Russia’s God of War - The Political and Military Power of Artillery

In the time of Suvorov, artillery was one of the most esteemed and prestigious branches of the Russian military – a view that was largely forgotten by the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the Second World War, artillery was extensively employed to dismantle enemy defences and, in many cases, to obliterate entire cities. This preference for artillery warfare persisted after the Second World War, as evidenced in the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan and various post-Soviet conflicts including the fighting in Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Despite this enduring characteristic, the importance of artillery in Russian military doctrine has often been overlooked.

While it may not inspire awe in the same manner as bombing from the air, Russia's extensive use of artillery has proven effective and remains difficult to counter. The significance of artillery in Russian warfare extends beyond its battlefield effectiveness. Through history and to the present moment, its deployment has carried direct political meaning, serving as a visible demonstration of Russia’s determination to achieve its objectives, regardless of the level of destruction or civilian casualties involved. The psychological impact of Russian artillery is not an unintended consequence but a deliberate feature of its warfighting strategy. This story starts in the less remembered eastern front of the First World War.

Russian World War I – The Baptism of Artillery Firepower in 1916

Russian use of artillery on a tactical and operational basis in the First World War mirrors the current evolution of artillery strategy in Ukraine: the emergent use of new reconnaissance technology, and artillery as a psychological weapon and obstacle-clearing tool.

The Brusilov Offensive (1916) was one of very few resounding Russian victories during the First World War, wherein, as historians often agree, the victory was achieved in part byspotter aircraft increasing the accuracy of artillery barrages on strategic objectives. The Tsarist Russian Empire was not an artillery powerhouse compared to other European powers such as France or Germany, primarily due to their lack of larger calibre artillery. However, the availability and efficacy of anti-aircraft artillery was limited, allowing spotter aircrafts to patrol the skies above enemy territory with comparative impunity. This has stark parallels with the modern-day usage of drones to improve the accuracy and targeting of artillery.

Because of the increased rate of communication, the impact of aerial reconnaissance does not reside solely at a strategic level, – concerning artillery’s capacity to have significant effect over a wide area – but at a squad level as well. The efficiency of targeting reached through aerial surveillance was part of the First World War revolution in military affairs allowing reliable and accurate delivery of indirect munitions from small unit-based mortars.

Another aspect of the Brusilov Offensive that proved effective for the Russian forces, and carries on to the modern day, was the use of artillery barrages days or weeks in advance of an offensive to create warning fatigue in the enemy. This hampered the capacity to attack only after a significant concentration of force. Longer artillery barrages across a frontline were a common indicator of an incoming attack by Russian forces General Aleksei Brusilov created warning fatigue in the enemy by ordering barrages meaning enemy infantry forces were not able to anticipate Brusilov’s movement due to the prolonged massive artillery attack that preceded. This allowed Russian forces to creep closer than anticipated to Austrian defensive positions.

This lesson is apparent in the current use of artillery warfare with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Considering the psychological impact of large-scale artillery barrages for soldiers in the trenches, the fact that Russia now owns a commanding lead in artillery shell production and manufacture of related parts is increasingly worrying for Ukrainian defences. A surplus of ammunition and available artillery pieces can allow modern-day Russia to feign offensives to draw a larger number of Ukrainian defenders to sectors that Russia does not plan to pursue offensively, thereby denying the usage of those troops in areas in which the numerically inferior Ukrainians need them.

Russia still exploits the artillery’s ability to clear traps and other obstacles to deny the enemy pre-planned kill-zones, as proved in the Brusilov Offensive. Barbed wire, mines, and other fortifications are often used by defending forces to control the avenues an attacking force can utilize for an operation, thereby allowing a defending force to establish kill-zones for the enemy. Kill-zones here are defined as the central piece of an ambush site with the following characteristics: convenient and likely to be traversable by the enemy; contains obstacles to slow advances; and has a large enough area that defenders can easily view the approaching enemy and benefit from an advantage in timing. As shown through the beginning stages of the Brusilov Offensive, artillery was used to destroy barbed wire and other such defences to allow the Russian forces to have a greater number of approach avenues.Grau and Bartle highlight the calculable reasoning achievable when opposed by artillery, as artillery barrages have known ranges, timing, areas of effect, and success probabilities given a certain level of fire exposure. This takes into consideration counterbattery fire, although in the modern era this proves less robust with loitering munition counterattack.

