Unstable, Uncertain, Unaware – the UK, Nuclear Instability and the Risk of Miscalculation

Practice preceded policy during the post-1945 transition to a nuclear world. As Lawrence Freedman noted, ‘by the time contemporary strategic studies took off, many of the great strategic issues had already been settled’. The system ‘sorted itself out’ as weapon deployments, commitments and doctrinal pronouncements then produced the underlying principle of mutually assured destruction. In 1989, Freedman characterised the ‘twin pillars’ of the resulting global order as mutual stability between nuclear rivals and non-proliferation among non-nuclear states.

We now witness the erosion of both pillars. As potential proliferation and geopolitical escalation coalesce, instability prevails. This presents two interconnected challenges for Britain. First, the UK is the only nuclear power where developments in the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) domain concern its entire deterrence delivery capability. Second, the population faced with this threat is less engaged on nuclear issues than ever before. A deteriorating strategic landscape, disengaged population and rapidly developing ASW field together represent the perfect storm.

Uncertain: Submarine Survivability vs ASW

Among Albert Wohlstetter’s six principles of deterrence was survivability, where ‘platforms which are mobile and concealed, such as Polaris submarines, have particular advantage’. Today, the UK often relies on a single vessel at sea to underwrite its deterrence. Admiral John Gower recalled that ‘prosecution of [ballistic missile submarines by the opponent] has evolved from a core component of nuclear strategy to an activity seen as unnecessarily escalatory’, but he conceded that technological ASW advancements could reverse this trend.

During the 2016 Trident debate in the UK Parliament, John Hutton and George Robertson emphasised that, despite five decades of such predictions, ‘the oceans remain opaque’. While the depths will likely remain as the defence secretaries described, localised transparency could emerge in strategic chokepoints. In 2004, the US Navy suggested employing unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) for ‘monitoring all the submarines that … transit a chokepoint’. A decade later, the China Shipbuilding Corporation proposed an ‘Underwater Great Wall’ with unmanned surface vehicle/UUV systems to ‘autonomously locate and track enemy submarines’. In 2018, Captain William Perkins of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre described the tactical implementation in two stages. First, the submarine passes a chokepoint continuously monitored by low-complexity assets. Second, these assets communicate to command-and-control centres that deploy advanced ASW capabilities to track the target. In 2021, Liquid Robotics pioneered the concept of ‘Wave Gliders for ASW’, a system that utilises UUVs/USVs to ‘maintain position in trip wire or hotspot coverage formations, continuously monitoring for acoustic signatures’, before transferring ‘over-the-horizon … contact reports’ upon detection. This year, DARPA’s autonomous Manta Ray UUV completed full-scale, in-water testing and validated ‘the vehicle’s readiness to advance toward real-world operations’.

Technology’s impact on deterrence is determined by perceptions of the strategic implications of the possible functionality of that technology. Even limited perceived effectiveness of these ASW assets could erode the credibility of UK deterrence. Additionally, information asymmetry in adversarial relationships leaves the UK unsure of the credibility of its deterrence in the eyes of an adversary, and an adversary would understand this. This could prove existential to the UK, as upon identifying the location of a single SSBN, an adversary may act pre-emptively in anticipation of UK action. As Thomas Schelling contends, ‘the urge to preempt – to preempt the other’s preemption, and so ad-infinitum – can become a dominant move’. Uncertain windows of perceived vulnerability of the continuous at sea deterrent could trigger escalatory miscalculations. Schelling’s remedy involves preparing de-escalation plans ‘ahead of time’, and an engaged UK community of academics and policy professionals will be required to develop ideas in this space.

Unaware: Deterioration of UK Public Engagement with Nuclear Security

The UK public is increasingly unaware of these dangers, a fact that is often overlooked. In a 2018 lecture, Brian Toon asserted that – unlike today – 20th-century politicians ‘recognised the dangers of nuclear conflict’. Accordingly, while a third of Britain’s 1983 population categorised nuclear weapons as important, the figure averaged 2% by 1991. During Cold War tensions, fear of nuclear miscalculation dominated newspaper headlines. Yet text analysis this author conducted on nuclear-related UK headlines in the two months following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed references to renewables appearing more often than threats of nuclear escalation.

Toon emphasised that ‘younger generations hardly give nuclear conflict a thought’. In response to a survey the author conducted over the aforementioned period, 100 students and young practitioners within the security domain prioritised cyber security, terrorism, energy, climate change and civil unrest above nuclear weapons as the most important threats to UK security. Granted, Google searches for the term ‘nuclear’ from UK-based IP addresses jumped ninefold as the Ukraine war began. However, the subsequent return to trend within a week suggests that the population believed escalation would not materialise. Ramesh Thakur attributes to decades of cohabitation with nuclear weapons a blissful ignorance towards the threat’s ‘gravity and immediacy’. While the Google searches point to an enduring concern, there is no sense of immediacy among Britain’s younger demographics, despite the deteriorating security situation. Should tomorrow’s problems require pre-emptive, innovative solutions grounded in deep expertise, the current trajectory of lack of public interest paints a dire picture for the UK nuclear community.

The Way Forward

William Potter identified that emphasis on post-hoc explanations – rather than predictions – has created an underdeveloped state of reflection regarding nuclear decision-making. The development of ASW technologies for use in maritime chokepoints represents a ‘when’ not an ‘if’ dilemma for the UK, and post-hoc remedies may prove insufficient. The potential for escalatory miscalculation means the UK cannot rely on the system to ‘sort itself out’ again. Despite this, we are faced with the least deterrence-engaged society in history, and tomorrow’s policy professionals appear equally apathetic. Forums like PONI could prove essential for nurturing the discourse on nuclear deterrence requirements to proactively navigate the volatility, and ensure tomorrow’s strategic challenges are settled before they occur.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.