An Uneasy Stalemate? Iran and Turkey Manoeuvre in Iraqi Kurdistan

The pace of the ebb and flow in the Middle East was on display in real time as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited the Kurdistan Region of Iraq on 12–13 September at a time of widening Turkish operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets there, and only days after Turkey’s foreign minister attended the ministerial meeting of the League of Arab States in Cairo. As the war in Gaza rages on, it is important not to overlook what is unfolding in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – a pivotal arena where Iran and Turkey, long aligned against Kurdish separatist movements, have both indirectly clashed through local factions as they seek to navigate their overlapping spheres of influence.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has escalated its cross-border strikes against PKK strongholds in recent months, with reports that it has advanced as far as 15 kilometres into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The PKK has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK since March 2001 and is also listed as a terrorist organisation in over a dozen other countries, as well as by the EU. While this puts the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) under pressure, it also pits Ankara against Iranian interests, as well as raising concerns among Arab League countries about Turkey’s expansionist regional ambitions. Like Syria next door, Iraqi Kurdistan remains a key battleground for Turkey and Iran, and Tehran in recent years has steadily moved to amplify its influence vis-à-vis the Iraqi Kurds.

Turkey’s decision to step up the intensity of its cross-border activities rests on several considerations. These include the Turkish security establishment’s assessment of a heightened risk of PKK militancy, combined with a weaker and divided political administration in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and re-centralising state dynamics in Iraq that are favourable to Turkish military objectives.

Turkey’s Claw Operation in Iraq

On 22–23 December 2023, twin PKK attacks left 12 Turkish soldiers dead in the Harkuk and Dohuk regions in northern Iraq. Then, on 12 January 2024, the PKK killed nine Turkish soldiers and wounded another four in strikes against a Turkish military base. While cross-border operations in the region have been a grim reality since 2018, with periodic casualties among Turkish forces, the proximity of these latest attacks raised fresh alarm bells. Since 2022, Turkey has conducted a military operation known as Operation Claw-Lock to secure the northern Dohuk area in Iraq along its border. And while President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on 10 July, ‘We will close the lock very soon in the Claw Operation Zone’, this is unlikely to mean the end of Turkish military presence in the operational area, including a network of bases, checkpoints and secured military roads to minimise reliance on aircraft for logistical transport and movement.

Since 2022, Turkey has expanded its operations against the PKK in northern Iraq, reaching into areas as far as the countryside of Sulaymaniyah and even regions along the road to Kirkuk. Turkish forces have established numerous bases in the areas where operations have been conducted, with consequences for local civilians and agricultural land. In northeastern Syria, the TAF has targeted key infrastructure, and it makes no distinction between Iraq and Syria in its fight against PKK-linked terrorism. 

The current Turkish operation in Iraq, which has been conducted below the threshold of a ground invasion, aims to degrade the PKK and deprive it of forward bases, and to prevent insurgents from reoccupying areas that have been cleared. This entails pushing PKK fighters southwards and away from the border, using a series of operations that leverage Turkey's advanced military capabilities, such as surveillance and air superiority. 

The recent phase of Turkish operations has been localised, aiming to secure the Matin mountains within the Amedi district north of Dohuk in northern Iraq. The area is significant because it is crucial for any future operations in the larger Gara mountain range, where the PKK has established a network of sophisticated bases. Gara's strategic importance stems from its central location, linking Qandil with Syria, Turkey and Sinjar. 

The PKK established a foothold in Sinjar in 2014 when so-called Islamic State attacked the local Yazidi peoples in a genocidal campaign, leading to mass civilian casualties and atrocities. The region has been penetrated by a medley of groups, including Iran-backed Shiite militias and Yazidi armed groups linked to the PKK. Sinjar is a crucial supply line that allows transit for the PKK across Iraq and Syria; losing its access will lessen the influence it holds in northeastern Syria.

The PKK’s Posture in Iraq

Three regions stand out for their strategic significance for the PKK: Mahmur, Sinjar and the so-called Medya Defence Zones. Having evolved over four decades, these enclaves represent strategic assets for the organisation, following its shift from bases in Syria and Lebanon to northern Iraq. Over time, the PKK expanded into civilian areas by expanding into cities, towns and villages through social, political and economic structures, giving it access to material assets and overland smuggling routes in the borderlands.

