Mess Around and Find Out: The Need to Decouple from Rosatom

Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) has contributed to Russia's occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities – namely, the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The company is also a central player in the Russian nuclear weapons complex and at the forefront of expanding Russian influence in the Global South. Yet, EU and NATO countries have continued to conduct business with Rosatom. Cutting Rosatom out of Western and global energy supply chains is therefore not only necessary to address a striking moral dissonance between expressions of support for Ukraine and continued business with the company, but is also a matter of energy and broader national security for Rosatom’s customers.

Complicity in a War of Aggression and Torture

One of the key objectives of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was the capture of its nuclear power plants, both to increase the supply of electricity to southern Russia and as a means of coercive leverage against Ukrainian communities who might protest their occupation and annexation. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) – with a production capacity of 6 gigawatts of electricity – was a key military objective, and the Russian military succeeded in occupying it on 4 March 2022.

The occupation and intended exploitation of the ZNPP required that it continue to operate, and this demanded expertise that was not available within the Russian military. Rosatom staff arrived at the plant within days of the occupation. Given the logistical challenge of moving personnel through a warzone, Rosatom’s arrival at the ZNPP was likely part of the original occupation plan drawn up by the Russian military and special services. A Rosatom subsidiary was eventually formed in October 2022 to take over the management of the facility.

As Rosatom had too few personnel to run the station, the company had to rely on the Ukrainian plant workers to keep the station operational under Russian supervision. Ukrainian workers were encouraged to remain at their posts by entreaty to their duty to keep the station safe and by offers of increased pay. As the authors heard in interviews with ZNPP employees and local officials, when these tactics proved insufficient, other coercive methods were used – namely, detention and torture. Rosatom personnel did not carry out the torture themselves. This was done by personnel from Russia's Federal Security Service, the FSB – mirroring the beatings and electrocution methods found at sites all across occupied Ukraine. However, based on the authors’ conversations with Ukrainian plant workers and local authorities, Rosatom staff seem to have played a critical role in the process by identifying uncooperative Ukrainian personnel to the FSB. This appears to have included both those staff who refused to work for Rosatom and those who may have been suspected of acting with subversive intent.

Another concern for the Russians was the risk of sabotage by plant workers, who were placed under constant surveillance. While the FSB and Russian military may have instructed Ukrainian personnel to operate the ZNPP, they lacked the technical expertise to understand what Ukrainian staff were doing, and whether their actions and assessments were appropriate or meant to undermine the occupying authorities. This would have placed Rosatom staff in the position of making those judgements and thereby providing the FSB with the information it needed to determine which plant staff to detain, investigate and – as has happened in numerous cases – torture. Rosatom’s complicity in the abuse endured by ZNPP staff has been corroborated through investigations by other organisations.

An Instrument of Political Influence

Despite all the above, the company has continued to be a supplier of nuclear material and technology to customers around the world – including EU and NATO states. In 2023, 38% of enrichment services delivered to EU utilities came from Rosatom. In the same year, Russia accounted for 27% of enrichment services purchased by US utilities. The US recently introduced a ban on imports of Russian enriched uranium. While this is an important step in the right direction, the availability of waivers through the end of 2027 means that significant imports of Russian material into the US will likely continue.

Most European utilities operating Soviet- and Russian-built VVER (vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reactor) units have made plans to transition to non-Russian fuel – with the exception of Hungary. In the meantime, imports of fuel from Russia into some European countries have persisted through 2024, as existing contracts continue to be executed. Furthermore, a French company in which a Rosatom entity has taken a minority stake is hoping to start producing fuel for VVER reactors at a factory in Germany. The project is still pending approval from local German authorities, but some reporting has suggested that Russian personnel and equipment may have already arrived onsite. 

Besides the moral dissonance of doing business with a company whose subsidiaries have been complicit in Russia’s war in Ukraine and the torture of civilians, the presence of Rosatom in countries’ civil nuclear sectors should raise concerns over energy and national security. In comparison to the income Russia generates from oil and gas exports, its nuclear energy-related exports are not a major source of revenue. However, the sector is strategically important and has been instrumentalised by Moscow to pursue its political objectives abroad. Rosatom's Supervisory Board includes a member of the FSB leadership, a number of advisors to the Russian president and other members of the Russian governing elite. 

