Peace Through Strength – How is that Working Out?

After spectacular military operations against Iran’s nuclear programme in June 2025 and the raid to capture Venezuela’s president in January, the US over-reached in the war that began with a joint US-Israeli attack against Iran on 28 February.

Having only partially achieved the goals it set for this intervention, the US would dearly like to withdraw combat forces from the Middle East and focus its energy and resources on the priorities set out in the NDS: homeland defence, deterring China, encouraging burden-sharing with allies and strengthening the US defence industrial base.

The on-off ceasefire, doubts about whether the MOU will hold, and prospect of tortuous negotiations with Iran over their nuclear programme suggest that the Iran commitment will be very difficult to withdraw from quickly or cleanly. Having pilloried previous US administrations for getting bogged-down in complex interventions in the Middle East, the Trump Administration has followed suit.

The policy goals set out in the NDS will be challenging to deliver. The World Cup and Cuba are the most immediate issues on the homeland and hemispheric defence agenda. China is stronger now than at the start of Trump 47. US allies in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and Middle East are assuming more of the defence burden, but in all cases, this is work in progress. The defence industrial re-set is progressing, but the $1.5 trillion defence budget request appears fanciful.

The NDS identifies the risk that one or more of the US’ potential opponents might act together in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theatres to challenge US national security. The US approach to international relations and the use of force over the past 18 months has arguably both made this ‘simultaneity problem’ more acute and, by diverting forces to and expending resources in a region it planned to deprioritise, made delivering the goals of the NDS more difficult.

The Story So Far

In an article for RUSI in 2025, your author expected the Trump 47 Administration would pursue a more assertive defence policy than during in the President’s first term, and be prepared to use military force more widely and regularly. At that time, some challenged this assessment. In practice, the Administration’s approach has been still more activist than the article predicted.

Since the start of his second term, the Trump Administration has undertaken strikes against ISIS targets in Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Syria and conducted a significant air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. The US military has also waged a sustained campaign of lethal maritime strikes in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific.

There were also two ‘spectaculars.’ Last June, the US conducted major strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Ferdow, Natanz and Ishfahan as part of the 12-day war. Trump claimed at the time that these surprise attacks, codenamed Midnight Hammer, totally obliterated Iran’s nuclear programme. The Pentagon assessed that they had set back Iran’s nuclear programme by up to two years. At the start of January, the US military launched an audacious, surprise attack – Operation Absolute Resolve – to extract Venezuela’s President and his wife from the country’s capital, Caracas and transport them to New York where they are facing narcoterrorism charges.

These self-assessed military successes appeared to create a belief among the small group of political figures at the top of the Administration that the US could apply military force, at a time and place of their choosing, without any risk or political downside. This belief was reflected in the hubristic tone of the NDS, published later in January.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) that preceded it, in November 2025, spoke of Trump ‘cementing his legacy as the President of Peace’. Among the principles set out in the NSS is a predisposition to non-intervention, which the text noted ‘should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention’. The conclusion of the NDS said that ‘no longer will we squander Americans’ will, resources, and even lives in foolish and grandiose adventures abroad’.

There has been plenty of commentary about the poor definition of the goals of the joint US-Israeli Operation against Iran which began on 28 February, the failure to consult allies and the decision to ignore the counsel of Gulf partners about the risks it would create for them. As of mid-June, it seems unlikely that Operation Epic Fury will achieve its headline goals and is instead having major, global second-order economic and security consequences.

It is difficult to square the US approach to the use of military force over the past 18 months with the principles set out in the NSS and NDS. The assassination of Iran’s then-head of state and the majority of its government, the seizure of Venezuela’s president, lethal strikes against drug-runners and the blockading of Venezuela, Cuba and the Straits of Hormuz are beyond accepted international norms. America’s potential adversaries will point to these examples to justify military interventions of their own.

