Turkey: Rough at Home, Essential on the Global Stage

As of today, Turkish domestic politics is primarily driven by foreign policy dynamics.

On the morning of 19 March the Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem İmamoğlu was taken into custody, along with his close associates, on charges of corruption and alleged links to terrorist activities, immediately before İmamoğlu was set to participate in the primary election within his party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), for the presidential candidacy.

There followed four days of interrogation – with the attention of international media closely following developments in Turkey - before the Mayor of Istanbul was formally arrested.

The events sparked demonstrations from young people dissatisfied with such actions by the ruling government of Turkey’s long-lasting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with the protests resulting in the detention of numerous individuals.

But, even before his arrest legal, measures had effectively rendered İmamoğlu ineligible to run for the presidency of Turkey in the next elections, as his Istanbul University diploma – obtained 31 years ago – had been revoked due to alleged irregularities in his transfer to a university in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Meanwhile, CHP leader Özgür Özel publicly expressed, across various national and international platforms, that they had been left isolated by world leaders throughout this process.

Although these events, including the street protests, may appear to be solely related to Turkey’s domestic politics, their underlying causes are deeply tied to the broader geopolitical turbulence and Turkey’s strategic positioning within this evolving global disorder. Correspondingly, the trajectory of this crisis – and Turkey’s political future – will be shaped by how international actors that are engaged with Turkey choose to position themselves.

Experts analysing these developments tend to cluster around two primary perspectives. The first group argues that Turkey is rapidly moving toward an authoritarian governance model like Putin’s Russia. However, they remain cautiously optimistic that Turkey’s long-standing democratic experience since the Ottoman Empire period, its younger generations integrated with the Western values, and its fragile economy may ultimately prevent a full autocratic shift.

Analysts within this group also contend that President Erdoğan, whose popularity has been declining in recent polls, may struggle to sustain his increasingly repressive policies in the long run.

The second group of experts, by contrast, asserts that street protests are unlikely to be sustainable, predicting that the angry crowds will gradually lose momentum and that Ekrem İmamoğlu and his associates will eventually fade from public memory. At this point, it is difficult to determine which of these two perspectives will prove to be correct.

However, one must not overlook the fact that, although Istanbul is significantly larger, similar patterns of repression have long been observed in Turkey, particularly in the Kurdish-majority regions. In these areas, mayors have frequently been removed from office and imprisoned on various charges.

Moreover, Selahattin Demirtaş, a prominent figure in the Kurdish political movement and a former presidential candidate, has been imprisoned for years. Undoubtedly, İmamoğlu represents a far more popular figure and a greater political threat to Erdoğan’s government than these previous cases. However, the recent events surrounding his arrest can be understood as a more prominent iteration of a well-established pattern of political repression in Turkey.

Undoubtedly, behind all these developments lays the power of a government that has successfully established hegemonic control over all state apparatuses in recent years. Given this reality, it would be overly naïve to assume that İmamoğlu’s trial will be brief. However, two critical questions must be addressed at this point.

First, if the elections proceed on schedule and are not held until 2028, why has Erdoğan decided to act now?

Second, as highlighted by CHP leader Özgür Özel, why have world leaders refrained from explicitly supporting İmamoğlu?

Answering such questions requires an analysis that first considers Turkey’s domestic political landscape from Ankara’s perspective. Turkey holds several strategic advantages in the evolving landscape: its position on the Kurdish issue within its involvement in Syria; the implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the situation in Gaza; Turkey’s current role within the European security architecture; and its potential function as a bridge in the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry.

Control Over Syria and Resolving the Kurdish Issue

On February 27, a statement was initiated by the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli – the unofficial coalition partner of President Erdoğan – suggesting that the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, should convene a PKK congress to dissolve the organization.

This cannot be explained solely within the framework of Turkey’s domestic politics. The prospect of a potential US confrontation with Iran necessitates stabilizing certain regional tensions, which would inevitably expand Washington’s strategic manoeuvring space.

The principal agreement reached between Ahmed Esh-Shara – Syria’s de facto leader - and the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, signals an even broader transformation, whereby Kurdish groups in the region are increasingly positioned as recognized political entities within their respective states.

This development appears to be among the tacitly established rules of the emerging geopolitical order. Considering Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s discussions with his US counterpart, Marco Rubio, regarding Turkey’s potential assumption of responsibility for the control of ISIS detainees in northern Syria, it becomes evident that resolving Turkey’s longstanding Kurdish issue has become an urgent necessity.

While the resolution of the Kurdish issue ideally requires democratization as a fundamental principle, both the Kurdish factions and the Turkish state appear willing to compromise on this front in accordance with a neo-realist perspective that prioritizes survival. This strategic calculus partly explains the Kurdish political movement’s relatively restrained approach to the İmamoğlu case in domestic politics.

Given this context, it is plausible that Kurdish political actors, through a series of multidimensional agreements with Erdoğan, may ultimately facilitate his retention of power – either through electoral means or by supporting constitutional amendments that enable an extended presidency.

The combination of direct and indirect US incentives, Turkey’s evolving patron-client relationship with the Syrian government, and the internal political calculations of key actors currently work to the advantage of the Erdoğan administration.

Turkey’s as a Peacekeeping Force in Ukraine and Black Sea Security

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, Erdoğan has remained the only NATO leader to engage in coordinated diplomacy with both Zelensky and Putin. Turkey even managed to bring Russian and Ukrainian officials together at the same negotiation table for the first time during the 2022 Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

However, despite Ankara’s strong desire to act as a mediator and host peace talks, these efforts have not been sufficient to grant Turkey an official role in the negotiation process. The United States has already delegated this responsibility to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Given the broader distrust among the Arab world – excluding Qatar – toward Erdoğan’s administration, Turkey is unlikely to play a direct role in the peace process. That said, this does not preclude Turkey from having an indirect influence.

