Small Eagle, Big Dragon: China’s Expanding Role in UN Peacekeeping

In the summer of 2021, to mark the 50th anniversary of China’s entry into the UN, Foreign Minister Wang Yi boasted of China’s peacekeeping efforts, highlighting that the country had fulfilled its pledge to establish an 8,000-member standby peacekeeping force, participated in 29 former and ongoing peacekeeping operations, and contributed more than 50,000 personnel. Wang declared, ‘China has met its responsibilities for upholding world peace. Over the past 50 years, China has taken the side of fairness, upholding equality and opposing interference in other countries’ internal affairs, power politics and hegemonism’. He emphasised that China’s active involvement was a major departure from its longstanding policy of not participating in UN peacekeeping missions, which – from Beijing’s point of view –strategists and policymakers had underappreciated for too many years.

By most accounts, the international community widely appreciates China’s growing contribution due to the unprecedented demand for UN peacekeeping. Today’s peacekeeping missions are increasingly complex in terms of the scale and scope of their mandates. However, China’s expanding role in peace operations highlights its growing prominence within the UN. This development directly challenges the US’s strategic influence and its broader role as leader of the rules-based international order. It is essential to recognise that peacekeeping, stabilisation and large-scale combat operations are not mutually exclusive. Instead, peace operations should be viewed through the lens of strategic competition which the US government can use to its advantage while assisting populations in need.

Growth of Chinese Peacekeeping Activities

Over the last 24 years, China has significantly expanded its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In 2000, the country provided fewer than 100 personnel to all peace operations. Now, Beijing is the 10th largest troop and police contributor (2,274 personnel) of any country and the second largest financial supporter, providing nearly 19% of UN peacekeeping programme funding (see Figure 1). Moreover, China provides more peacekeepers to UN operations than all the other UN Security Council permanent members combined.

While these contributions may appear positive for the overall UN peacekeeping agenda, China – like other countries – is motivated out of self-interest to advance its foreign policy objectives. Strong participation in UN peace operations is an ideal way for China to gain on-the-ground operational experience abroad, build multilateral cooperation, improve bilateral relations and advance a positive image domestically and worldwide. Also, China’s peacekeeping efforts appear to match its resource investments and economic interests, particularly in Africa, where more than three-quarters of Chinese nationals on UN missions are deployed. Beijing has progressively linked these deployments to protecting its interests and citizens on the continent.

However, other significant factors may influence China's peacekeeping activities apart from its economic interests, as suggested by data collected from 2012–2018 by Lucy Best. While China has disproportionately deployed peacekeepers in areas where it has commercial interests, investment levels do not necessarily lead to increased personnel counts. This implies that other factors could be at play in China's decision to participate in peacekeeping missions.

In addition to its growing troop and financial commitments, China established its Peacekeeping Affairs Centre in 2018 to coordinate international cooperation and manage its UN peacekeeping troop deployments, and is actively involved in leading peace training workshops and seminars. Through these efforts, China is gradually pressing for normative changes in UN peacekeeping that align with its more technocratic and state-centric vision.

Most recently, China has been seeking to secure senior political and military peacekeeping leadership posts in the UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO), and it is alleged that Beijing wishes to supplant France as the head of the department – a position French diplomats have filled since 1966. To this end, China is building its depth of qualified personnel, as 13 of its military officers have held top UN operational peacekeeping positions, serving either as a force commander, deputy force commander, sector commander or deputy sector commander. If the assertions about Beijing’s ambitions prove correct, China could over time gain the experience and access needed to prioritise its interests to the detriment of US foreign policy objectives and Western peacekeeping norms.

In June 2023, Beijing distributed a short English-language promotional film on its Ministry of National Defense website (and on YouTube) called ‘Here I Am’, depicting its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a benevolent force that upholds justice and peace. The two-minute video combines live footage and animation highlighting the country’s military achievements in UN peacekeeping. While the video’s declarations may seem farfetched to some, it is undoubtedly good publicity. Chinese media and government officials portray these deployments as a positive investment in the country’s promise to support multilateral peace and stability missions. According to Courtney J Fung, China is seen by the UN community and beyond ‘as a committed peacekeeping state, one that recognises the value of peacekeeping for the UN and for its own discrete foreign policy goals.’

Current US Peacekeeping Efforts – Are They Enough?

Since its inaugural mission in 1948, the US has consistently been the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts. Despite maintaining its position as the top funder, the US ranks 84th out of 123 contributing countries regarding the number of peacekeeping personnel deployed. With only 24 peacekeepers participating across seven missions, the US troop and police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have gradually decreased since 2000 (see Figure 2).

