Protecting the Force from Uncrewed Aerial Systems

The impact of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) on land operations has been a subject of extensive discussion, from the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022. The corollary to the importance of armies fielding UAS is that effective, layered and efficient counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities are neither a luxury nor a concept to be explored as part of an abstract ‘future force’. They are a basic requirement for a land force to be suitable for operations on the modern battlefield. Without C-UAS capabilities, a force will be seen first, engaged more accurately, and ultimately defeated by an opposing force that successfully fields UAS and C-UAS capabilities at scale. For NATO members, the aiming mark set by the Alliance’s senior leadership is to be ready to deter Russia by 2028. Fielding C-UAS capabilities, which are absent in any structured sense from the British Army and from most other NATO land force elements, is therefore an urgent operational requirement.

There is a risk that in attempting to fill this critical gap, NATO members purchase a range of C-UAS capabilities that are overly specialised in dealing with specific threat systems, are not integrated effectively across the force, and cannot keep pace with the threat as UAS continue to rapidly evolve. This paper outlines the core tasks and capabilities required to provide coherent, layered C-UAS protection. The paper then explores how to integrate layered C-UAS protection across land forces without overburdening units and thus preventing them from performing their primary tasks. 

The paper concludes that: 

• Software solutions are as important as hardware to enable accurate detection, classification and identification of UAS, and the allocation of appropriate effects to efficiently defeat UAS. Software can also reduce the bandwidth requirements for the networking of sensors. In most cases, the necessary data to field robust machine-based filtering is already available in Ukraine, so there should be little difficulty in obtaining libraries of signature data.
   
• There are multiple active and passive sensor techniques, and a wide range of soft- and hard-kill techniques exist for engaging and either providing a mission kill or physically destroying UAS, but none are a universally applicable solution, and they must be employed together across the force to provide effective and efficient coverage.
   
• All platoons must have the ability to detect the presence of UAS and have electronic countermeasures to protect themselves from them.
   
• Across the force, remote weapon stations and other existing platforms should be updated to be able to engage UAS with direct fire. 
   
• At the company level, it is necessary to have dedicated passive sensor arrays capable of detecting, classifying and identifying UAS. 
   
• Battalions should have a dedicated counter-reconnaissance capability with hard-kill C-UAS systems, fielding both self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery and UAS interceptors. An electronic warfare section is also necessary, to update and orchestrate the electronic protection suites at subordinate echelons that provide a soft-kill layer that attacks UAS command links and navigational systems.
   
• The brigade should have independent C-UAS platoons that can be pushed to support the efforts of company groups, or to close key axes to hostile UAS.
   
• The brigade should field directed energy systems to efficiently defeat medium-level ISTAR UAS overflying its area of responsibility.
   
• The brigade should have the responsibility for electromagnetic spectrum command and control (C2) and deconfliction.
  The division should fuse lower-echelon C-UAS capabilities with the common air defence picture and orchestrate a distributed defence in depth of the airspace to avoid local saturation of C-UAS systems at critical sites.
   
• The point defence role for critical sites such as airbases should see C-UAS capabilities integrated into the wider integrated air and missile defence system at the national, theatre and Alliance levels.
   
• It is vital that the permissions on training areas allow these capabilities – both soft and hard kill – to be used in combination, alongside the rest of the force’s communications and C2 systems. This is to familiarise commanders with the use of C-UAS capabilities and the deconfliction procedures necessary, and to ensure that systems do not commit fratricide. Where it is not possible to train with these capabilities in live exercises, they should be made available in a synthetic training environment.