The Russian military experience in artillery warfare in the First World War laid the foundation for the use of artillery by Russian forces: the notable reliance on aerial reconnaissance for accurate indirect artillery barrages; effective use of artillery in psychological operations; and the utilization of artillery as an obstacle-clearing tool to allow for rapid offensive manoeuvres. The lessons of the First World War still apply to this day.

World War II-1941-1945 – Red Army Way to Artillery or ‘God of War’”

Russia adjusted its artillery doctrine with the introduction of earlymulti-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and relied on direct fire of 76.2-millimeter batteries to provide accurate fire on enemy armoured vehicles and fortified positions. The new approach greatly increased the number of available artillery resources per kilometre of a frontline.

Before the onset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, the Soviets had successfully developed one of the world’s first MLRS systems, the BM-13, which provided a greater rate of fire and manoeuvrability than traditional towed artillery systems. A full salvo of rockets could be fired in7-10 seconds and each salvo had up to 48 rockets, with the only downside being the lower sustained fire rate due to a slower reloading process. Hence, Soviet forces were able to deploy devastating levels of destruction upon an enemy in a short time and avoided counterbattery fire through the increased maneuverability of ;a truck-mounted launch system. BM-13 platforms were deployed in the battle of Stalingrad (1942). After the Second World War, the BM-13 was improved upon, eventually resulting in the BM-21, a highly configurable ;MLRS that is fielded by multiple nations across the world, including Russia and Ukraine.

As a result of the rapid evolution of tanks in the inter-war period, Soviet doctrine adjusted to deploy large numbers of 76.2-millimeter guns and 57-millimeter anti-tank guns to support defending or advancing infantry. Unlike the regimental 122-millimeter howitzers, both variants would be placed in a direct-fire capacity where the crew operating each weapon would not need to rely on a forward observer to engage targets accurately. Laddering techniques, i.e., two guns alternating responsibility for firing on a target and advancing, would be used to ensure consistent fire upon enemy positions, thereby denying the enemy time to effectively engage advancing infantry.

The concept of laddering fire is fundamental to understanding the movement of Russian artillery during offensive operations. A potential cause of this shift away from direct-fire artillery implements is likely a result of the means of communication used by artillery spotters: from wired communication lines to radio-based. This development allowed for better coordination of fire between different units with a greater dispersion of information, and as more units were be able to receive communication from spotters it lowered the risk to valuable field guns by placing them out of view of the enemy.

The final notable development of Soviet artillery doctrine in the Second World War was the disparity in guns and mortars per kilometre of frontline compared to pre-war estimates. Multiple Russian experts before the onset of the Second World War recommended between 75 and 100 guns per kilometre of front to break through a positional defence; however, in the later years of the Second World War, Soviet density of firepower on breakthrough fronts was between 150 and 200 guns per kilometre. The disparity between the expected and observed ratios shows the reliance of the Red Army on its industrial capability to overwhelm its enemies with devastating barrages of artillery fire. As Stalin is thought to have stated of the Red Army, ‘quantity has a quality all its own.’

As a result, the Red Army’s Second World War experience in artillery warfare showed the spectrum of improvement expected from a more industrialized economy with a greater productive capacity and outcome – including sophisticated Soviet-designed weapon systems. However, as is clear from the Tsarist Imperial Russian armed forces, this does not necessarily follow from progress toward modern firepower and force concentration. Though the Red Army proved to be far more advanced and sophisticated in both quantity and quality than its direct predecessor, its achievements were based on a direct evolution, more than a revolution, in technology and doctrinal development. As a result of this consistent evolution, the effectiveness and broad use of artillery assumed a political importance, testified to by Stalin who is thought to have labelled artillery the ‘God of War’.

Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) – Red Army’s Artillery Warfare in a ‘Limited’ War

Soviet evolution of artillery doctrine throughout the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) consisted of a conjunction of overwhelming air and ground-based barrages. This was supported by an emphasis on smaller specially trained units to follow up a successful barrage. Underlying this was a tactic of resource denial on an unprecedented scale. The Soviet forces had to contend with a competent and well-supported insurgency in a non-conventional war, that erased the concept of a defined frontline and other concepts central to a typical nation-state conflict. It came to resemble later hybrid wars fought by post-Soviet Russia and Western countries.

