A Window of Opportunity on the Iran Nuclear File

On 29 November, the deputy foreign ministers of Iran, France, Germany and the UK (the latter three known together as the E3) are due to meet in Geneva to discuss a range of security issues in the Middle East – including, apparently, the Iranian nuclear programme. While there is still no indication that Iran has made a decision to weaponise its nuclear capabilities, it continues to advance its programme and to threaten a readiness to re-evaluate its apparently peaceful intentions. Yet there is a unique window of both opportunity and necessity over the next few months to push Iran towards meaningfully addressing concerns over its nuclear activities. Capitalising on this will require Europe and the Biden administration to maintain and expand diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, while offering clear diplomatic off-ramps and maintaining reasonable expectations on the extent and pace of concessions that can be expected from Tehran.

Mutual Vulnerability and Time Pressures

Last week, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution censuring Iran for its continued unwillingness to cooperate with the Agency on outstanding questions over its nuclear programme. The resolution calls on Iran to provide the IAEA with the missing information and requests that the Agency produce an assessment of the outstanding issues and of its ability to verify Iran’s compliance with its obligations. The resolution – which was tabled by the E3 – was followed by a joint statement from the three countries urging Iran to comply with a list of measures to address concerns over the increasingly advanced and opaque nature of its nuclear programme. The message to Tehran was put clearly that the three countries ‘stand ready to use all diplomatic levers’ to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Patience is obviously running out. 

It’s not just patience, but time, that is in short supply. With the stakes for both sides at a high point and continuing to rise, this might be precisely the kind of pressure that is needed to make meaningful progress.

In October 2025, the option of reimposing UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions that were lifted from the Iranian economy as part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – better known as the Iran nuclear deal) will expire. Should the so-called ‘snapback’ provision be allowed to lapse, the E3 will lose one of the more meaningful diplomatic levers in an otherwise limited arsenal of options to convince Iran to roll back its nuclear programme. Current UNSC dynamics mean that the introduction of new sanctions after snapback expires is highly unlikely. Meanwhile, the highly advanced state of Iran’s nuclear programme, repeated threats from leading Iranians regarding the country’s technical ability and political willingness to reconsider the allegedly peaceful intentions behind the programme, as well as questions over whether Russia may be willing to supply relevant expertise or technology to Tehran should inspire urgency regarding the need to move Iran away from the nuclear brink. 

Iran is facing its own set of pressures. Should the E3 decide to use the snapback option before they lose it, Iran would once again become a country under UNSC sanctions. The practical economic implications of the latter are likely to be limited – although not non-existent – for Tehran. However, the reputational – and potential domestic – implications of being put back on the diplomatic version of the naughty list may yet be something Iran wants to avoid.

With the re-election of Donald Trump, Iran will also be preparing itself to contend with a highly unpredictable – but almost certainly more hawkish – US policy towards the resolution of the nuclear question. The threat of a military response against the Iranian nuclear programme has long suffered from a credibility issue. Now, with Israel having clearly demonstrated a willingness to escalate in the region and against Iranian territory directly, and with a Trump administration that can reasonably be expected to be less scrupulous than its predecessor in holding Israel back should it decide to strike Iranian nuclear sites, the threat is more credible than it has been in a long time. The degradation of Hamas and Hezbollah and the possible depletion – at least in the short term – of Iran’s ballistic missile stocks after its large-scale October attack on Israel will surely be adding to an Iranian sense of vulnerability and hopefully convincing it that the time has come to demonstrate some willingness to meaningfully cooperate over its nuclear programme. 

Nuclear Diplomacy is a Team Sport

The Europeans would do well to seize on this opportunity to push Iran towards meaningful concessions on its nuclear programme. This will require a combination of continued and escalating pressure on Tehran, as well as clear off-ramps that would allow Iran to demonstrate an intention to cooperate with the Agency and engage meaningfully in renewed nuclear diplomacy. The IAEA censure resolution and the E3 statement – both of which include a clear list of expectations for Iran – were sensible and well-timed steps. The meeting between the Iranian and E3 deputy ministers presents another opportunity to highlight to Iran the extent of its vulnerability while providing a clear path for it to avoid additional economic and diplomatic pressure. 