Turkish pressure and shifting realities on the ground have rendered Baghdad and Erbil more pliable on the question of the PKK in recent years. The central government’s formal ban of the group – which falls short of the terrorist designation Ankara wanted – is more than a symbolic gesture. Iraqi officials have warned against the possibility of PKK-linked attacks on oil refineries and other critical national infrastructure, an indication that Ankara has made strides in persuading Baghdad that the organisation poses a risk to Iraqi national interests.

At the same time, the PKK’s slow and steady encroachment into civilian areas, infringing upon the territorial authority of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has triggered a legitimacy crisis at a time when the latter is already under pressure from Baghdad and local opponents. The PKK maintains a presence in the area of Sinjar, despite the agreement in October 2020 between the central government and the KRG that calls for the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the area. As the PKK’s freedom of movement has grown in the area of Sulaymaniyah, which is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), tensions have intensified between Turkey and Iran. For Erbil, the effect of PUK cooperation with Iran is to hand greater leverage to Baghdad over the Iraqi Kurds and the ability to degrade the region’s autonomy through economic, judicial and security interventions.

In a series of setbacks to the power-sharing arrangement that has held since 2005, the KRG has seen its autonomy come under mounting pressure from Iranian- and Shia-influenced politics in Baghdad. In February 2022, the Federal Supreme Court decreed that the KRG’s 2007 natural resource law was unconstitutional and its oil exports and contracts illegal. This was followed in January 2023 by a ruling against new federal budget transfers to the Kurdistan region. In March 2023, the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce ruled in favour of Iraq in a decade-long arbitration case that led to the Iraq–Turkey pipeline closure, which remains unresolved. In a further blow, in a February 2024 decision, the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq ruled that the KRG must hand over control of its finances to the federal government.

The war in Gaza has amplified the role of various Iran-aligned Shia militias in Iraq, a patchwork of ideologically like-minded groups that have been called to action against US military targets since the 7 October attacks on Israel. Iran views Turkey’s sizeable military footprint as a threat to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ and Shia militias’ areas of operation inside northern Iraq and the border areas. To prevent Turkey from regaining a foothold in areas like Mosul and Kirkuk, and to degrade its existing influence over Erbil and Duhok, Iran has both targeted the KDP in ways that are a throwback to the dynamics which defined the region in the 1990s, as well as engaged with it in recent months. 

In the mid-1990s, as US influence receded from northern Iraq, a delicate balance of power took shape among the region's key players. Turkey threw its weight behind the KDP, while Iran lent support to the PUK. Meanwhile, the PKK entrenched itself in the rugged, mountainous terrain along the Turkish-Iraqi border – territory neither the KDP nor the PUK could decisively control. During this period, the PKK forged strategic ties with the PUK, a relationship that shaped the insurgent dynamics of the region for years to come. The PKK has historically moved to exploit local fractures for its own survival. 

Re-centralisation Dynamics in Iraq 

Since the unsuccessful independence referendum held in 2017, the KRG has seen its authority weakened by the federal government in Baghdad through political manoeuvres and tools of lawfare, a series of judicial decisions that Iraqi Kurds believe have incrementally eroded the region’s constitutionally mandated autonomy. 

While Ankara benefits from closer security cooperation with the KDP, it has simultaneously benefited from the centralising dynamics that have transferred greater control to the central government at the expense of the KRG’s constitutionally mandated autonomy. Iraq continues to be a key foreign policy and security priority for Turkey, as evidenced by a series of high-level meetings in quick succession early this year. On 14 March, the Turkish defence and foreign ministers and the head of the National Intelligence Organisation visited Baghdad. A Turkish diplomatic win came in March ahead of Erdogan’s visit to Iraq on 22 April 2024 – the first in 12 years – when the government of Iraq designated the PKK a ‘banned’ group on Iraqi soil, effectively rendering the activities of the group illegal inside Iraq and clearing the path for Iraqi state forces (in principle, at least) to pursue, prosecute and punish militants.

On 21 July, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani inaugurated a 115-km power transmission line that had been stalled for 20 years, running through the Kisik station west of Mosul to supply the provinces of Nineveh, Salahuddin and Kirkuk with a capacity of 300 megawatts. This dwarfs in comparison to the proposed $20 billion Iraq Development Road project, a landmark network of railways and highways that will alter existing supply chains and link Asia to European markets via Basra and overland via Turkey. The proposed transit route will traverse through Mosul, the outskirts of Kirkuk, areas of Islamic State cell activity as well as PKK presence, and clearing this insurgent-held territory is essential to minimising the chances of disruption or sabotage. The project will not effectively counter growing Iranian hegemony in Iraq. On the contrary, the route will run through territory that is under Iran's influence, and if Tehran wants to block it, it probably can. 

