The fall of Mosul to Islamist extremists poses the single biggest challenge to the Iraqi nation state since the fall of Saddam. Baghdad may not be able to fend off the insurgents by their own, and the United States lacks the political capital to intervene.
The seizure of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is a major milestone for post-Saddam Iraq, with regional repercussions. Iraq is creaking at the seams; the war in Syria has given strength (both financially and in terms of military experience) to extremist Sunni militias operating with impunity between the two countries. As a military-political entity, they aim to establish Islamic government from the Mediterranean all the way across to the borders of Iran, and appear to be prepared to stop at nothing to achieve it.
For the West and the US, there is no desire to become entrenched in another war. Exhausted by the expense of blood and treasure in previous conflicts and likely to be blocked by Russia in any Security Council attempt to authorise force, there is little that can be done save for a message of ‘good luck you’re on your own.’
Indeed, acting on its own, the Iraqi state has proved itself totally incapable of being up to the challenge. With morale appallingly low, the US trained Iraqi Army units in and around Mosul have, to all intents and purposes, dissolved. Soldiers of the Ninawa Command fleeing Mosul to the Kurdish regional capital of Erbil told reporters that they simply stopped receiving orders. Other reports have circulated that Iraqi Army troops in Kirkuk to the south-east of Mosul handed their weapons over to Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces and deserted, leaving the Kurds to fight alone. So bad was the rate of desertion that ISIS fighters took over at least five army installations and the city’s airport. Aware that US army equipment was now falling into the hands of extremists, the military has bizarrely taken to bombing its own bases.
Maliki Strong or Weak?
Politically Nouri al-Maliki’s position had appeared strong. The Prime Minister’s State of Law coalition comfortably came first in the recent June elections, on course to forming a coalition government for the third consecutive term. However the inability of Maliki to enforce security will raise serious questions about his suitability to lead the country. This despite his immediate announcement of a state of emergency authorising him with extraordinary powers to tackle the crisis, which may in fact alienate Sunnis and Kurds even more from the Iraqi polity as they perceive Maliki to be moving toward sectarian dictatorship.
Maliki can either emerge from the scenario a hero uniting the country together to fight back against ISIS, or, more likely a sectarian demagogue urging on Shia citizens and Iranian backed militias such as Asaib Ahl al Haq to go north to fight the Sunni insurgency. Muqtada al Sadr, whose political movement has stood staunchly against Maliki, has now talked of organising ‘peace militias’ to defend Shia holy places. This is hardly the unified national response that many had hoped for, and leads to questions about whether the Prime Minister can seriously mobilise Iraqis that are not of his political persuasion, or sect, to believe in the kind of Iraq he is trying, and failing to create.
Peshmerga Cooperation, What Next for the Erbil Baghdad axis?
Then there are the Kurds, currently absorbing thousands of fleeing refugees from Mosul and Kirkuk, and are likely to use their Peshmerga forces to strike back at ISIS.
Subsequently, their relationship with Baghdad will surely change. They are deeply angry at Baghdad over disagreements on oil exporting from their autonomous region, placing strain on an already fragile state, and the Kurds will seek to cash in on their efforts against ISIS to gain concessions from Baghdad on future oil exports. Baghdad will have little choice but to acquiesce to their demands. A stronger regional government is inevitable, albeit one that is burdened by hundreds of thousands of dependents, many of whom speak Arabic and not Kurdish as their mother tongue.
A Convoluted US Policy
The conflict in Iraq is turning into a zero-sum game in which either the state wins and begins to reassert itself in areas of deep insecurity, or it loses and facilitates the beginning of a fragmentation in which Baghdad loses control over Anbar and Ninawa, as well as ceding more control to the Kurdistan regional government.
In the midst of this stands the United States, who reiterated its commitment to continue to work closely with Iraqi political and security leaders on a holistic approach to diminish ISIL’s capacity and ability to operate within Iraq’s borders.
US assistance to Maliki may well have to be increased beyond arms sales if the conflict escalates, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that, with Maliki’s invitation, the US moves in Reaper drones armed with Hellfire missiles to try to stem the movement of ISIS. While not loosening ISIS’s grip on Mosul, such weapons would significant blunt any advance toward the capital, buying the Iraqis time to regroup and launch an effective counter-offensive.
The slightly absurd corollary of this is that it aligns US goals for Iraq with those of Iran, who also seek to bolster a Maliki led government, and will most likely sponsor Shia militias to whom Maliki is increasingly outsourcing the state’s dirty work. When juxtaposed to Iranian-US differences in Syria the region begins to look a very odd place indeed.
In fact while ISIS are consistent in their goal to enforce their regional dominance, and Iran are equally consistent in their goal to oppose ISIS, the US doesn’t seem to know what it wants to do. It is tentatively making steps toward Iran on the nuclear file, whilst trying to reassure its Sunni Gulf allies, meanwhile it utterly opposes Iranian aims in Syria, whilst aligning closely with them in Iraq.
It is a sorry mess of a policy that will breed nothing but distrust amongst US allies across the region.
The Future
What does this all mean for Iraq? Firstly the events that have taken place in Mosul reveal that the state is already far weaker than previously imagined and is in need of serious external support to keep from collapsing.
With the backing of a number of Sunni tribes in the Anbar, Diyala and Ninawa regions, and bolstered by angry ex-army officers of the Saddam regime, ISIS has now marched on to Tikrit and sits just 150km from the capital city. These are critical days for Iraq’s future as a nation state, and it remains to be seen whether it can face the most serious challenge to its authority since Saddam Hussein was removed from power.
WRITTEN BY
Michael Stephens
Associate Fellow
