Time for an Update to the UK’s Taiwan Policy

The UK has maintained a consistent legal position on the status of Taiwan since 1972, when it recognised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole government of China and took the view that the future status of Taiwan would be a matter for the Chinese people to decide – including those in Taiwan. The UK’s approach over the past five decades has helped to reinforce an international status quo regarding Taiwan that has supported peace and stability between Taipei and Beijing, even if relations have at times been tense.

The UK’s longstanding position is under pressure as the character of China–US relations has changed from engagement to competition, making Taiwan a flashpoint once more. This new situation means that previous approaches designed to support the status quo over Taiwan are losing effectiveness, while the risk of a major armed conflict is increasingly challenging the UK’s international interests. London, therefore, needs to consider recalibrating its practical engagement on the Taiwan issue in order to maintain its principled position that Taiwan’s status should be determined peacefully by the populations of Taiwan and the mainland.

This article surveys the approach that the UK has taken to Taiwan, notably the policy that has been followed by London since the early 1970s. It examines the shifting security dynamics over the status of Taiwan, and critically the growing confrontation between China, the US, Taiwan and its regional allies, and identifies the risks that this represents to the UK and its position on Taiwan. An analysis of the evolving situation in respect to Taiwan, and notably the prospect of a major armed conflict as China seeks to coerce Taiwan by various means, indicates a growing threat to the economic, security and political interests of the UK.

The UK, nevertheless, has policy instruments available as a result of its Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’, announced as part of the Integrated Review of March 2021, that expand its range of options. Given the evolving situation, the UK should be ready to support the efforts of Taiwan and its international partners to build deterrence against China’s efforts to alter the status quo unilaterally through hybrid activities, and the threat – or even the use of – military force. Working together with allies and partners, the UK can reinforce deterrence through diplomacy, strategic communications, military and security policy, and by promoting Taiwanese economic security and resilience.

The UK’s Policy on Taiwan

Since breaking off official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) In January 1950, the UK has not diplomatically recognised the ROC government, though informal diplomatic interactions have continued. The exchange of ambassadors with the PRC was delayed by the UK’s subsequent decision to withhold support for the Communist government taking the ROC’s UN seat. This changed in 1972 with the UK–PRC communique, which ‘acknowledging the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China’, confirmed that the UK recognised the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China.

Official recognition of the PRC, alongside support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan status issue by the Chinese people (including the population of Taiwan), has been the foundation of the UK’s legal approach to the Taiwan issue since the early 1970s, but approaches to achieving this policy – officially ‘long-standing’ and ‘unchanged’ – have shifted as the political context has evolved.

Critically, the widening divergence in political systems across the Taiwan Strait that has developed since the end of the Cold War has increasingly cast doubt on the prospects for a peaceful and consensual resolution of the dispute over Taiwan. Decades after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the PRC remains resolutely undemocratic, while during the 1990s the ROC laid the foundations for an enduring and dynamic democratic system to emerge. The harsh imposition of ‘one China two systems’ on Hong Kong from 2015 has reinforced concerns in the UK that Taiwan could expect little systemic divergence on being ‘restored’ to China.

Despite not recognising the ROC diplomatically, the UK maintained a representative office in Taiwan under the name of ‘The British Trade and Cultural Office Taipei’. In 2015, the office was renamed ‘The British Office Taipei’, and the position of its head upgraded from ‘director-general’ to ‘representative’. While maintaining a legal openness to unification, the UK’s policy has been to support the status quo over Taiwan, including to ‘regularly lobby in favour of Taiwan’s participation in international organisations where statehood is not a prerequisite...’.

