China’s Civil Nuclear Strategy and the Risk it Poses for Nuclear Proliferation in Africa

Recent years have seen China surpass the US as the largest trading partner with several countries worldwide. Ongoing investment in infrastructure abroad suggests this trend may be set to continue.

One of the most demonstrative examples of this is China’s civil nuclear strategy abroad. Over the last decade, China has formed numerous partnerships focused on developing civil nuclear power across Africa. Current energy use per capita across the African continent remains among the lowest in the world, accounting for just 6% of global energy consumption. With a population forecast predicted to grow to 2.5 billion by 2050, policy regarding African energy is increasingly reflecting a growing need.

One example of the current reality is the recent signing of the Ugandan powerplant project deal with the China National Nuclear Corporation assisting Uganda in developing a 2000 MW nuclear power plant (NPP), the first 1000 MW of which are set to be connected to the grid by 2031.

Increasing civil nuclear investment in Africa presents several opportunities and risks. Nuclear proliferation risks in particular are highly relevant, given some of Africa's current circumstances. Can China continue to ensure the security of nuclear materials in the unique backdrop of the African continent? For the purposes of this work, the definition of nuclear proliferation is ‘the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, fissionable material and nuclear weapons-making information to the countries that do not possess these’. In this context, loss of control of fissionable material is the most pressing issue.

The African continent faces three key drivers for a potential increased risk of proliferation as its civil nuclear industry develops:

• Higher than global averages for risk of coups and war.
• Higher than global averages of terrorism.
• ‘Brain drain’.

These are each explored below.

War

While war is not unique to Africa, the region has experienced the most coups in recorded history; there have been nine since 2020 in West Africa, Central Africa and the Sahel region alone.. Since the 1950s, this has been most pronounced within sub-Saharan Africa, where population growth is highest, and where exists the greatest need for energy.

War in a proliferation context is highly concerning, as it can cause discontinuity of safeguards regulating nuclear materials and inhibit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections – as at Zaporizhzhia NPP during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.

Terrorism

Outside of state-sponsored diversion of processed materials, theft of fissionable material by terror groups is often suggested as the most likely route through which proliferation may occur. This is relevant to the African continent as it presently faces the highest prevalence of terrorist groups worldwide. For reference, the UK government currently classifies numerous African nations (including Benin, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania etc) to be “very likely” to experience terrorist activity. As such, a world wherein Chinese- / African-built nuclear power plants become high-value targets for groups wishing to incite fear and cause widespread harm to human life could feasibly become a reality.

‘Brain Drain’

In 2022, it was estimated that 250 to 300 skilled persons had left Koeberg – the only active NPP currently on the African continent – raising concerns over the plant's ability to function properly in the future. This brain drain of skilled people isn’t unique to Koeberg; it is prevalent across sub-Saharan Africa. Another report found that 52% of 4,500 surveyed Africans aged 18-24 were ‘likely to emigrate’ in the next few years.

The Koeberg plant recently required a 20-year life extension which faced a slew of problems. Most damning of these were reports that on-site storage facilities for radioactively contaminated steam generators were not ready. This is a big oversight in a facility where controlled material handling should be maintained across a plant’s lifetime. Therefore, even with Chinese endeavours to provide comprehensive training in plant management and reactor health, the skills necessary to maintain NPPs in the region may become increasingly scarce in the region.

The threats or war and brain drain result in an increased risk threatening the region’s capability to maintain safeguards. The risk of terrorism presents an environment wherein dwindling safeguards could be exploited. Clearly, the building of NPPs in Africa increase the overall risk of proliferation.

Despite increased risk, African nations in general maintain great relationships with the IAEA, particularly through their agricultural and mining industries. Not only that, but the resulting energy stability NPPs would bring would likely alleviate many of the issues that brought about these three drivers in the first place.

Additionally, regardless of motivations, the fact remains that China is currently leading the race in construction of new NPPs, and likely one of the few nations capable of carrying out the proposed projects. That leaves a situation where ultimately, given the global drive towards cleaner, more efficient energy, this a matter of when, not if. And so, while China may be acting as one current partner and supplier, all nations, especially our own, have a duty to maintain nuclear safety. Thus, all international parties need to continue to adapt policy and assess and develop global engagement to minimise the probability of risk realisation and consequence.

 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.