Explaining the Diplomatic Rush to Normalise Syria's Assad

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 24 July on the heels of reports that Turkey and a handful of European states are reconsidering their engagement with Syria. The EU suspended relations with Damascus in 2011 following the outbreak of the civil war, but in late July eight EU foreign ministers, including those of Italy and Austria, called on the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell to ‘review and assess’ the bloc’s approach to Syria after 13 years of conflict. On 25 July, Italy became the first G7 member to announce it would restore diplomatic relations with Syria. This move signifies a shift that echoes the Arab world’s normalisation of Assad last year.

On 7 July, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he would extend an invitation to Assad 'any time' for possible talks to restore relations. This set off speculation about Assad's potential response and any preconditions he might insist upon before agreeing to such talks. Previous attempts at diplomacy between the Turkish, Syrian and Russian defence ministers in December 2022 did not result in policy convergence. Syria experts have suggested that low levels of engagement between intelligence and security officials date back to 2018. 

While a major breakthrough in Turkey–Syria ties is unlikely, one explanation for the abrupt interest in restoring ties with Assad is that Turkey is seeking to navigate new rules of engagement ahead of a scenario where the US withdraws its remaining 900 or so troops that are currently stationed in northeastern Syria, a step that is likely to be expedited in the event of a Trump win in the November US presidential election. But rising regional tensions following a series of high-profile assassinations in Lebanon and Iran mean that a US withdrawal is not imminent. 

Syria was readmitted to the Arab League in May last year, but despite this regional pivot on Assad, US and European policy on Syria has remained stagnant, with little indication of what a long-term strategy would look like. There are unquestionably economic incentives that seem to justify a reset. War-torn Syria represents an opportunity for reconstruction and investment, and international actors are recognising that humanitarian funding and efforts require engagement with Assad’s government to have sustained impact.

Despite external support from Russia and Iran, Damascus still controls only 70% of Syrian territory. Turkey controls a sizeable area including towns such as al-Bab, Azaz, Jarabulus, Rajo, Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. The Syrian Democratic Forces control most of the northeast, including Hasaka governorate as well as areas in Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa.

Russia’s Mediation over Turkey-Syria Talks

Russia, a steadfast ally of Assad, has been pushing for normalisation as part of its broader strategy to consolidate its influence in the Middle East. Despite overarching agreement on the need to stabilise Syria, there is scepticism on all sides. In 2019, Russia pledged to clear a 30-km strip along the Turkish-Syrian border from the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian Kurdish militia that Turkey considers to be an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While Ankara has been irritated by Russia’s ongoing engagement with the YPG since then, it continues to lobby Putin to seek concessions from Assad given its frustration that the US will not abandon its support of the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. Moscow is likely weighing up whether Turkey, a NATO member, may succumb to US pressure to prevent Russian companies from evading Western sanctions through Turkey. Unconfirmed reports suggest that in anticipation of talks, Turkey and Russia are considering restarting joint patrols on the M4 highway which runs from eastern Aleppo to western Latakia via Idlib through areas controlled by the Syrian opposition. Patrols had stalled for four years.

On 12 July, Iraq’s Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated that Baghdad may host the first meeting between Erdogan and Assad in over a decade. Holding the initial talks in Iraq would undoubtedly open them up to meddling and pressure from Iran, but also reflects Iraq’s own interest in stability along the Turkey–Syria border, which has implications for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq due to PKK strongholds there that are targeted by Turkish military strikes.

Strategic Interests Driving Turkey–Syria Normalisation

Erdogan’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) performed poorly in the 31 March local elections, losing most larger cities to the secular opposition Republican People’s Party. The AKP attributed the loss mainly to rising public anger about the 3.6 million Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, as well as what was seen by its core constituency as a weak response to Israel’s military action against Palestinian civilians in Gaza following the 7 October Hamas attacks. 