In 1972, UK policy was non-committal on the means of unification, viewing it as ‘China's internal affair to be settled by the Chinese people themselves’. Half a century later, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly confirmed that ‘Britain’s longstanding position is that we want to see a peaceful settlement of the differences across the Strait… it’s essential that no party takes unilateral action to change the status quo’ (italics added for emphasis). Following Taiwan’s January 2024 elections, then Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated that ‘I hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will renew efforts to resolve differences peacefully through constructive dialogue, without the threat or use of force or coercion’, suggesting that the UK government’s interpretation of ‘internal matter’ has evolved to give greater weight to the interests and views of the population on Taiwan, and the distinctiveness of its political system.

Taiwan’s Growing Conflict Risk

The UK’s position on the status of Taiwan was adopted during an era when the PRC’s capability to force unification by military means was relatively modest. China’s economic rise over recent decades has, however, seen a growing political focus on resolving the Taiwan issue and a commitment of resources to support this goal, including a massive military build-up. Beijing’s effort to shift the Taiwan status quo through various forms of pressure and the threat of military action has fed into a worsening regional security environment. China–US rivalry is deepening, raising the prospect of a major international confrontation, for which Taiwan would be the most likely trigger.

President Xi Jinping defines national ‘reunification’ (absorbing Taiwan into the PRC) as a core interest linked to achieving the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation by 2049. The 2005 anti-secession law confirmed ‘non-peaceful means and other necessary measures’ can be used if ‘possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted’. As seen from China’s response to the visit by US Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2021, and subsequent exercises in 2024, the PRC is normalising regular demonstrations of military force to apply psychological pressure on the Taiwanese population. 

In spite of China’s efforts to advance unification, successive generations of Taiwanese are overwhelmingly and increasingly unwilling to support joining the PRC, and persist in electing governments representing that view. In response, the PRC continues to tighten its policy, reducing the degree of autonomy in descriptions of Taiwan’s post-unification status, and seeking to isolate Taiwan by persuading countries that recognise the ROC (Taiwan) to switch recognition to the PRC. In 2024, PRC officials confirmed new guidelines for the law targeting ‘die-hard “Taiwan independence” separatists’ (including current or former Taiwanese officials) to allow for the death penalty. 

Under the first Trump administration, Washington’s China policy changed from ‘engagement’ to competition, a posture extended throughout the Biden administration. The PRC leadership interprets the intention behind this policy, through actions like Biden’s October 2022 restrictions on advanced semiconductors, as nothing less than the sabotage of China’s development. The downturn in US–PRC relations, more than any other factor, is raising both the probability of a Taiwan crisis and its potential to escalate. 

The shift to open competition as the basis for US–China relations challenges the US policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ whereby, following the termination of its formal alliance with Taiwan in 1979, the US sought to prevent the non-peaceful resolution of the Taiwan status issue, without making a formal defence commitment to Taiwan. The ‘ambiguity’ was intended to maintain stability across the Taiwan Strait by perpetuating doubt about the US’s willingness to prevent unilateral moves by either the PRC or the ROC to change the status quo (by invading or declaring independence, respectively). 

For Beijing, this policy was unwelcome, but to the extent that it worked to discourage formal independence, it was tolerable. The shift to strategic competition removes some of that comfort, because it fosters suspicion on the PRC side that the US will return to using Taiwan as a component of a military containment strategy (as was the case in the early Cold War). 

While PRC sources indicate Beijing views Taiwan as ‘holding essential strategic and military value to China’, comments by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner lent weight to the perception that the US views Taiwan as integral to containing Chinese military influence. In public testimony in 2021, he explained its importance principally in terms of its position as an anchor for a network of US allies and partners ‘critical to the defense of vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific’. The Pentagon views the PRC as its ‘pacing challenge’, and believes ‘a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario’. Over the past four years, US President (and Commander in Chief) Biden broke with precedent, making repeated commitments to defend Taiwan.