Wider Policy Priorities – Progress and Prospects

Delivery against the four ‘lines of effort’ set out in the NDS has been patchy. On the first, the NSS described the goals of a ‘Trump Corollary to the Munroe Doctrine’ as being to restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere, protect the US homeland and ensure access to key geographies throughout that region. The NDS pointed to Operation Absolute Resolve as an example of this policy in practice. Operations against the cartels in and around Venezuela and in Mexico are bracketed in the same category. Trump backed down from threats to use military force to achieve US control over Greenland. But it is clearly a fixation, and we should not discount him returning to the charge on this issue.

The two most immediate questions on the homeland/hemispheric defence agenda are the World Cup and Cuba. Planning for security at the World Cup which started last week will have been extensive, with domestic or international terrorism probably presenting the greatest threats. Cyber or drone disruption or attacks will be at the top of mind for the civil agencies and police forces planning security operations. National Guard and specialist military capabilities will be used selectively and be available in reserve. The organisers will not discount the possibility of attacks by individuals or groups – including those affiliated with or sponsored by Iran – being justified by US military activities overseas.

Since imposing a blockade on oil imports to Cuba in January, the Administration has progressively increased pressure on the government in Havana. Citing classified intelligence, Axios reported last month that Cuba has acquired several hundred attack drones and was discussing striking nearby US targets. Cuba's foreign minister, Rodríguez, accused Washington of building a ‘fraudulent case’ for military intervention. There were also reports last month that US wargaming had modelled a military intervention in Cuba to remove the government.

Secretary of State Rubio said earlier this month that the White House's preference was for a diplomatic solution, but that the likelihood of a peaceful agreement is not high. The US has the military forces available in the region to undertake a decapitation operation in Cuba if ordered to do so. Trump will presumably avoid launching any such operation while the World Cup is on, and until there is a more stable ceasefire in the Middle East. If he could be confident of quick success in Cuba – a big if – he might be tempted to act later this year in an attempt to recreate a positive narrative about the successful use of US military force.

On the second NDS priority, the tone of Secretary of War Hegseth’s remarks at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue reflected the agreement reached during Trump’s visit to Beijing last month that the US and China would seek an improved relationship which prioritised strategic stability. In a departure from his speech at last year’s forum, when he warned of the imminent threat of a Chinese attack against Taiwan, this year Hegseth did not mention the island. He said that the US would not let China impose hegemony on the region, would bolster its military presence along the first island chain, and would work with partners in the Asia-Pacific to create a ‘favourable, durable balance of power’.

Based on statements over the past couple of years by senior Chinese and US officials and a series of exercises simulating the blockading and invasion of Taiwan, a range of commentators have pointed to 2027 as the year in which a major confrontation over Taiwan becomes more likely. Both sides are now dialling down the rhetoric. China’s military modernisation continues apace. But it seems more likely that Xi will continue to consolidate the political advantages he is deriving from Trump’s foreign, economic and defence policies rather than commit to a major military operation which would be very challenging to conduct and would harm China’s economic interests.

Trump has moved the dial significantly on the third NDS priority. This author’s article for RUSI from 2025 anticipated a set of steps the US might take to encourage the European members of NATO to assume a much greater share of the defence burden. Almost all have come to pass, including the recent adjustments to US assumptions about the scale of reinforcements it would be prepared to deploy to Europe in the event of a major crisis there, as set out in Oana Lungescu’s recent RUSI commentary.

Most European members of NATO are now spending more heavily on defence and NATO Secretary General Rutte will be working to set a positive tone and agenda for the Summit in Ankara in July. At a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels last week, US Secretary of War Hegseth reportedly threatened to reduce US force levels in countries spending the least on defence. And there are concerns in European capitals that Trump could lash out at countries who have made what he will regard as inadequate progress towards the goals agreed at the Summit in the Hague last summer for all NATO members to spend 3.5% of their GDP on defence. That group would include the UK and France. Meanwhile, Congress will continue to work to constrain the Administration from undertaking further major adjustments to US bases, capabilities and force levels in Europe.

