In Nuclear Organisations, Russia Continues to Wield Outsized Influence

Regulation has an important impact on which nuclear technology is adopted by countries and how. The highly technical nature of the sector also means that exchange of expertise is critical for countries to ensure that their regulations keep pace with technological developments and for nuclear technology suppliers to remain at the leading edge of nuclear safety and other developments. Unfortunately, Russia continues to exploit international fora to extend its influence and has maintained its leadership position in a number of organisations, despite having demonstrated a brazen disregard for nuclear safety during its occupation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

Russia's Leverage of the MDEP

The Multilateral Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) is a relatively little-known body, even among nuclear experts. Yet, the forum claims to be ‘the only international platform that deals with safety specific issues on new reactor designs’. The MDEP serves as a forum for cooperation and coordination in the review of new nuclear reactor designs by national regulatory authorities. Among its objectives is the harmonisation of regulatory requirements and safety standards for the licensing of new reactors, including through the issuing of Common Positions and technical reports. The MDEP’s membership includes countries with commitments – or plans for firm commitments – for the construction of nuclear reactors. At the time of writing, MDEP member countries include Argentina, China, Hungary, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. Of these, Russia and China are the only exporters of nuclear reactors, with China currently being only a very minor player on the export market. 

In January 2022, Alexey Ferapontov – Deputy Chairman of Russian nuclear regulator Rostechnadzor – was named Chair of the MDEP. The MDEP’s secretariat services are provided by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), which operates within the OSCE framework. The NEA suspended Russia’s membership in April 2022;Ferapontov, however, remains in post.

Correspondence reviewed by the authors outlines the ways in which Russia has continued to leverage the work of the MDEP since 2022 to advance the interests of its nuclear industry. While the outputs of the MDEP’s work are not binding on member states’ licensing and regulatory processes and decisions, the correspondence highlights the fact that MDEP outputs inform licensing decisions for new reactor construction. It notes further that Russia’s participation in the MDEP helps increase trust in Russian reactor designs by passing them through a technical peer review process. Such a process is, in principle, a positive thing; however, the fact that all of the MDEP’s members are either current Rosatom customers or have expressed serious interest in hosting Russian nuclear reactor technology in the future – along with Russia's chairing of the group – raises questions over the independence and value of the review process and the resulting conclusions. 

The correspondence also notes that, in the period between 2022 and 2024, Rostechnadzor pursued 'new lines of work by the MDEP’, in response to a plan put forward by the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak in November 2021 for the promotion of Russian nuclear technology abroad. According to the correspondence, this has included the establishment by the MDEP of working groups on light-water small, medium and modular reactors (LW-SMMR) and on high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR). According to the correspondence, participation in the former will allow Russia to demonstrate its ‘high [nuclear] safety standards’ while promoting the Russian RITM-200 small modular reactor design for export.

The HTGR working group is apparently meant to serve a slightly different purpose: facilitating Russian access to foreign HTGR technology – namely, to China’s HTR-PM reactor design and an HTGR design under development in South Africa – which will allow Russia to ‘optimise efforts [and] minimise resources and time’ for the development of indigenous HTGR technology. In light of these benefits, Russian officials have recommended that Russia’s budgetary contribution to the MDEP be increased.

Rethinking Russia’s Role 

The above outline of Russia’s engagement in the MDEP is just one example of Moscow’s approach to leveraging its influence and access within multilateral fora for the benefit of its nuclear industry. Likely to be even more pervasive and directly impactful is the important role that Russia continues to play within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the international standard-setter and watchdog for the nuclear industry. For instance, Russia’s Mikhail Chudakov has been IAEA Deputy Director General and the Head of the Agency’s Department of Nuclear Energy since 2015. He has remained in that role since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and occupation of the ZNPP, despite somecalls for him to be removed from the post. As others have pointed out, Chudakov’s leadership of the IAEA department responsible for supporting the expansion of nuclear energy programmes around the world risks posing a conflict of interest, considering the strategic importance that Moscow places on the expansion of Rosatom’s presence in global nuclear supply chains. Chudakov had also previously served as Deputy Director General of Rosenergoatom, the Rosatom subsidiary responsible for the operation of Russia’s nuclear power plants. 

The potential for conflicts of interest is of course an unavoidable aspect of the governance structure of any international organisation. IAEA Secretariat roles are staffed by nationals of member states who may deal with files in which their respective governments have vested interests. The IAEA’s Deputy Directors General and department heads also include French, Chinese and US nationals, among others. Re-evaluating the processes for the appointment of IAEA Deputy Directors General would be politically contentious, which means that member states are unlikely to open that discussion. As for the MDEP, it is not surprising that Russia is using what is intended to be a forum for technical peer review and exchange for these purposes. Furthermore, considering Russia’s leading role in global nuclear supply chains, it is only right that the country maintains membership in fora that inform nuclear safety standards and assessments – even in the wake of its atrocities in Ukraine. Nuclear safety should not be politicised, as the consequences of poor nuclear safety practices – which can, in worst-case scenarios, result in nuclear accidents – will not discriminate based on politics or national borders. 

However, Moscow’s role in these organisations must be reviewed. Russia’s military occupation of another IAEA member state’s nuclear energy infrastructure and its harassment and torture of nuclear personnel sets it apart from its peers within the nuclear energy sector and should raise alarm over Russian leadership in international nuclear organisations. Furthermore, the strategic importance of the nuclear energy sector for Moscow should raise some concerns over any Russian efforts to leverage multilateral fora to further advance its interests in global – and especially, emerging – nuclear markets. Russia remains the leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Construction projects for new plants are not just a revenue-generating venture. They tie customer countries to long-term involvement of the supplier – in this instance, a Russian state-owned entity – in their critical national infrastructure. The generous financing arrangements Russia offers many of its clients also create long-term financial dependencies. This should raise concerns about the extent and nature of influence that Moscow may be able to exert over customer states, and how Russia may take advantage of its leadership position in international and multilateral fora to entrench and expand its influence in global nuclear supply chains.

© RUSI, 2025

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