While Beijing and Washington are clarifying their positions, the military balance around Taiwan is shifting in China’s favour. This raises the odds of the Chinese leadership gaining sufficient confidence to resolve the issue by force. US analysts believe the US military is stretched and not adequately provisioned to fight a war in the Taiwan Strait. There is, in particular, concern that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advanced missile and air defence capabilities would make it difficult to flow forces into the area quickly enough to prevent a fait accompli ‘decapitation’ strike on the government in Taipei. While the problem of penetrating China’s anti-access/area denial bubble remains, the US will need to concentrate more effort on improving Taiwan’s own capability. Such support is designed to ensure that Taipei can resist a potential invasion long enough for US forces to overcome Chinese efforts to deny them access to the area. 

During his presidency, Biden authorised new arms sales and transfers of arms (at US taxpayer expense), and expanded training programmes that quadruple the number of US soldiers on the island. Even if the US intention is merely to enhance deterrence, Beijing may perceive larger numbers of US forces on Taiwan as a pretext for the US to invoke a ‘self-defence’ justification to use force against the PLA if it attacks the island. The influential Chinese ‘expert’ Jin Canrong (金灿荣) has written that unification by non-peaceful means is now more likely than the peaceful alternative.

The Rising Stakes for the UK

The growing tensions over Taiwan and the risks of a military confrontation are a threat to UK interests and a challenge to London’s longstanding position on the status issue. As then UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly set out in 2023, ‘A war across the Strait would not only be a human tragedy, it would destroy world trade worth $2.6 trillion... Distance would offer no protection from this catastrophic blow to the global economy’. 

Uncertainties about a Taiwan conflict – how it would develop, how long it would endure, the risk of nuclear escalation, who would get involved, the possibility that it would catalyse conflicts elsewhere, and how long it could take for economic and other relations to return to normal after conflict termination – make a precise calculation of the ‘costs’ of such a war difficult, but most agree that they could be substantial. Rhodium Group estimated the cost of a blockade to the global economy at over $2 trillion, but that is ‘before factoring in international responses or second-order effects’. This scenario assumes ‘a blockade of Taiwan by China that halts all trade between Taiwan and the rest of the world…[but] does not attempt to estimate the costs associated with additional disruptions from a military escalation or the imposition of international sanctions’. Bloomberg predicts a 10.2% global GDP decline (double the effect of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis or Covid-19), costing the global economy $10 trillion. 

As well as the economic shock of a war, the UK’s longstanding interest in upholding UN principles of international order – as a Security Council member duty and as a national interest – would be harmed by a conflict over Taiwan. The ROC’s loss of representation at the UN does not change the fact that an erosion of the principles of self-determination and the peaceful settlement of disputes could weaken restraints on other aggressors, which would be contrary to UK interests elsewhere. At the same time, the UK has repeatedly stated its support for democratic forms of government, of which Taiwan is a leading example. The Chinese Communist Party shows no sign of emulating the ROC’s political evolution, but developments across the Strait stand as a counterweight to the fallacy that Chinese culture and society is unsuited to a democratic system. 

There is also a risk that a war over Taiwan could escalate into a regional war, threatening UK allies and partners – South Korea, Japan and the Philippines – while there is additionally concern that if Beijing is able to seize Taiwan, countries across the region would be increasingly vulnerable to China. A prominent former US defence official suggested unification would lead almost automatically to Chinese regional hegemony, and even worldwide domination. If this theory guides US policy, there is a strong likelihood that attempts to force unification would trigger war between the US and the PRC, with devastating consequences for UK national interests. 

Beyond humanitarian and economic impacts, the US would suffer major military losses regardless of which side prevails, with even a limited conventional war over Taiwan degrading US capacity for European defence. In the aftermath of a conflict, relations with China would remain hostile, forcing the US to concentrate its remaining capability and force regeneration in the Pacific at the expense of its contribution to European — including UK — security. There is also no guarantee that a China–US conflict would not escalate to nuclear war.

If the US backs down from legal or rhetorical commitments to Taiwan, or loses the war, this would call NATO’s credibility into question, inviting a challenge to European security that would a UK response. At the same time, the loss of credibility might destabilise the US alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific, a region to which the UK has come to see its security and prosperity as being ‘inextricably linked’. 

