Jordan’s Stability is Critical: What Can the UK Do to Help?

In the UK, Jordan is rarely spoken about in politics or in the media as much more than an anchor of stability in an increasingly fragmented Levant region. To its north lies southern Syria, where Assad has managed to wrestle back nominal control of provinces by striking deals with warlords who collect rent from drugs production. Iraq and Lebanon, two of Jordan’s close neighbours, are captured states, where non-state actors supported by Iran have taken control, and strengthen their grip on power every day through normalising corruption and dispensing patronage to their supporters. To Jordan’s west are the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel, where Israel’s war on Gaza continues.

Jordan, in comparison, maintains an air of stability, with a stable monarchy and democratic elections. Despite this, Jordan is in a uniquely difficult position due to instability caused by Israel’s war in Gaza and the worsening economic conditions within the Kingdom. Before the 7 October attack, Jordan already struggled with high unemployment, particularly among young people (aged 15–24), at over 40%. Since the conflict began, this problem has been exacerbated by a catastrophic drop in tourism and trade. Tour guides and tourist businesspeople this author spoke to reported almost endemic booking cancellations, with no promise of future work. Jordan’s economic model relies heavily on tourism, and the collapse of that market leaves thousands more unemployed or without income. Jordan’s economy also relies on foreign aid and support, much of which comes from multilateral institutions such as the UN. The withdrawal of US support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is a sobering prospect for Jordanian policymakers, who rely on the work of UNRWA to support the two million registered Palestinian refugees currently in Jordan. In this way, UNRWA, UNHCR and the myriad NGOs within Jordan cover gaps in welfare that the Jordanian civil service simply does not have the money or capacity to provide.

Socially, Jordan is in similar disarray. There have been almost daily protests in Amman and other major cities regarding the country’s close relationship with Israel. There have also been specific cases where protestors have targeted government buildings, a recent example being a protest attempting to storm the Israeli embassy in March 2024. At the heart of these protests is the long-established Palestinian community. Palestinians make up over half of the Jordanian population, and feel frustrated that Jordan continues to cooperate with Israel politically and militarily. Particularly incendiary was Jordan’s participation in the Middle East Air Defence Alliance response to Iran’s strikes on Israel in April 2024. The Jordanian foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, replied to accusations by explaining that the motivation was simply to defend Jordanian airspace, but many within Jordan continue to interpret the intervention as a stance in defence of Israel. In an era of unprecedented social media use, Jordanians are consistently confronted with harrowing images and videos from inside Gaza, further inflaming tensions. Antisemitism is also widespread in the country.

The existence of an anti-Israeli sentiment in Jordan or the wider Middle East is hardly a novel phenomenon, and neither is Jordan relying on foreign aid to stave off economic collapse. However, the region’s fragmentation brings a set of novel and unique challenges to Jordan. One of these challenges is that Iran and its proxies are increasingly identifying Jordan as a potential vector for their shadow war with Israel and the West. Iran has excelled in its policy of establishing a network of dissident groups across the region, whether in Lebanon with Hezbollah, Iraq with Shiite Militia Groups, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen or Polisario in the Maghreb. Iran has continued this opportunistic support of groups in Jordan. Examples of this include weapons- and drugs-smuggling across the vast Iraqi and Syrian borders; hacking support targeting the Jordanian government; rhetorical support of dissident groups; and criticism of the monarchy.

In an era of increased great power competition, Keir Starmer and his ministers have stressed at every opportunity that their focus and priority is European security. While the UK has clear economic and energy security dependencies on the Gulf, the same is not true of the Levant region. It is clear that there is very unlikely to be new funding from the UK in the region, and we can also rule out interventionism of the kind we saw under past Labour governments, as the US looks set to concentrate resources around China. The combination of a lack of resources and the fact that what limited resources are available are focused on Europe leaves UK policy on the region at an inflection point.

Securing Jordan: Actions for the UK and International Partners

Jordan’s long-term economic weakness, coupled with an increasingly fragmented regional security landscape, poses an increasing threat to the only stable country in the Levant. As a pivotal UK ally in the region, Jordan and its stability should be of paramount concern for UK policymakers. A weak Levant region directly impacts the UK through migrationary pressures, the export of terrorism, and the disruption of key supply lines and international trade. So what can the UK and its allies do to mitigate Jordan's instability and support Jordanians in their struggle for a better future?

First, ending the conflict in Gaza would significantly alleviate pressure on Jordan. David Lammy began his tenure as Foreign Secretary by correctly pointing out that the UK has limited influence in bringing this about, then visited Israel, and the OPT, and called for an immediate ceasefire. Realistically, the UK has very limited scope for unilaterally bringing about an immediate ceasefire, though Lammy may feel that calling for one will begin to tip the pressure dial in Washington. The UK government should instead concentrate on supporting the US in its negotiating efforts and ensuring that post-conflict initiatives include steps towards establishing a Palestinian state. Still, while the UK has limited prospects for singlehandedly bringing about an immediate ceasefire, it has enduring credibility that can be leveraged with future Israeli governments. UK officials should emphasise to future Israeli governments the dangers of allowing internal political struggles to lead to breaches of conventions regarding the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and settler activity in the West Bank. Additionally, the UK should maintain and expand its policy of identifying and sanctioning those involved in illegal settler activities in the West Bank.

Second, the UK must persist in providing direct support to Jordan, particularly through government projects aimed at capacity building. Historically, UK spending in Jordan has largely been directed towards military training and democratisation. A shift in focus towards enhancing the capabilities of increasingly strained Jordanian government departments is essential.

Third, the UK should advocate for sustained regional and international support for Jordan. This includes ensuring the continued operation of multilateral aid agencies in Jordan, especially given the critical gaps left by the US withdrawal of support for UN organisations like UNRWA and UNESCO. If direct economic aid from the UK is not feasible, diplomatic efforts in the Gulf should prioritise generating and coordinating regional aid for Jordan. This could include bilateral aid packages as well as multilateral regional and international agencies.

Finally, the UK should engage in regional and international discussions on addressing Iran's influence. Since the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal – there has been a lack of coherent strategy, contributing to tensions on the Israel–Lebanon border, the security vacuum in Yemen, and instability in Iraq. Acknowledging this issue is crucial for any UK efforts aimed at regional stability. The new government should prioritise convening and supporting regional initiatives, in collaboration with the US and European allies, to prevent Iran from perpetuating instability. Iran’s threat to regional peace and security must be taken seriously and acknowledged for what it is.

Jordan stands at a critical juncture amid regional turmoil, grappling with economic fragility exacerbated by external conflicts and internal dissent. The country's stability remains pivotal for the broader Levant region, making it imperative for the UK and its allies to take proactive measures. Addressing the conflict in Gaza, advocating for Palestinian statehood, and maintaining diplomatic pressure on Israel are immediate steps, but the UK government needs to delineate a coherent strategy. While Jordan currently outperforms its troubled neighbours, complacency will not ensure sustained stability unless proactive measures are taken.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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