In this context, Turkey is expected to contribute significantly to the anticipated 100,000-strong peacekeeping force in Ukraine. Historically, the Turkish military has demonstrated its capabilities in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Afghanistan, often outperforming its European counterparts.

Turkey is also one of the key actors in Black Sea security, a topic that will be central to peace negotiations. Its strategic position in ensuring the safety of commercial shipping, controlling the straits, and facilitating grain and other food shipments makes Ankara an essential player.

Given these factors, both Western and Russian actors will likely choose to work with Turkey’s current foreign policy architects during and after the Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations.

Erdoğan’s Stance on Gaza

President Erdoğan has positioned himself as a vocal and enduring advocate for the Palestinian cause, frequently using rhetoric that resonates with Muslim communities worldwide via its transnational state apparatus such as Diyanet (the Presidency of Religious Affairs).

His government maintains close ties with Hamas, which Turkey does not recognize as a terrorist organization, unlike the United States and the European Union. Erdoğan’s discourse often portrays Turkey as a protector of oppressed Muslims, a stance that strengthens his appeal in the Middle East while simultaneously complicating Ankara’s relations with the West.

Despite his strong pro-Palestinian rhetoric, Erdoğan has historically pursued a pragmatic foreign policy, balancing his support for Hamas with efforts to maintain economic and diplomatic ties with Western nations.

Turkey has played a mediatory role in various regional conflicts, and Erdoğan likely sees an opportunity to position himself as a key negotiator between Hamas and the West. Given the lack of alternative intermediaries with access to both sides, Erdoğan may seek to leverage his unique position to extract concessions from Western powers while maintaining his influence in the Muslim world.

This geopolitical calculation also affects Western attitudes toward Turkish domestic politics. While many Western leaders view Ekrem İmamoğlu, the opposition’s most prominent figure, as a more predictable and EU-aligned leader, they have been reluctant to overtly support him.

Aligning with İmamoğlu could risk alienating Erdoğan at a time when his role in mediating the Gaza crisis remains uncertain. As a result, the West may adopt a cautious approach, avoiding strong backing for İmamoğlu to prevent jeopardizing the fragile yet strategically significant relationship with Erdoğan.

Turkey’s Role in the European Security Architecture

With the arrival of Trump’s administration, it became clear that there would be a significant shift in the US’ traditional Euro-Atlantic security approach. According to some experts, even if the US halts global developments and focuses solely on investing in European defence, it would take 7-10 years for the continent to match the US’ current status.

However, Europe needs to defend itself and its allies from regions ranging from North Africa to the Caucasus, the Balkans to the Arctic and requires not only the acquisition of weapons but also to provide arms through sales, as well as establishing reliable partnerships.

In other words, while Europe needs to sell Eurofighters, it also needs to purchase drones. Similarly, in regions like Somalia or Ethiopia, which would be more challenging for Europe to access, it requires the actors already present there.

Turkey is currently the country best positioned geographically and geostrategically to meet these needs. Moreover, while there have not been significant developments, Turkey began unofficially engaging in Cyprus negotiations for the first time since 2017.

The Intensifying US-China Rivalry

In the intensifying rivalry between the US and China, Turkey is well-positioned to play a pragmatic role as an economic intermediary and balance factor. As the two global powers engage in a multifaceted competition spanning trade, technology, and security, Turkey’s strategic location and geopolitical leverage allow it to facilitate economic negotiations and offer alternative pathways for cooperation.

Turkey’s capacity to act as a bridge stem from its unique position in global trade routes, its role in regional energy supply, and its growing economic influence, which enables it to maintain beneficial relations with both powers.

One of the key areas where Turkey’s role could prove indispensable is data security and digital infrastructure. With both the US and China vying for dominance in emerging technologies such as 5G and artificial intelligence, Turkey could serve as a neutral ground for technological cooperation and data security agreements, creating a space where both powers can engage without compromising their respective national security concerns.

By leveraging its position within NATO and its established relations with China, Turkey could foster a conducive environment for dialogue, minimizing direct confrontation between the two global giants. Moreover, in regions where US and Chinese interests collide – such as in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa – Turkey could act as a balancing force.

Its involvement in these areas, particularly through its military presence and economic investments, allows Turkey to influence the outcomes of disputes between the two powers, ensuring that neither side gains an overwhelming advantage.

Turkey’s role as a regional stabilizer becomes increasingly valuable as both the US and China seek to expand their influence but find themselves at odds over issues like trade routes, energy supplies, and security arrangements.

Turkey’s Future cannot be Viewed Separately from the World

Considering these explanations, it may seem that for Erdoğan the world, the moon, and the sun are perfectly aligned. However, as a fundamental rule in social sciences, when you exert excessive pressure on society, an unexpected eruption may occur from an unlikely source – this remains a very real possibility. Yet, today’s world is unfortunately far beyond a place where moral superiority is the primary consideration.

In the case of Ekrem İmamoğlu, I believe world leaders are approaching the issue with an excessive level of caution for this very reason. Policy makers sitting in the Washington, London, or Brussels seem, at this moment, to prefer a repressive stabilization in Turkey over a democratic dynamism.

However, the future will be determined by free market conditions, global changes, and the responses of opposition groups in Turkey. Yet, at present, the future of Turkish politics cannot be considered separately from its position in the world and the global political balances.

© Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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