As Afghan warlords commonly concentrated most of their forces in positions observable from aerial reconnaissance the initial stages of the war proved successful for the existing Russian artillery doctrine. Afghan forces were left decimated by artillery and attacks from the air. However, the Afghan forces quickly adapted to rely on tactics that spread out their resources in underground structures resistant to aerial or artillery campaigns, whereby they could launch successful hit-and-run attacks on Soviet troops and armoured columns, proving costly for the Soviet Army and invalidating its air and artillery superiority. Afghan forces ambushed the enemy at ranges where Soviet artillery could not be utilized, and putting Soviet troops in danger of friendly fire during attacks that were over so quickly that air support could not respond in time. The Soviets responded by employing engineer battalions to level farmlands and other natural obstacles within 300 meters of roadways to ensure ground troops could spot and engage Afghan forces at a distance that would allow for the use of artillery and air power. While it is unlikely that efforts to level 300 meters to the left and right of every roadway were successful, the fact that it was attempted in the first place emphasizes the Soviet reliance on artillery and established road networks for strategic victory. To this day, close-range ambush tactics have proven effective against Russian forces, as shown in the ongoing Kursk offensive.

Soviet artillery and air dominance were invalidated by Afghan tactics, and the Soviets struggled to adapt to the battlefield. One notable exception to this trend was that of the first and second battles of Zhawar (September 1985 - April 1986), in which Soviet artillery, along with a complete encirclement of the underground position held by the mujahideen, was able to break the will of the Afghan defenders after the deployment of special forces into tunnels. This victory by the Soviets illustrates one of the only ways artillery can be used successfully to secure an underground fortified position. Tactics like these only succeed when the subterranean fortifications are surrounded, and all escape avenues are either destroyed or properly guarded, thereby cutting defenders off from resupply and reinforcements, as was recently seen in the Israeli intervention in Gaza against Hamas. However, underground defence networks can slow an advancing army to a halt until a given position is thoroughly cleared, a lesson that Ukraine learned in the final days of thebattle for Mariupol.

The Soviet experience in a limited conflict shows how a reduced use of artillery can be both effective and strategically constrained, contrasting with the First and Second World Wars, where artillery was the ‘crown jewel’ of a sophisticated land force centred on concentration of firepower. This said, Afghanistan is a rural country where cities or demographic density will not allow for major concentration of forces, the natural target for artillery. When the appropriate situation was realized on the ground, artillery was able to prove its worth once again.

Post-Soviet Russia’s 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars – A Never-Ending Quest for Neighbor Control

The Russian political need to secure the Chechen capital of Grozny in 1995 was defined by the indiscriminate levelling of infrastructure by artillery and unconventional adaptations in operating procedures that included hit-and-run tactics in an urban combat scenario. In the initial stages of the First Chechen War (December 11, 1994 to August 31, 1996), long Russian armoured columns were used en masse in an attempt to overwhelm defending Chechens in their capital city. Chechen hunter-killer rocket propelled grenade teams made short work of these armoured columns, as the main cannons of the Russian vehicles lacked the degrees of elevation to eliminate hunter-killer teams raised positions. To remedy the situation, artillery strikes were called in to level the buildings where hunter-killer teams were thought to be hiding, and armoured columns began to include ZSU anti-aircraft vehicles as they could successfully engage enemies regardless of their elevation in relation to the armoured column. These changes in approach show a key characteristic of Russian operations in urban combat: their desire to take the city or town by any means necessary. However, it must be noted that the negative effect artillery has on communications in an urban environment is a key weakness of this strategy.

Importance of Artillery Warfare in the Russian Way of War

Russia’s armed forces still heavily rely on artillery as one of the main tools to exert power appropriately (as in the case of the First and Second World Wars) and inappropriately (as in the case of the Soviet-Afghan War and the First and Second Chechen Wars). Artillery is seen as an intermediate weapon between the strategic weapons (such as nuclear missiles) and purely conventional armaments. There is no reason to believe that in future wars Russia will not use artillery as a means to exert political and psychological pressure, and express determination, both internally and externally.

Brett Evans studies at James Madison University, Intelligence Analysis Program, School of Integrated Sciences. Along with Dr. Pili, he analysed Russian way of artillery warfare for NATO reports.

Ryder Finn studies at James Madison University, Intelligence Analysis Program, School of Integrated Sciences. Along with Dr. Pili, he analysed Russian way of artillery warfare for NATO reports.

Dr. Giangiuseppe Pili is an Assistant Professor at James Madison University in the Intelligence Analysis Program. He is a Senior Associate Fellow with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defense College and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. He earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele in Milan, Italy.

© Brett Evans, Ryder Finn, and Giangiuseppe Pili, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

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