Europe’s levers vis-à-vis Iran are, admittedly, few. The UK and EU could impose further sanctions on Iranian entities, but such a step would have limited economic implications for Tehran. As mentioned earlier, the prospect of UNSC snapback may carry some more weight; Europe has already made clear that it will not hesitate to resort to that option if necessary. The greatest source of pressure, however, will have to come from elsewhere – namely, the US.

The increased credibility of a military threat to Iran’s nuclear programme may be helpful to this end. Washington is also marginally better-placed to increase economic pressure on Tehran – for instance, by strengthening enforcement of its secondary sanctions intended to target countries that import oil from Iran; this pertains namely to China, which is the primary importer of Iranian petroleum. With only two months left in office, the Biden administration can afford to tighten the screws on the Iranian economy further, with the expectation that any response from Iran is likely to remain measured as it waits to see what direction that the Trump White House will take.

Between now and the first part of the new Trump administration – as it sorts out precisely how it plans to tackle the Iran nuclear question – there is an opportunity for the US and Europe to play out a ‘good cop, bad cop’ dynamic. With the E3 making clear diplomatic overtures to Tehran, while the US – and the E3 themselves, to the extent that they are able – continue to increase pressure, Iran may see the logic of showing its willingness to engage productively on the nuclear question. If Tehran and Europe manage to establish a functional diplomatic process for the resolution of key concerns before the Trump administration has had time to articulate a policy, the E3 and more doveish forces in Washington will be much-better placed to make the case to the White House that diplomacy is showing promise and remains the option with the greatest likelihood of success. 

This two-front approach need not require a public splintering between the US and its European allies on the nuclear question. Such obvious disagreements are in fact best avoided. Both Europe and the US have made clear their willingness to increase pressure on Iran – they are consistent on this point. And military threats need not be made explicitly by Washington; Trump’s hawkishness and unpredictability, as well as the ever-present threat of unilateral Israeli action, speak for themselves. Europe is well-placed to offer Tehran an alternative just as the threat grows more credible.

Managing Expectations

Yet, the E3 must also be realistic about what can be achieved on the diplomatic front and on what timeline. A return to the 2015 JCPOA is no longer feasible – the Iranian programme has advanced too far and the challenges of promising meaningful sanctions relief have become too clear. A major rollback of the programme in advance of the October 2025 deadline is also unlikely. But neither can Iran be allowed to engage in nuclear diplomacy simply for diplomacy’s sake or to be rewarded for limited and easily reversible concessions, like the recently announced capping of its 60% enriched uranium stocks. Otherwise, there is a high risk that Iran will stretch the process out until October 2025, only to reverse course afterwards. 

Expectations should initially be focused on Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA and the extent to which it makes tangible contributions to the resolution of concerns over the programme. Such an approach will allow Tehran to show its intention – or lack thereof – to engage on the nuclear issue in good faith, while allowing it to claim that its concessions are not to the E3 but to the IAEA. Iran has indicated that it distinguishes between actions taken at the IAEA and ‘matters related to the UN Security Council’ in considering its responses to diplomatic pressure over its nuclear programme.

Addressing outstanding questions over its nuclear programme and cooperating with the Agency in the drafting of the report called for under the censure resolution should be the bare minimum if Iran wants to avoid snapback in October. Further steps could include the recertification of senior inspectors, a return to implementation of Modified Code 3.1 and provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP), and full cooperation with the Agency on reconstituting continuity of knowledge on its programme, which the Agency lost after Iran stopped implementation of the AP in 2021. Halting all uranium enrichment above 3.57%, down-blending a significant portion of its stocks of 60% enriched uranium or significantly reducing the use of advanced centrifuges could eventually also be put on the table, along with a concrete plan and forum for further progress on the nuclear file, as preconditions for foregoing snapback in October. All these measures could reasonably be achieved before October 2025. Expecting an Iranian return to JCPOA limits before October 2025, however, is not a credible negotiating position for the E3.

Of course, the risk that Iran will still renege on any progress made after the expiry of the October 2025 remains, as does the possibility of miscalculation and of hardening, instead of softening, Iranian resolve against cooperation on the nuclear file by increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran. Yet, Iran too must contend with the risk of miscalculating the extent of European, US and Israeli patience over its continued foot-dragging on the nuclear file. In light of its current vulnerabilities and the ticking clock to the start of a new Trump administration and possible UNSC snapback, the stakes for Tehran are higher than they have been in a while. Europe and the Biden administration must take advantage of the opportunity this presents. 

© RUSI, 2024

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