Factors that have contributed to this decline include US military obligations in Afghanistan and Iraq, policy shifts in response to significant geopolitical events, and the domestic political environment. In addition to its financial and troop commitments, the US provides training and equipment to assist partner countries in developing key enabling capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies through efforts such as the US State Department-led Global Peace Operations Initiative and the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership. With a total budget of more than $1.4 billion between fiscal years 2005–2022, these programmes provide a critical funding activity to prevent personnel readiness shortfalls in UN peace operations.

In 2015, at the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, President Barack Obama committed to expanding support for UN peace missions. He issued new presidential guidance, stating:

‘We’ll work to double the number of US military officers serving in peacekeeping operations. We will offer logistical support, including our unrivaled network of air- and sea-lift. When there's an urgent need…we’ll undertake engineering projects like building airfields and base camps for new missions. And we’ll step up our efforts to help build the UN’s capacity…’

The summit was deemed a success, with 31 member states, including the US, committing to contribute over 40,000 troops and police, along with helicopters, engineering and naval units, and field hospitals. However, in the years that followed, the US’s commitment to enhancing UN peacekeeping operations seemed fleeting. Several initiatives have since stalled or been scaled down due to shifting US national security priorities.

Recommendations

To prevent China from dominating UN peacekeeping and achieving its objectives in this mission space, the US should develop and implement several actions now to reassert its leadership role in authorising and shaping peace operations, limit Chinese influence, and demonstrate that it is fully invested in bringing peace, security and stability to challenged regions.

At a minimum, the US should support building a bench of qualified military personnel to serve in senior UN billets as proposed in a 2021 Institute for National Strategic Studies report by Bryce Loidolt. Presently, UN headquarters and peace operations deployments are not viewed by the US military services as career-enhancing assignments. However, this attitude may change if senior officers are regularly nominated and selected to serve in key UN peacekeeping staff billets.

In addition to filling UN peace mission mid-level general staff positions, the US should actively seek to fill key operational-level leadership positions such as Chief of Staff or Command Group Advisor. This would be an ideal way to make UN officer assignments more attractive within the US military and to demonstrate to all member states that the US has the requisite experience to compete for senior positions within UNDPO.

A high-impact, low-cost initiative would be to appropriately staff and fund the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). The institute serves as the military lead agent for joint advocacy of peace and stability operations. Additionally, PKSOI develops concepts, doctrine and training to ensure the US joint force, interagency and allies/partners have the requisite expertise to plan and execute peacekeeping and stability operations.

Often, PKSOI actively participates with the UN on doctrine and concept development, ensuring that US values and peacekeeping norms are upheld. In a 2018 cost-cutting move, the Army decided to decrease PKSOI’s staff and budget dramatically. Restoring PKSOI’s staff and funding to pre-2018 levels (42 billets for $3 million per year) would go a long way in expanding its doctrinal reach inside the UN and signal to the military departments, interagency and the international community that the US values peacekeeping operations and understands that they are a critical conflict management tool, particularly in an era of great power competition.

The US rarely makes public pronouncements or consistently touts its longstanding support for UN peacekeeping. So, the US government should develop a comprehensive and active engagement plan to communicate all the ways in which it contributes to UN peacekeeping operations. For example, the US Military Observer Group – the Department of Defense’s focal point for military members serving in the UN – does not have a social media presence, and the State Department has few articles announcing its achievements in support of UN peacekeeping. Frequently broadcasting these milestones on US government social media accounts and public-facing webpages would be a low-cost strategic investment that would enable the US to enhance its image and effectively use peacekeeping as a tool to advance its key foreign policy objectives.

Moreover, formally published US peacekeeping themes and messages may encourage Combatant Commanders to develop complementary talking points in order to foster better relations and increase US credibility on the issue when they engage in bilateral discussions with major UN peacekeeping troop-contributing countries. The preponderance of these large troop contributors are in the Indo-Pacific and Africa – two strategically important regions to US security interests. Better messaging would assist in emphasising the importance of upholding Western-backed peacekeeping norms – protecting civilians, monitoring and preventing human rights violations, and pursuing governance and security sector reforms.

Conclusion

While increasing US participation and visibility in UN peacekeeping operations offers benefits, it also entail risks. The US possesses substantial military capability and capacity, but these resources are finite and subject to ever-evolving foreign policy priorities. Despite these challenges, the US should capitalise on its contributions to UN peacekeeping by fostering relationships and securing access. This strategic approach would help to counter China’s influence, safeguard national security and advance the US’s foreign policy goals, ultimately enhancing its competitive edge.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Military Academy, the US Army War College, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the US Government or RUSI.

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