Kursk Nuclear Power Plant: The Newest Target for Russian Disinformation

The recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast has raised concerns over the potential risks to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), with Russia endeavouring to paint a picture of the KNPP as being in imminent danger from Ukrainian military attack. Yet, Moscow’s accusations that Ukraine is planning to target the KNPP have had no grounding in evidence. Instead, the Russian narrative appears to be yet another effort by Moscow to leverage nuclear safety and fears of a nuclear accident for political operational gain in its war against Ukraine. As it stands, there is little operational or strategic incentive for Ukraine to threaten the safety of the facility.

More of the Same

Since the start of Ukraine’s advance into Kursk Oblast several weeks ago, Russia has been raising alarm over apparent – and unsubstantiated – Ukrainian intentions to attack the KNPP. On 17 August, Russian nuclear state enterprise Rosatom and the Russian Ministry of Defence accused Ukraine of planning to attack both the KNPP and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in a series of false flag attacks. A few days later, Russia reported finding remnants of a drone on the territory of the KNPP, which Vladimir Putin attributed to an attempted Ukrainian attack on the plant. Ukraine has, for its part, denied any plans to target the facility, calling Russian claims ‘insane’ and noting that ‘Ukraine has no intention or ability to take any such actions’.

Following an invitation from Rosatom CEO Alexey Likachev, and citing ‘the serious situation’, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi travelled to the KNPP on Tuesday. At a press conference following his visit, Grossi highlighted the vulnerability of the reactors and warned of the potential for ‘extremely serious’ consequences should the plant be attacked. He confirmed having been shown drone remnants at the plant but did not comment on who may have been responsible. While Grossi refused to attribute responsibility for any threats he perceived to the KNPP, the visit and Grossi’s comments are already being spun by the Russian leadership and media as validation of Moscow’s concerns that the plant is at risk from military attack by Ukraine. Russia’s representative to the IAEA, Mikhail Ulyanov, has called Grossi’s warning against attacks on NPPs a ‘clear signal addressed first of all to Ukraine’.

This is not a new tactic for Russia. Over the course of the last two and a half years, Moscow has repeatedly accused Kyiv of threatening the safety of the ZNPP, which Russia has occupied since the start of the full-scale invasion. In autumn 2022, Russia went so far as to accuse Kyiv of planning to use a ‘dirty bomb’ – claims that were investigated by the IAEA and found to be baseless. By focusing international attention on purported Ukrainian plans to attack the KNPP, Russia will hope to gain some moral ground over Ukraine on the issue of nuclear safety – despite Russia’s continued occupation and mismanagement of nuclear safety at the ZNPP – and to generate political pressure on Kyiv over its military activity in Kursk. 

No Clear Intent

Yet, there are good reasons to take Kyiv at its word that it has no plans to target the KNPP. The KNPP is outside the range of the unguided artillery systems that Ukraine is known to be using in Kursk Oblast, whereas guided artillery is unlikely to strike the facility unless the plant is explicitly targeted or Russian forces interfere with a Ukrainian munition’s guidance in a way that affects its trajectory. As such, the probability of an accidental Ukrainian artillery strike on the plant is very low. As for intentional strikes, any attacks or military advance on the facility would make little operational or strategic sense for Ukraine. 

As has been explained in greater detail in The Moscow Times by Dmitry Gorchakov of the environmental protection organisation Bellona, the KNPP holds little energy-generating potential for Ukraine, and an attack would not meaningfully threaten Russian energy production. Gorchakov notes that, outside of the Kursk Oblast, any Russian loss of energy production from the KNPP could be compensated by alternative sources. Meanwhile, moving electricity from the KNPP into Ukraine would require connecting the plant to the Ukrainian grid – a timely and costly endeavour, with a low likelihood of success. The transmission lines and the substations would be extremely vulnerable to Russian attack. The plant itself would also be at risk of blackouts and other safety issues, likely prompting it to be placed in a shutdown state where it would not be able to generate energy.