The Need to Recalibrate the UK’s Approach to Taiwan

The UK’s exposure to a Taiwan crisis has increased in step with the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific for the national interest. In recent years, the UK has signalled a growing engagement in the region as the Indo-Pacific has developed as a major source of economic growth but also as a theatre for geopolitical competition. The ‘tilt’ policy set out in the 2021 Integrated Review and 2023 ‘Refresh’ committed a commensurate increase in UK diplomatic, trade and military presence in the region. The Royal Navy’s ‘persistent presence’ in the region (currently two offshore patrol craft) will undergo a step change from 2027 or even earlier with rotational deployments of nuclear submarines, as agreed in the 2023 ‘optimal pathway’ for the AUKUS agreement. Before then, the 2024 commitment to US–UK–Japan trilateral exercises will increase UK military presence in the region. 

The Labour government that took office in July 2024 included in the terms of reference for a defence review the parameter to ‘identify ways to maintain the UK’s defence ties to the Indo-Pacific region, the Gulf and the Middle East. The UK is committed to the delivery of the AUKUS partnership with the US and Australia’. Alongside these security commitments, the UK has joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement and sought to deepen its network of partnerships, highlighting its growing regional interests. 

The UK’s increased military presence and heightened regional interests do not commit it to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict. They do, however, elevate exposure to political and economic risk. The regular tempo of military deployments, with warfighting platforms like nuclear powered submarines or even a Carrier Strike Group (due to visit in 2025) appearing more regularly, will also raise questions about the UK commitment in the event of a crisis. 

The strengthening of UK interests in and linkages to a potential Taiwan crisis requires a careful balance in the UK approach. On the one hand, the threat of a ‘one China’ outcome falls short of representing a direct ‘existential’ threat for the UK, suggesting investments and risks taken to avert it should be capped accordingly. On the other hand, the prospect of a major confrontation over Taiwan constitutes a serious challenge to the UK’s regional and global interests. In the context of rising pressure on Taiwan and a regional military build-up, a UK posture that does not adapt is likely to be read as accommodating to Beijing’s demands, representing a de facto shift in the UK’s longstanding position opposing a change in the status quo that is contrary to the wishes of Taiwan’s population. An inference that the UK is hesitant to clarify its commitment could contribute to a sense in Beijing that Taiwan and the US are becoming more isolated, improving the odds of achieving its goal by force. 

In this context, the UK can best maintain its longstanding position on Taiwan’s status by joining with regional allies and partners to enhance deterrence as the most effective means to counter the drift towards crisis and war. To achieve this, the focus should be on intensifying efforts to manage tensions, discouraging aggressive actions by China, and strengthening measures to prevent escalation to war. Four distinct areas where the UK could contribute to strengthened deterrence are identified below.

Diplomatic: Challenging Mischaracterisations of Taiwan’s Status and UK Policy

The PRC is currently stepping up the ‘lawfare’ and strategic communication strategy that it pursues to demoralise the Taiwanese people, minimise international support for Taiwan, and undermine Taiwan’s ability to operate internationally. One aspect of this is to assert that the 1971 UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 settles all issues related to Taiwan under international law. Another element of the strategy is Beijing’s effort to promote equivalence between its own ‘One China’ Principle (that Taiwan is a province of the PRC) and ‘One China’ policies of other governments, such as the US (whose policy is that Taiwan’s status is ‘unresolved’) and UK (whose policy is that Taiwan’s status is a matter to be settled by the population on both sides of the strait).

Thus, following a visit to Taiwan by the UK foreign affairs committee in 2022, a PRC spokesperson said, ‘The Chinese side urges the UK side to abide by its commitment, stop any actions that violate the one-China principle, and stop interfering in China's internal affairs’, adding that ‘Moves of the UK side that undermine China's interests will be met with forceful responses from the Chinese side’. In fact, no forceful response followed. 

