely to be limited. Furthermore, the unpredictability of the dispersion of a contaminant from an attacked nuclear facility creates significant risks of contamination to friendly populations and forces and this contamination might expand and escalate a conflict if toxic material reaches the territory of a third country.

Due to the psychological salience of radiological hazards among the general population, attacks and threats of attack on nuclear installations may be used for escalatory, deterrent or coercive purposes. States may threaten attacks on nuclear facilities and the release of radioactive material from these installations as a ‘half-step’ between the use of conventional weapons and a nuclear weapons attack, despite the differences in effect and normative significance of nuclear safety incidents and nuclear weapons attacks.

Short of attacking nuclear installations as a primary target of a military operation, militaries may also encounter and need to contest nuclear facilities on an axis of advance during a land invasion or may be required to carry out air campaigns against territory where nuclear sites are present. Militaries – supported by relevant national authorities – must therefore ensure they have the necessary expertise and capabilities and have conducted the necessary operational planning to be able to safely operate around nuclear facilities if this becomes necessary.

Based on analysis of operational and strategic drivers for the use of military force against nuclear installations, the paper proposes a number of considerations and recommendations to manage and mitigate related nuclear safety risks.

The author is grateful to the Stanton Foundation for their generous financial support of this project