Why Jordan’s Role as a ‘Buffer State’ is being Tested

On 24 November a gunman opened fire on a police patrol near the Israeli embassy in Amman, injuring three Jordanian security officers. The assailant, who was killed, was reported to have a criminal record for drug trafficking. While the motives behind the attack are unclear, it serves as a reminder of the multiple threats that Jordan faces amid the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. A second Trump administration may embolden Israeli settlers in the West Bank, complicating Amman's fragile balancing act. Meanwhile, the kingdom’s borders with Iraq and Syria remain volatile. Jordan may be more in the crosshairs now than ever before.

The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, secured nearly a quarter of the seats in the kingdom’s parliament during the 10 September national vote. This marks the Brotherhood's first national election since 1989, having been sidelined from political life following Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel. While the group’s electoral success is unlikely to challenge Jordan’s pro-Western and moderate orientation, it underscores mounting public discontent over Jordan’s ties with Israel, as well as the risk that the Brotherhood may orchestrate attacks against Israel from inside Jordan. On 18 October, two members of the Jordanian Brotherhood, Husam Abu Ghazala and Amar Qawas, breached the Jordan–Israel border to the south of the Dead Sea and opened fire on two Israeli soldiers. While initially the Brotherhood identified the gunmen as members of their movement, a second statement appeared to walk this back. 

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has existed in a symbiotic relationship with the Hashemite monarchy since 1945. The Jordanian Brotherhood operated at the grassroots level until the legalisation of political parties in 1992. The Brotherhood’s relationship with the monarchy has ebbed and flowed between cooperation and cooptation over the years. 

The ascent of 31 Brotherhood parliamentarians (out of 138) came in the first election since new party and electoral laws were adopted by King Abdullah II to modernise the political system in 2021. Explanations for the Brotherhood’s gains are multi-causal: low (31%) voter turnout, the use of blank ballots as a protest vote against the elite’s inability to pressure Israel for a ceasefire, and the failure of newly formed political parties to organise effectively ahead of the vote. Of the 38 approved parties – most formed after the new party law – 25 competed in the elections, but only 10 made it into parliament. New parties such as the Al Mithaq Al Watani (National Charter) Party and Irada Party, as well as establishment – tribal, centrist and pro-government – actors were criticised for complacency on the Gaza conflict. The IAF captured the pro-Palestinian mood, especially among the youth and Jordanians of Palestinian origin, translating personal grievances into political protest. The Brotherhood also included some influential tribal candidates on their electoral lists. If this becomes a long-term trend, the tribal-Brotherhood linkup may threaten the monarchy’s status quo. Referring to the Jordan–Israel peace treaty, signed in October 1994, some IAF candidates campaigned under the slogan ‘You either vote for normalisation or against normalisation’. 

On its own, the Brotherhood’s new parliamentary footprint does not have enough heft to destabilise Jordan in the short term. But this is also the problem. The IAF has gained a larger audience and greater legitimacy now. By remaining in opposition rather than governing, it can continue to channel public anger toward Israel without bearing responsibility for the consequences. The country faces significant cross-border and regional challenges, which could be intensified by the pro-Hamas elements within the Brotherhood movement in Jordan. Iran has struggled to gain a foothold in Jordan for decades. This is not new. But the level of military pressure that Iran’s so-called axis of resistance is under is new, and this increases Jordan’s national security vulnerabilities.

West Bank Instability

Earlier in November, Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, stated that he had ordered preparations for the annexation of settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Annexation is a long-defended stance, and he has previously called for the establishment of new settlements deep inside Palestinian areas, including Gaza. The Jordanian security establishment considers Israeli annexation as an act of war. Home to a large refugee population, mass Palestinian displacement from the West Bank would cross a red line for Jordan. The Israeli offensive on northern Gaza’s Jabalia camp has also raised alarm bells in Amman. 

Jordan is not a major military or economic powerhouse in the Middle East and has lacked the leverage to mobilise diplomatic consensus around the two-state solution. Israeli-Jordanian military channels have proven resilient despite a varied and complex threat landscape, but political dialogue has been frayed since the conflict in Gaza began. Israeli right-wing rhetoric defending plans for annexation in the West Bank is troubling. Jordan’s firm position is that it will not tolerate the ‘alternative homeland’ proposal, owing both to the kingdom’s right to self-determination as well as that of the Palestinians. Instability in the West Bank, sparked by unlawful Israeli land seizures and Palestinian armed violence in response, would have destabilising domestic consequences given the risk of sleeper cells inside Jordan, high levels of youth unemployment, and a poor economic outlook. 