The PKK is unsettled by the deepening rapprochement between its adversary and the Iraqi government, and for good reason. Northern Iraq has long served as a strategic haven for the group, providing a safe zone for its leadership, military assets, and logistical networks. Any disruption to this sanctuary would have cascading effects across the PKK’s operations, both in Iraq and Syria. 

Iran’s Role

Iraq has become even more critical for Iran against the backdrop of the Gaza war. Iraq is a critical node in the highly networked supply chains of logistical and financial support that feed not only the militia there, but also Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and militias in Syria. Iraqi Kurdistan is important for Iran as it seeks to limit the activities of armed Iranian Kurdish groups such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komeleh and the Free Life Party, consolidate its influence over the country, and apply pressure on Turkey.

The KDP accuses the PUK of engaging in opaque relations with Baghdad, Tehran and Shiite groups, as worries mount that the increasing influence of the PUK may result in a growing Iranian dominance over the KRG. The KDP initially attempted to counterbalance the alliance between the PUK and Iran-linked Shiite groups by converging with Sunni Arab factions and Muqtada al-Sadr, but this failed as Iran successfully downgraded al-Sadr’s influence and divided the Sunni Arab coalition. 

On 15 January 2024, Iran's Revolutionary Guards claimed to have targeted an Israeli ‘espionage headquarters’ near the US consulate in Erbil, with Iran-backed Iraqi militias having made similar claims following strikes conducted in December 2023. Iranian sources claimed the attacks were in retaliation for Israel’s role in targeting commanders of the ‘Axis of Resistance’. Four were killed, including a prominent Iraqi Kurdish businessman. 

As he has consolidated his leadership over the PUK, Bafel Talabani has grown closer to Iran. But he is not alone. In early May, President of the Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani paid an official visit to Tehran, in an attempt to recover from the January strikes and to balance interests between Turkey and Iran. Shortly after his return, the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court issued a ruling that favoured Masrour Barzani’s formal objection to the election law that altered the distribution of seats and the minority quota in the Kurdish parliament. The KDP will be cautious about confronting Iran-linked militia because the stakes are so high. Antagonising Iran may lead to unforeseen circumstances that will work against its claim to ensure stability as the governing party.

In June, three Iranian Kurdish armed groups under the ‘Komeleh’ umbrella were relocated to a ‘less accessible’ camp in Iraqi Kurdistan, restricting their activities, logistical access to weapons and supplies. This stems from a security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran signed in March 2023 that saw Iraqi Kurds push several armed factions away from the Iranian border in order to comply with Tehran’s demands. In July, Nechirvan Barzani attended the inauguration ceremony of President Pezeshkian.

These overtures seem to have paid off. On 12 September, Pezeshkian visited Erbil (after touching down in Baghdad) on his first overseas visit since taking office, showcasing the level of priority given to a neighbour that Tehran wields significant influence over and extracts considerable value from. Pezeshkian also visited Sulaymaniyah, effectively acknowledging that the Kurdistan Region has two centres of authority.

The outcome of the region’s parliamentary elections, which look to be finally going ahead on 20 October, will impact these dynamics. If the KRG is fragmented further, or the results are disputed by either of the major parties leading to instability, this will impact the federal balance of power in Iraq, as well as complicate US and allied interests in the region. Ankara may opt to take steps to prevent the KDP from falling under Iranian control, a scenario that would curtail the manoeuvrability of Turkey’s counterterrorism operations. One possibility would be supporting the KDP to strengthen the local economy in order to stem popular discontent, which may include building momentum towards finally reopening the oil pipeline to Turkey.

As US forces prepare to withdraw from Iraq, the scramble to fill the inevitable void has long been underway. The increased activity of local and regional actors needs to be read within the context of a future US withdrawal, or rather, drawdown. Instability in the Kurdistan Region, and increased Iranian infiltration, does not bode well for wider Western interests in the Middle East, especially given the current fragility in the region. Curtailing Iranian influence is a persistent concern, which is ever more pressing – and simultaneously difficult – given Tehran’s deeply embedded networks and vested interests across the rest of Iraq.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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