Extremism and Terrorism Programme

In the past few years, far-right extremism and terrorism have received a significant amount of interest and media coverage. As part of our Far-Right Extremism and Terrorism (FRET) programme we pay particular attention to understanding what transnational connections far-right actors have; what role communities play in far-right extremism; and what role gender plays in radicalisation and recruitment. We assess how far counterterrorism (CT) and prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programming can be adapted or reimagined to address violent extremism and terrorism driven by far-right ideologies.

The two-decade focus in international CT on addressing Islamist terrorism has had substantial consequences for the design of CT frameworks for meeting other threats. 

Our aim is to help address research gaps and inform approaches to tackling the threat from the far-right in the following areas:

• transnational dynamics of far-right extremism and terrorism;
• far-right milieus and the role of communities in far-right extremism;
• the role of gender in radicalisation and recruitment into far-right extremism; and 
• transferability of current CT and P/CVE programming to the far-right threat.

Closely connected to the discussion on social media, there is growing concern and interest in the role of online gaming in violent extremism and terrorism. Violent extremist organisations are actively exploiting online gaming across the world. However, research into gaming and radicalisation is sparse and outdated. There is a need to gather further evidence around the particular socialisation processes that happen within gaming culture and the role these processes play in the radicalisation of gamers. Additionally, the practical ways in which gaming environments can be utilised for communications, as well as potentially flows of illicit finance to fund extremism and terrorism, need to be explored further.

RUSI has initiated its research in this space by co-founding the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN).

Terrorism is commonly defined as a form of politically motivated violence and intimidation, which uses communication strategies to amplify its intended effect of causing terror. Violent extremist and terrorist actors utilise a wide range of platforms as communications tools within these strategies. These strategies can target ‘traditional’ mainstream news media reporting, such as in physical newspapers and their associated online sites, broadcast television, and radio. Additionally, these strategies often utilise online and social media platforms to create and disseminate their own content.

The role of the media in the advancement of terrorism’s objectives is controversial, as it remains difficult to draw direct lines of causation due to the diversity of factors contributing to terrorism and the process of radicalisation. However, RUSI seeks to contribute to the body of research on the ways in which media can contribute to the spread of extremism and terrorism, as well as media’s potential responsibilities in mitigating negative impact.

Historically, the term ‘eco-terrorism’ was reserved for groups that committed or threatened to commit acts of violence against people or property in support of environmental causes. Today, the term is returning to mainstream use as climate activists seek to force governments to address the climate crisis. There are concerns, however, that attempts to criminalise and stigmatise peaceful forms of climate-related protest might encourage more violent and radical forms of eco-activism. Moreover, there are fears that the term eco-terrorism may become a politically expedient label for those looking to delegitimise groups calling for stronger action on climate change.

While the far-right traditionally eschewed the concept of climate change – going as far as to label it a ‘left-wing conspiracy’ – some factions have recently changed tack and embraced the climate crisis to form new narratives. For example, in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the far-right in Germany and elsewhere embraced conspiracy narratives that framed the pandemic as a way for governments to normalise future ‘climate lockdowns’. On the other hand, many far-right figures are increasingly portraying the climate crisis as an opportunity to seal borders and take decisive action against the perceived threat of over-population, linking it to concerns about demographic change and using it to justify anti-migrant narratives.

As part of RUSI's wider Climate Security Research Programme, our team explores the intersections between climate change and violent extremism and terrorism. This includes contemporary and historical case studies of how far-right groups and movements dealt with environmental questions as well as analysis of the implications these narratives have for the current actions of far-right extremist groups.

Studying extremism and terrorism through a gender lens is essential to understanding and accounting for how socio-cultural gendered norms and role expectations impact how and why individuals might engage in violent extremism. Gender permeates extremism from the processes of recruitment to the ways in which individuals participate in extremism, and to the narratives shaping perception of that participation. Due to the gender-blind approach that is common in security research, policy and programming, there remains a significant lack of data on these gender dynamics.

Additionally, gendered stereotypes are often applied in analysis of extremist actors. Men are commonly classified as the aggressive and active threat, while women are broadly brushed into categories of either victim or peacebuilder, or at very most as playing (lesser-than) supporting roles in violent extremism.

Our team seeks to challenge these gendered stereotypes and build the evidence base by applying a gender lens across our research on extremism and terrorism.

Over the last several decades Islamist violent extremism has been driven to the forefront of concern for governments and international counter-terrorism bodies. Violent Islamists show many similarities with other conflict actors and are as much a symptom of governance failure as other violent groups. However, ideology influences how Islamist groups frame their scope, aims, tactics and recruitment strategies.

Salafi-jihadist ideology is absolute and utopian and promotes war as a route to a better world. This would appear to make negotiation impossible or futile. However, ideology is also contested between and within groups, which are as a result prone to splintering, potentially opening opportunities for dialogue with more tractable elements. Although violent Islamist groups are strong where governance is weak or repressive, state building efforts by themselves are unlikely to resolve the conflicts they are involved in. Such efforts can, however, constrain their operations and limit their capacity to gain public support. Even conflicts framed by Salafi-jihadists as part of a global war are deeply rooted in their countries and regions.

It is out of the context of the ‘Global War on Terror’, waged against transnational Islamist extremism, that a vast array of counter-terrorism programmatic responses have been developed and subsequently dominated by this ideological focus.

As intelligence agencies and law enforcement have become increasingly adept at detecting and disrupting large-scale terrorist plots, potential attackers have instead turned to smaller-scale, less sophisticated assaults. Lone actor or self-activating terrorism has become a major security threat in Europe and around the world. There are challenging dynamics to developing effective risk assessment, prevention and countering strategies for individuals who only loosely affiliate with particular extremist groups and ideologies or engage anonymously in online forums associated with certain groups or ideologies. The focus on lone or self-initiated actors has also raised the question of how significantly mental illness and related personal dynamics factor into threat of violence.

While the term “lone” is used commonly, evidence suggests that even individuals who make the choice to use violence without group activation or consent are most often connected into wider extremist environments and receiving encouragement for their acts of violence from an online community. RUSI is currently engaging in research on these dynamics, especially in relation to growing concern over far-right inspired acts of self-initiated violence.