On 30 July 2024 the Australian Senate unanimously adopted a bipartisan resolution rejecting the PRC’s attempts to mischaracterise Resolution 2758, stating that it does not address the political status of Taiwan nor establish PRC sovereignty over it, and that it is silent on the status of Taiwan in the UN and on Taiwanese participation in UN agencies. The UK parliament adopted a similar resolution on 28 November 2024, with one parliamentarian observing that ‘Ukraine stands as a reminder that it is best to form policy on a crisis before the crisis emerges. Incremental changes to the status quo made by authoritarian regimes are likely a prelude to more overt measures, and the best time to deter an aggressor is before their confidence grows’.

The UK should continue to speak out against the PRC’s misinterpretation of Resolution 2758 and other forms of lawfare, not only with the practical objective of involving the world’s 22nd largest economy in global discussions where it can make a contribution, but also to communicate to the Taiwanese that they are not being abandoned, thereby stiffening morale and the social resilience that underpins their capacity for self-defence. 

Information: Affirm that Peace Across the Taiwan Strait is a Legitimate International Interest 

Beijing deploys a narrative designed to neutralise international involvement in the Taiwan issue, insisting that the Taiwan question is a strictly internal matter. The more this goes unopposed, the more Beijing may come to believe it has succeeded in isolating Taiwan and that it is safe to contemplate a coercive unification. To make this less likely, UK officials should affirm the fact that the consequences of a Taiwan crisis would be of a magnitude that such a scenario would constitute a threat to international peace and global prosperity, and to UK security and other interests. The most recent speech by a UK minister on the Indo-Pacific made no mention of the issue of security across the strait at all.

To help convey the seriousness of such an action to Beijing, the UK should confer openly with regional allies and partners on how, collectively, they can best deter actions that could trigger an international armed conflict. To make it more credible, the message should be backed up with multinational economic and military exercises to signal the ability to undermine potential Chinese measures to restrict Taiwan’s maritime trade (a quarantine). 

In addition, the UK should work with the G7 or G7+ partners on a statement recognising that coercive moves to change the status quo over Taiwan would be viewed as a threat to international peace and security, and that any such actions would trigger consultations on the appropriate collective measures to take in response. The UK should support Taiwan’s application to the International Criminal Court in order to pre-emptively establish lines of accountability to international institutions and norms in the event of a conflict.

Security Policy: Strengthened Security Assistance 

As tension over Taiwan continues to build, so does the UK military presence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, when UK forces approach Taiwan, their presence is framed in terms of upholding freedom of navigation. This may send a reassuring signal to the PRC that the UK can be excluded from a Taiwan crisis, rather than a more ambiguous signal which would contribute to deterrence against the use of force or a blockade by the PLA. 

To increase Beijing’s uncertainty, the UK should frame the purpose of its military presence in the Indo-Pacific – including the nuclear submarine on rotational deployment under the AUKUS agreement – as upholding not just a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific, but a stable and secure region, in cooperation with allies (such as the US) and partners (such as Japan and Australia). Further, it should communicate in word and action that the purpose of deployments and exercises is not restricted to training and defence diplomacy. This posture would not constitute a commitment to defend Taiwan, but would require the PRC to weigh UK forces and political commitment in its calculation of the balance of international powers potentially opposing any coercive action that it might consider. 

The disparity in scale between the UK and US military presence can lead some to the conclusion that the UK presence is too minor to count. However, at the end of August 2024, not one of the US Navy’s 11 aircraft carriers was in the Pacific as a result of regional crises elsewhere. The UK is one of only two nuclear-armed US allies that can deploy a carrier strike group escorted by a nuclear-powered submarine to the region. 

