Mercenary Politics: Algeria’s Response to Wagner in Mali

Algeria, a long-time advocate of non-intervention, has for some time been confronting growing security risks posed by the expanding presence of Russia’s mercenary proxy, the Wagner Group, in neighbouring Mali. Despite Algeria’s historical ties with Russia, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has openly criticised the use of mercenaries in both Mali and Libya. As tensions rise, Algeria faces the delicate task of balancing its critical partnership with Russia while considering whether military intervention in Mali is necessary to safeguard its interests. This article examines Algeria’s stance on Russian operations through Wagner forces in Mali, and the potential implications of Algeria’s response.

In January 2024, Mali’s military junta officially terminated the 2015 Algiers Accord, a peace agreement that had been key to maintaining relative stability between the Malian government and the Tuareg-led Coordination of Azawad Movements. This decision heightened tensions with Tuareg separatists in northern Mali following the expulsion of French forces and the withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in late 2023. Citing hostility from Algeria and a shift in the posture of the signatory groups, the junta declared the accords ‘absolutely inapplicable’, signalling a major diplomatic setback for Algeria. With Wagner’s presence in Mali, Algeria’s central role as a mediator has been further weakened, undermining its efforts to foster political stability, particularly through dialogue with Tuareg separatists.

Algeria’s Growing Concerns over Wagner in Mali

Algeria’s concerns over Wagner highlight a fundamental disagreement on how to address Mali’s instability. While Algeria emphasises the need to address the socio-political grievances of marginalised Tuareg, the Wagner-backed Malian junta has focused on a military-first approach. Despite achieving some tactical victories, such as the recapture of Kidal, this strategy has failed to contain escalating violence. Wagner’s aggressive tactics, including forced displacement of Tuareg communities and targeting of Fulani civilians, have only exacerbated local grievances, feeding directly into the recruitment efforts of jihadist groups like Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

Algeria fears that these escalating tensions could lead to a successful Tuareg separatist movement, which would inspire marginalised ethnic groups across Algeria, Niger and Libya to pursue autonomy. A Tuareg breakaway in Mali could potentially destabilise an already fragile Sahel region, with Algeria's southern borders especially vulnerable. This threat of separatism would further complicate Algeria's efforts to manage not only internal security but also cross-border challenges like migration flows, jihadist violence and trafficking networks. Beyond immediate security threats, Algeria’s economic ambitions are becoming more uncertain as Mali’s instability disrupts major infrastructure projects. Delays in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline threaten Algeria’s goal of becoming a key energy supplier to Europe, while the deteriorating security environment puts initiatives like the Trans-Saharan Highway at risk. These setbacks could have lasting implications for Algeria’s economic ties with both Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The threats to Algeria were made starkly evident in July 2024 when the Tuareg-led coalition, known as the Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad, ambushed Wagner mercenaries and Malian forces near the border town of Tinzaouaten, just 12 miles from Algeria, resulting in a fierce battle that left dozens of Wagner and Malian soldiers dead. Reports suggest that Wagner suffered one of its heaviest losses in Africa, with up to 50 of its fighters killed in the encounter. The ambush brought Algeria’s security concerns to the forefront, exposing the fragility of its borders and deepening its diplomatic dilemma over how to counter Russian-backed forces in the Sahel without jeopardising its crucial relationship with Moscow.

Balancing Security and Russian Ties

Algeria’s deep historical ties with Russia, dating back to Soviet support during its independence movement, have led some to speculate that Algeria tacitly facilitated Wagner’s presence in Mali as part of a broader strategy to counterbalance Western influence, particularly the French in the Sahel. However, while Algeria maintains a robust partnership with Russia, its concerns over Wagner’s presence have grown. By 2023, Tebboune had begun publicly criticising the use of mercenaries, asserting that such interventions, rather than offering solutions, exacerbate instability. Tebboune emphasised that resources should instead be allocated to addressing the socio-economic issues driving regional unrest, as he had similarly argued in relation to the Libyan conflict, where foreign mercenary involvement only worsened the chaos. 

Algeria’s response to Wagner is as much about preserving its own regional influence as it is about maintaining a delicate balance with Moscow. While Tebboune has publicly criticised the use of mercenaries, Algeria has so far preferred quiet diplomacy, signalling its concerns over Wagner’s presence to Russian officials without risking a direct confrontation. Algerian sources confirmed that tensions exist and that Algerian officials have communicated their concerns about Wagner's destabilising role in Mali and Libya. Meanwhile, Russian officials have reportedly sought Algeria’s intervention in negotiating the release of Wagner operatives captured in the ambush near its borders and still held by Tuareg separatists.

Despite their disagreement, there is a strong belief in Algiers that Moscow values its relationship with Algeria too much to let a dispute over Wagner cause a rift. Algeria is one of Russia’s largest arms customers, relying heavily on Moscow for advanced military equipment. This connection was reinforced in June 2023, when the two countries signed agreements to deepen their strategic partnership beyond military cooperation. At the same time, Algeria seems to be careful in maintaining a high degree of independence. While it abstained from the UN votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it also reportedly declined a Russian request for naval access to its Oran base. Algeria has instead leveraged its strategic position to strengthen ties with Europe, becoming a key energy supplier as the continent reduces its reliance on Russian gas. 

Algeria’s Options: Diplomacy or Military Intervention?

Algeria’s current approach to Wagner reflects a careful balancing act between strategic restraint and assertive diplomacy. While Algiers has signalled its disapproval of Wagner's destabilising role in Mali, a direct confrontation with Moscow remains unlikely due to Algeria's long-standing economic and military ties with Russia. Instead, Algiers is relying on quiet diplomacy to urge limits on Wagner's operations, while simultaneously strengthening ties with Europe to maintain its strategic autonomy.

However, Algeria is increasingly facing pressure to take more decisive action, weighing the risks of military intervention against the potential consequences of inaction. The 2020 constitutional reforms, which permit military operations abroad, provide a legal framework for intervention. Yet, such a step could provoke domestic instability and a public backlash, particularly in the context of recent elections and the fragile political climate. On the regional front, Algeria is also feeling the strain of Morocco’s growing influence in West Africa, fuelled by economic and military partnerships. This dynamic adds urgency to Algeria's decision-making as it seeks to uphold its traditional influence in the Sahel.

That said, if Algeria were to intervene militarily, the operation would likely be limited in scope, focusing on high-profile incidents like the Tinzaouaten ambush. The objective would be to restore a delicate balance between the Wagner-backed Malian junta and the Tuareg rebels, rather than engaging in a broader campaign or directly targeting Wagner forces.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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