Suggestions that Ukraine may want to capture the KNPP to use it as a trading chip in any future negotiations with Moscow – potentially in exchange for the ZNPP – are also unconvincing. First, it is unclear that Ukraine can or is intending to use its incursion into Kursk as a way of generating leverage to use in future negotiations. Doing so would require Ukraine to hold the territory it has captured long enough for Russia to agree to negotiations, which may prove challenging. Moreover, for the KNPP to become a trading chip, Ukraine would need to expand the depth of its incursion quite significantly, as the plant remains about 40 km from the front line. Second, should Kyiv decide and manage to use the Kursk incursion to generate trading chips, the ZNPP could presumably be traded for something other than the KNPP, thus avoiding the safety and political risks that Kyiv would have to incur by targeting a nuclear plant. Considering that Russia has not managed to connect the ZNPP to its own grid and is struggling to maintain safe operation of the facility even in a shutdown state, it is also possible that Moscow may be willing to offload the plant simply as part of a broader exchange of territory. 

Short of an outright occupation of the facility, threatening the safety of the KNPP would be operationally and strategically counterproductive for Kyiv. Any such attack, if attributed to Ukraine, would result in strong criticism from the IAEA, national governments and nuclear safety experts and a loss of public and political support for Kyiv. Critically, Kyiv may also jeopardise the future supply of military equipment from Western partners – or expanded permissions for use of Western weapons – should it be found to be acting irresponsibly or skirting the boundaries of international law by attacking a nuclear plant. While the US and the UK have judged that Ukraine is within its right to use certain donated weapons on Russian territory in order to defend itself, targeting a nuclear plant would undermine any Ukrainian efforts to make the case to Western partners that it is using donated technology responsibly. 

Finally, outright occupation of the plant would leave Ukraine having to manage a highly vulnerable piece of infrastructure in challenging wartime conditions. Even limited attacks on the facility or its supporting infrastructure would pose considerable risks of miscalculation and of a serious nuclear accident. The risks posed to nuclear facilities in warzones have already been starkly illustrated at the ZNPP and Ukraine’s other nuclear sites. The vulnerabilities at the KNPP are even greater considering the RBMK (reaktor bolshoy moshchnosti kanalnyy, or high-power channel-type reactor) design of the reactors, which have some inherent safety flaws and lack reinforced containment structures like those in place at the ZNPP. Attacking the plant or trying to hold it in a military occupation would be too risky an endeavour for Ukraine to attempt for very limited – if any – gains.

Sober Analysis Needed

Certainly, the fact that the KNPP is in proximity to military activity and thus could face threats to its safe operation should not be overlooked. The plant may face other risks to its safe operation, including damage to electrical lines that provide external energy to the plant, interruption of supply lines and staffing issues as personnel flee the fighting in the region. To this end, the IAEA must urge Russia to place all of the KNPP’s reactors into cold shutdown – the safest operational state for a plant in the vicinity of military activity. One of the KNPP’s reactors remains fully operational, while a second has been shut down only temporarily for maintenance. If Russia is truly worried about the safety of the plant, there are meaningful measures it can – but has so far failed to – take to significantly reduce the risks.

In the meantime, the IAEA should take care not to give Russia further ammunition for one of its most effective weapons – disinformation. An IAEA presence at the KNPP is useful, and a visit by the Agency to the plant was not in and of itself a bad idea. IAEA experts can provide an impartial and technically minded assessment of the state of nuclear safety at the plant in an otherwise highly politicised situation. This in itself can be helpful in countering misinformation and disinformation. Future delegations should not be ruled out; however, they should be limited to technical experts. A visit by the head of the Agency carries political significance and considerable propaganda value. While Grossi may be right that the conflict is not ‘the responsibility of the IAEA’, recognising that the Agency’s work does not occur in a vacuum and limiting opportunities for it to be politicised should be. 

Threats to the safety of nuclear facilities in warzones need to be taken seriously. Yet so must attempts to weaponise fears over nuclear safety and potential nuclear accidents for political and operational gain. Over the course of this war, Russia has become adept at the latter. As Moscow now aims its disinformation efforts at the situation surrounding the KNPP, sober analysis of developments and risks and fact-checking of Russian rhetoric will be as critical as ever. 

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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