Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy: How the Gulf Feels Threatened
Stoking sectarianism, threatening stability and interfering in sovereign countries: Iran already is a source of instability to Gulf countries even without a deal on its nuclear programme. Feeling vulnerable, Gulf countries may look to US alternatives to guarantee their security.
By Omar Mahmood for RUSI.org
Bahrain - These are crucial times for the Gulf region. The current nuclear deal between Iran and the West has been viewed with much pessimism throughout the world and even more so amongst the Arab Gulf states. What should be understood from the Gulf states perspective regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions is not the fear of Iran ever using a nuclear bomb but of the power holding such a weapon brings.
A key issue that is not given much attention in all the talks about a nuclear Iran are the non-nuclear abilities Iran is currently building, which would likely increase tenfold if Iran ever went nuclear. The greatest threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is Iran’s asymmetric capabilities. The reaction of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia is not one out of vexation but of genuine concern regarding these capabilities.
Iran is currently in the process of developing precision guided missiles, which are more of a real world threat then nuclear weapons would ever be. Their asymmetric naval capabilities are a real threat to the shipping lanes and even against much bigger (and slower) US ships. Iran currently has thousands of sea mines in its possession, and also possesses an array of short and long range anti-ship missiles.
Another fear of a nuclear Iran is the expansionist policies Iran would feel free to pursue due a lack of a serious threat against it if it ever went nuclear. Iran would further heavily invest in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, further bringing these states into its orbit, which is seen with real fear in Riyadh. An issue that has also been neglected is the growth of sectarian tensions in the region which would come about through Iran’s increased political clout if it were to have a weaponised nuclear programme. Iran’s interference in the Gulf states would no doubt increase, which would most likely also cause more of a rift between the different sects and their relations with the governments of the Gulf States.
The Gulf states, apart from Saudi Arabia, all lack strategic depth, which is also one of the many reasons each Gulf states’ policy towards Iran differ. As mentioned in the paper, for now, the Gulf states have no choice but to rely on the US as a security guarantor and partner. Gulf militaries have heavily invested in US military technology and weaponry, and it would require decades and billions of dollars to purchase new weapons and systems from countries such as China or Russia for example.
No doubt the Gulf States face a conundrum, States such as Saudi Arabia currently do not have the power to directly affect any nuclear deal made with Iran. For now the only viable options the Gulf States have are diplomatic and political. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing civilian nuclear programmes, many doubt they would expand this into the realm of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia would face intense international pressure and threats of sanctions if it were to go ahead with its threats.
This leaves the Gulf states with a few options; the first would be to expand diplomatic, political and economic ties with countries such as India and China (which they have been). Both China and India have close relations with Iran and the Gulf states could use this to their advantage.
Second, the Gulf states need to get their own houses in order, to deal with a potentially nuclear Iran. This would require sacrifices, and following through on years of outstanding intra-Gulf deals and agreements which have yet to be implemented and putting aside their personal quarrels. Increasing Gulf military and defence cooperation is vital, coordinating weapons purchases, military exercises, and finding lasting solutions to the political issues that affect many of the GCC states. This will require patience and will not be achieved over night.
A few of the GCC leaders recently met privately to reduce any perceived tensions between them and strengthen ties. In particular, there is a sense of newfound hope regarding the new Emir of Qatar who is believed to be less intrusive and more in line with the rest of the GCC. Oman has always been different in its policies and traditions; the biggest threat Oman believes itself to face is an even stronger and bullish Saudi Arabia, which will force its own objectives on the rest of the GCC states. Many in the Omani government believe that forming a Gulf Union currently is not realistic, looking at the fact that so many GCC initiatives have yet to bear fruit. Saudi Arabia and the GCC states need to address these concerns and begin the implementation of earlier initiatives.
The US should take these concerns seriously and understand why many of the regions states have publicly questioned the current nuclear deal with Iran and view the US commitment to the region, especially the Gulf, with suspicion. The US has spoken a lot about its ongoing commitment to the region, but perhaps it needs to put words into actions. While the options of the Gulf states are limited regarding the nuclear deal, the US should note that the Gulf states are not minor players in the region. The GCC is one of the biggest buyers of US weaponry, and it holds significant influence amongst other nations in the region, which it can use to undermine or disrupt US policies and objectives if ties were to ever sour further. The GCC will always be a major player in the Middle East and a better alternative to the Arab League.
To the GCC states, an Iran once again integrated into the international order, will not change its asymmetric behaviour, through the various means it employs in the region. Finally, a few questions must be asked; if the deal is successful, what does it mean for the future security architecture of the region? What role will the US play in integrating Iran into this new architecture? How will civil war in Syria and internal conflict in Yemen and Iraq play out in the relations between the Gulf and Iran, whether Iran’s nuclear programme becomes weaponised or not?
Omar Mohamed is currently a Research Analyst at DERASAT Bahrain, with a degree in Peace and Conflict Studies with Economics.