A strengthening of the military dimension of the UK’s Taiwan policy will likely be characterised by Beijing as a provocation. However, higher diplomatic costs should be tolerated provided that they are proportionate to greater geopolitical stakes. Consider the example of Ukraine, where the risks arising from the involvement of UK forces (albeit not in a combat role) in a conflict involving a nuclear-armed opponent have rightly been deemed proportionate to what is at stake. Notwithstanding Ukraine’s importance, there is no contingency on the horizon that would have a greater impact on UK national interests than war over Taiwan, with the likelihood that it would involve the US – the UK’s most important ally – and have global implications.

Strategic communication about enhanced UK regional military engagement is not only necessary for sending a signal to the PRC. Public acceptance of this policy is important to building credible deterrence. Without it, the PRC is more likely to disregard the possibility of UK involvement. Absent public support, there is a risk of over-extension followed by precipitate withdrawal. This was the case with the reversal of then Prime Minister David Cameron’s proposal to use force in Syria in 2013. Withdrawal in the face of potential conflict would damage the credibility of the UK’s general commitment to security in the wider region, and in this case the strategic trust of the US and regional partners, notably Australia and Japan. At the same time, the UK will need to maintain its strategic ambiguity over military contingencies and not raise unrealistic expectations, including with Taiwan.

One scenario to explore in this context is providing security for a humanitarian operation. Japanese strategic thinkers are reflecting on lessons learned from the Afghanistan withdrawal to consider a role for their armed forces in non-combatant evacuation operations, to extract the large number of Japanese nationals from Taiwan in the event of a conflict. The UK would also face the issue of evacuating significant numbers of its nationals – and possibly those of European allies – in such a crisis, and planning for such a contingency would offer a practical way to signal UK concern about current developments to Beijing.

Economic: Forget Sanctions, Concentrate on Economic Security and Resilience

Considering the disappointing results of sanctions against Russia following the Ukraine invasion, the notion that economic sanctions would be effective in deterring China over a Taiwan conflict is hard to credit. The imbalance of bilateral economic relations is also discouraging. In 2023, Chinese total imports of goods amounted to approximately $2.56 trillion, compared to total exports of $3.38 trillion. Of this, the 2024 estimated UK trade in goods and services of around £90 billion is trivial from the PRC’s perspective, and the bilateral trade imbalance means that UK sanctions would be a self-sabotaging move, costing the UK more than the PRC. 

Instead of pursuing a sanctions-led approach to deter China, the UK should go further with its efforts to support Taiwan’s economic security and resilience, including its ability to sustain itself under blockade. The UK foreign affairs committee visiting Taiwan in 2022 discussed cooperation on cyber security and countering disinformation, and the Enhanced Trade Partnership arrangement agreed that year widened the scope for alleviating economic vulnerabilities and supporting Taiwan’s military development with dual (civil/military) use components or goods. 

Trade policy should be developed to alleviate economic vulnerabilities, such as by furthering support for Taiwan’s renewable energy programme. The UK can expand the flow of dual (civil/military) use components or goods to enhance Taiwan’s ability to deter aggression. The PRC may accuse the UK of failing to limit its relations with Taiwan as agreed under the 1972 communique. However, as the PRC has itself demonstrated, there is scope for strategic ambiguity when it comes to ‘dual use’ components. The UK might respond as Beijing did when it rejected UK requests to stop the flow of war-related items from China to Russia: rejecting illegitimate external interference in normal trade relations, and highlighting the difficulty of interfering with private-sector trade relations. 

Conclusion

As the Prince of Salina said in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s novel The Leopard, ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’. If the UK seeks to make an effective contribution to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait as it has for over half a century, changed circumstances require new approaches. Despite projecting more influence into the region surrounding Taiwan, the UK is not making full use of a widening array of policy instruments available to deter a crisis that would shatter the international balance over Taiwan and likely trigger a great power conflict. It is time to update rather than abandon strategic ambiguity to take account of the UK’s increased exposure and presence, as well as the opportunities offered by its participation (such as through AUKUS and other aspects of the ’tilt’) in the ‘latticework’ or ‘integrated deterrence’ currently emerging in the region. 

© RUSI, 2024

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