The long lead times for the conclusion of contracts and execution of new projects in the nuclear energy space, and the fact that the sector involves the construction and operation of countries' critical national infrastructure, makes it a particularly effective area for Russia to leverage for long-term political influence. Rosatom-built plants will subsequently normally rely on Rosatom-produced nuclear fuel, maintenance components and servicing. Depending on the contracting model, Rosatom may also train a country's staff to operate the reactor. In the case of Turkey, Rosatom has introduced a new contracting model, whereby the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant will be built, owned and operated by a Rosatom entity. This will result in a long-term Rosatom presence in a NATO country, with control over a major piece of critical national infrastructure; the Akkuyu plant is expected to produce just under 5 gigawatts of energy when complete. Rosatom is also planning construction of two new reactors in Hungary.

Time for a Break

Cutting Russia out of North American, European and global nuclear supply chains is not just a moral obligation in light of Rosatom's role in Russia's war on Ukraine. It is a matter of energy security for customer countries and of curtailing the further spread of Moscow's influence around the globe. Decoupling from Russia will have to be pursued through a series of technical and political efforts, and will require involvement from both industry and governments.

Western and friendly countries must be able to offer attractive alternatives to Russian technology and materials across the nuclear fuel cycle. Some efforts to this end are already ongoing. For instance, the US company Westinghouse Electric offers alternatives to Russian-produced VVER fuel, which has been deployed for use in Ukrainian reactors for several years now. As mentioned earlier, a number of other European utilities that have historically sourced their VVER fuel from Russia have also recently contracted with Westinghouse. There are also alternatives to Russian enrichment and conversion services, as well as non-Russian reactor manufacturers.

Besides the technical ability to replace Russian technology and materials across the nuclear fuel supply chain, Western and friendly suppliers will need to ensure that they have sufficient capacity to cover domestic needs as well as demands for export – not just in Europe and North America, but also in emerging markets. While exact and comprehensive data on enriched uranium and nuclear fuel stockpiles for individual countries and utilities is difficult to access from public sources, it seems that European utilities may have sufficient material to maintain operations in the short term, while waiting for additional non-Russian enrichment capacity to come online. US utilities are likely to have more trouble in bridging disruptions.

Where needed, further growth of alternatives to Russian supply can be supported by competitive government funding opportunities to expand production, as well as assurances of long-term demand by customers and governments. Additional uranium enrichment capacity is due to come online in the US in 2025, with expansions of enrichment facilities also planned in France, the Netherlands and Germany thereafter. In the meantime, strategic enriched uranium reserves should be used to replace Russian imports, where available. The extent to which contractual or commercial concerns – rather than availability of alternative supply – are precluding individual utilities from diversifying away from Russia must be assessed by governments. If and where such instances exist, national authorities may consider offering legal, regulatory or economic support to facilitate transition away from Russia. Otherwise, governments may decide that severing relations with Russia’s nuclear industry and prioritising energy, national and international security concerns is worth whatever commercial concerns may arise as a result.

Growing interest in nuclear as a source of sustainable energy production will also hopefully encourage expansion of Western and friendly supply. However, as China looks to play a greater role in global nuclear supply chains, Western suppliers will face competition. Chinese exports of enriched uranium to the US have increased significantly in the last two years compared to pre-2022 figures. In 2024, China also reportedly made its first export of enriched uranium to Europe in decades. There are indications that Russia could be facilitating some of China’s ambitions. Governments looking to diversify away from Russia must take care not to create dependencies on suppliers who may pose similar energy security concerns in the future. Meanwhile, Western and other friendly suppliers need to look at expanding their market shares not only in Europe and North America but also in emerging markets in Africa and Asia.

Ultimately, continued engagement with Rosatom not only benefits a major state enterprise that has contributed to Russian aggression in Ukraine, but it also challenges countries’ energy and national security interests. Every effort must be made by Ukraine’s European and North American partners to terminate these relationships as quickly as possible, while also highlighting the risks of doing business with Rosatom to potential future customers and offering attractive alternatives. Some commendable efforts to this end are already underway, but there is room to do more.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors’, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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