The Administration appears to have concluded that the war in Ukraine is a matter for Europe to deal with. It will continue to supply weapons to bolster Ukraine’s defence but will expect European members of NATO (and Canada) to pay for them. Congress is divided on this question and that will become more important beyond the mid-terms, when some US funding could be reinstated.

Trump has also put pressure on Japan and South Korea to invest more heavily in defence and has been prepared to move capabilities from that theatre to reinforce the US military presence in the Middle East. Further adjustments seem likely as the US continues to review its global force posture.

A different debate is underway in the Middle East. Most Gulf states’ national security assumptions and plans were predicated on the belief that a combination of high-end US capabilities they had acquired and the substantial US bases in the region (which they had very largely funded) would provide both effective defence and robust deterrence. Although US-supplied missile and drone defence systems performed reasonably well, the bases did not act as a deterrent to attacks from Iran. Rather, they had the opposite effect. Iran used the presence of the US bases as justification for launching strikes both against the bases, some of which have suffered major damage, and against infrastructure and other targets.

Due to having invested heavily, and also for political reasons, Gulf states will not walk away from their defence relationships with the US. But they will certainly look to further diversify and strengthen relationships with others (for example, Saudi Arabia with Pakistan and Turkey, UAE with Israel and India, Qatar with the UK and France).

And the Gulf states will all be looking to accelerate their programmes of defence modernisation: towards Counter-UAS and very short-range air defence; integration and battle management (C4I); ballistic missile defence and long range air defence (BMD-LRAD); medium-range air defence (MRAD); and enablers such as tankers, intelligence aircraft, space-based intelligence and communications.

Hegseth’s tenure as Secretary of Defence (now Secretary of War) has been widely criticised, including by this author. But he is reportedly devoting greater energy to the fourth NDS priority – ‘supercharging the Defence Industrial base’ – than many of his predecessors.

In a statement to the House Armed Forces Committee in April, Hegseth spoke of transforming the Department’s acquisition to build a resilient ‘Arsenal of Freedom’. The internal reforms he described hardly sound revolutionary, but approaches like agreeing multi-year procurements of munitions and making direct investments in the supply chain have the potential to move the dial.

It remains to be seen whether he can apply these principles and approaches to larger, more complex programmes such as submarine building and combat air, which have traditionally been very difficult to deliver on time or budget.

In 2025, Trump spoke of increasing the US defence budget to $1 trillion. At the start of 2026 he announced that he would ask Congress to increase that figure to $1.5 trillion for 2027 and made that request in April. Even with huge investment in the planned Golden Dome missile defence system, major increases in spending on other major programmes and the replenishment of US munitions stocks, ramping up spending as quickly as that seems practically impossible. Fiscal hawks in Congress will also challenge this approach.

Outlook

Like several previous US administrations, Trump 47 set out to de-prioritise the Middle East and re-set US foreign, security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. It has failed to do so, and made only modest progress against the goals of the NDS. Rather than taking steps to mitigate the simultaneity problem identified in the NDS, the approach taken by this Administration – including expending a significant proportion of its advanced weapons stockpiles in attacks against Iran – has arguably made it more acute. China is stronger than 18 months ago, and Russia will have concluded that the US commitment to European security is weaker than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Coordinated attacks against US interests seem unlikely but adversaries could take advantage of the unintended Middle East commitment to act opportunistically.

Many predict that the Republicans will fare badly at the mid-terms and Trump will be a lame duck by the end of the year, with Congress severely constraining his domestic agenda. Traditionally, lame duck presidents have focused on their legacies and been more active overseas. If he survives in office until the end of his term, Trump could well double-down on the sort of military adventurism that he asserted he would avoid and the NDS was at pains to dismiss. Based on the experience of the past 18 months, this does not seem to be an Administration that does self-reflection or learning, so we should buckle up and prepare for more turbulence ahead.

© RUSI, 2026.

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