Implications of Advanced Capabilities Within the AUKUS Pact on Deterrence

These will, in fact, be available well before the SSN-AUKUS boats are delivered. And they may be more consequential in terms of strengthening and diversifying the military capabilities of the AUKUS partners, thereby contributing to deterrence. Pillar II also provides a new opportunity for extended deterrence through the highly integrated nature of technology-sharing envisaged in AUKUS. Amid great power rivalry with its nexus in the Indo-Pacific, the AUKUS partners are increasingly aware that deterrence is no longer simply about nuclear weapons but, rather, having the right mix of capabilities.

AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between the US, the UK and Australia. Launched in 2021, it operates as a twin-pillar structure: the first pillar is the delivery of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines; the second is the development of advanced capabilities, comprising artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, quantum technologies and undersea capabilities, as well as other military-relevant technologies. The motivation for developing these is to maintain a leading edge against technologically advanced competitors, most obviously China.

Pillar II capabilities are expected to improve the speed of decision-making, situational awareness and the capacity to process greater volumes of data. Technologies such as dispersible autonomous vehicles also provide the means for generating more disruptive and nimble power projection in the expansive maritime environment of the Indo-Pacific. Warfare is increasingly being conducted short of a hot war, with greater emphasis on strategies such as espionage, coercion and diplomacy. With shipping lanes and undersea cables and pipelines critical to global trade, augmenting the toolkit of military options helps to sustain an open and secure maritime order.

The AUKUS Pillar II tracker of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute shows there is a two-horse race between China and the US when it comes to high-impact research of critical technologies, with other states coming a distant third. China is leading in 19 of these 23 technologies – and has a ‘commanding lead’ in some technologies which presents a risk of Beijing achieving ‘breakout capability’ and a ‘technology monopoly’. Not only is losing the global military technology race a concern for the AUKUS trio, but there are ethical implications of technologies such as AI being driven by autocratic regimes.

Maintaining a stake in global technology competition makes the rationale of Pillar II clear. However, developing the technologies themselves requires the partners to get past the difficulty of opening up access to sensitive technologies. Given the importance of critical minerals such as lithium to facilitate these efforts, it is also vital for the partners to develop trusted, secure supply chains – a ‘symbolic third pillar’ already underway with critical minerals agreements being inked, and recent reform of the US’s stringent International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Expanding conventional military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific contributes both to deterrence for the AUKUS states and reassurance to allies. Classic definitions of deterrence – the practice of preventing an adversarial state from taking unwanted action – emphasise the triumvirate of capability, credibility and communication. AUKUS embodies a commitment to act in unison – as well as to deploy assets far from home – sending a powerful message to adversaries that the trio will respond forcefully over territorial or military transgressions. Of course, Pillar II capabilities do not exist in isolation but are part of a wider set of extant capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Success depends on close cooperation among the trio’s armed forces and those of their allies. This kind of cooperation is what the US National Security Strategy envisages under its concept of ‘integrated deterrence’.

A challenge for AUKUS, however, is that its deterrence value has never been adequately defined; even the objective at the heart of the pact to contain China has never been formally articulated. This risks deterrence measures being misinterpreted as a prelude to offensive measures. Furthermore, although Washington’s ‘integrated deterrence’ lexicon holds value in bringing all tools of power to bear, the practicalities of working with a network of allies remain unclear and untested. As the AUKUS story unfolds, the partners may seek to issue greater clarity in their security postures but at the current juncture the line between offensive and defensive actions remains unwisely ambiguous.

AUKUS is far more than a technology pact. Pillar II encompasses interoperability in military technology, trust in sharing advanced technologies, and securitisation of supply chains, alongside the much-feted integrated deterrence. The impact of Pillar I is decades away, but Pillar II is now arriving. Advanced technology capabilities will be decisive in determining which states maintain the upper hand at this time of strategic competition. Nevertheless, there are challenges to AUKUS that will need to be carefully managed, including the risk of deterrence misperceptions. But given the consequences of failure – particularly the democratic and rules-based world losing control of the direction of advanced military technology – there is an imperative to succeed.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.