Border Security and Iranian Influence

On 21 November, Jordan's State Security Court sentenced former MP Imad al-Adwan to 10 years of hard labour for smuggling weapons into the West Bank. He was arrested in in April 2022 at the Israel-administered Allenby Crossing between Jordan and the West Bank while attempting to bring weapons into Palestinian territory. A telling indication of the precarious climate in Jordan, the verdict elicited a mixed response, with some claiming al-Adwan – who was stripped of his parliamentary immunity – was supporting the Palestinian resistance. Both Israel and Jordan sought to prevent the trial from spiralling out of control and damaging bilateral ties, with Israel having transferred Al-Adwan to Jordan to be tried. The risk of illegal arms smuggling into the West Bank from Jordan is ongoing, although open source reporting indicates that smuggled weapons intercepted by Israeli police are mostly small arms like handguns and assault rifles. On 9 September, for example, 74 Glock handguns and 61 magazines were seized at the Yitzhak Rabin Crossing near the southern Israeli city of Eilat inside a vehicle attempting to cross into Israel from Jordan. Weapons smuggled from Jordan are reported to be destined for criminal gangs in Israel or Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank. A complicating factor are unverified claims that Hamas operatives fleeing from Gaza may have crossed into Jordan since the horrific attacks on 7 October 2023. Amman does not formally deal with Hamas, which is designated as an Egyptian and Qatari dossier. 

If the Jordanian Armed Forces needed to redirect military or security personnel to counter threats on the West Bank border, their military surveillance and security operations along Jordan’ borders with Iraq and Syria may become overstretched. Reports earlier this year stated that Iran was exploiting a medley of organised crime groups (OCGs), militants, and intelligence officers to smuggle weapons into the West Bank through Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel to ‘inundate the territory with guns and ammunition’. Jordanian security officials are acutely aware of the threat that Iran-linked actors may pose through indirect or direct threat activity. Central to this risk nexus are conflict dynamics brewing inside Iraq and Syria via Iran-linked militia, and what a second Trump presidency may mean for Jordan.

With Iran-linked supply lines under pressure in Syria from Israeli military attacks, Iraq may become more prominent as a transit route for weapons smuggling into the West Bank via Jordan. Iran-linked Iraqi militia operatives, ideologically motivated and tactically able to support Hamas, may challenge Jordan’s border defence strategy. In August, Jordan formally complained to Iraq about the buildup of Popular Mobilization Forces (locally known as Hashd al-Shaabi forces) near its border. Iraq argued the Shiite forces were there to prevent Islamic State from reorganising in the area. 

To the north, the porous 360-km Jordanian-Syrian border, infiltrated by OCGs involved in drug and arms smuggling, is similarly vulnerable. Bedouin smugglers on the northeastern front along the border with Syria use well-trodden routes to carry arms, drugs or other illicit items into Jordan. From there, the smuggled weapons are either taken to the border with Israel or hidden for pick-up by other criminal groups in the illicit supply chain. Reports earlier this year indicated the deployment of Iran-backed groups, including the Syrian Zainabiyoun Brigade – consisting of Pakistani Shiite fighters – near the Jordanian border, mainly to direct the arms and drug smuggling operations into Jordan and onward.

Gaining influence over Jordan would allow Iran to circumvent Israeli surveillance and offensive strikes that are restricting Iran’s access to existing supply chains through Lebanon and Syria, enabling it to reconstitute Hamas and Hezbollah. The risk that Iran may use exploit the Brotherhood as a conduit to mobilise local elements against Israel and in the service of Iranian interests is gaining more attention in Amman, but Iran’s ability to execute this kind of influence operation is likely limited, at least in the short term. 

Jordan faced instability after the Arab Spring protests in 2011–2012, the exponential rise of so-called Islamic State, the economic implications of the Covid-19 pandemic, and more recently due to the economic slowdown resulting from the Israel–Hamas war and Israel’s operations inside Lebanon. Jordan has proven it can absorb these shocks, but policymakers and voters lament the downward trend in exports, tourism and foreign direct investment. These trends challenge Jordan’s internal stability, which could lead to a rise in the Brotherhood’s popularity as the self-declared party of social justice.

Avoiding these scenarios – instability in the West Bank and Jordan – requires a just and credible ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages. Officials in Amman note the absence a unified, long-term international plan as a problem, as well as the lack of cohesion within the Palestinian Authority. Jordan has been committed to coalition-building with regional and international partners to advance a political settlement in Gaza and stabilisation in the West Bank. That US President-elect Donald Trump and his close clique of advisors may permit settler annexation in the West Bank is causing fresh concern in the Jordanian government. By opening up the political system to include a range of voices and rejecting a security intervention to curtail the Jordanian Brotherhood, the monarchy demonstrated a commitment to democracy. But the spectre of instability hangs over the kingdom.

© RUSI, 2024

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