The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey has become a contentious issue, with many in the opposition and the public as a whole perceiving them as unfair beneficiaries of state aid. Concerns are also growing over socioeconomic and demographic changes, with far-right nationalists warning of an 'Arabisation' of Turkish society. 

Despite his brutal crackdown on civilians throughout the civil war and alleged war crimes, the fact that Assad has so far defied calls for a political transition agreement likely gives him an impression of strength vis-à-vis Turkey. The gap between the military, political and strategic objectives pursued by Ankara and Damascus that are driving normalisation is significant, however, and complicates efforts to identify common ground for negotiations.

If Turkey’s role in the historic US–Russia prisoner swap deal revealed on 1 August is an indication of Ankara’s influential broker role in the region, Erdogan will justify meeting Assad as necessary to address chronic disputes between the neighbouring states. If a meeting is to take place – as early as this month according to some Syria experts – it is likely that Erdogan and Assad will agree on a preliminary but low-stakes framework of principles as a starting point. 

Several longstanding public demands voiced by Ankara and Damascus provide clues as to the negotiating positions of each side. Damascus seeks the withdrawal of Turkish Armed Forces outposts and troops in northern Syria, which were installed during successive military operations: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Operation Olive Branch (2018), Operation Peace Spring (2019), and Operation Claw-Sword (including targets in northern Iraq, 2022). Damascus favours a return to the status quo that prevailed before 2011 and wants Turkey to lay out a timeline to withdraw militarily from the areas it controls. But regime forces are too weak to unilaterally control northwestern Syria, and lack sufficient sustained territorial control to alter the status quo.

Ankara and Damascus agree that the Syrian Kurdish movement is a source of instability, but differ in their threat and opportunity perceptions. Turkey sees the PKK-YPG as an existential threat that justifies its military presence on counterterrorism and stabilisation grounds. Ankara argues that its departure will consolidate PKK-linked groups and their military, administrative and political structures in northern Syria. Damascus appears unwilling to entertain a military option to root out the group and sees the Kurds as valuable leverage against Turkey—as it has done for decades. 

Other demands likely raised by Damascus include the transfer of border crossings between Syria and Turkey that are under opposition control to regime forces; that Ankara bans Syrian opposition groups from operating inside Turkey and hands over wanted dissidents to the regime; and that Ankara pressures the US to hasten its troop withdrawal from northern Syria.

What is more likely is that through a process of step-by-step talks, Turkey may greenlight a phased confidence-building approach that could lead it to scale back its support for certain opposition and jihadi groups in Idlib and opposition-held areas through security agreements with Damascus. Turkey backs the opposition Syrian National Army, an umbrella coalition of armed Syrian opposition groups (previously known as the Free Syrian Army). The possibility of developing a coordination mechanism for joint patrols with Syrian regime forces and opening up crossing points to facilitate trade between regime and Turkish-held areas and allow food and basic supplies to reach the civilian population are also on the table. Seen as steps to open up the north to regime control and exploitation, such measures are opposed by the Syrian opposition, with Turkey accused of betrayal. In a sign of the volatility of local opposition-held areas in the north, anti-Turkey protests broke out in early July in Afrin and Jarablus as some local factions fear the repercussions of any deal Erdogan may make with Assad.

How future normalisation may impact Syria’s northern Idlib province is difficult to predict, with few options that Ankara and Damascus find mutually palatable. The area is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of Islamist Sunni anti-government armed groups affiliated with Al-Qa’ida that has been listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU and the UN. Turkey has a complex relationship with HTS but will try to use its leverage over the group as a bargaining chip with Damascus. At the same time, a Russian-backed regime offensive against Idlib risks instability and a major outflow of Syrian refugees that will put pressure on the Turkish border, a scenario Ankara is desperate to avoid. 

Ankara’s proposed blueprint for normalisation is rumoured to include provisions for Assad to agree to the repatriation and resettlement of around 2 million Syrians. A strategy to empower the Syrian state’s capacity to absorb the en masse return of Syrians has also been defended by European states that are concerned with limiting migration flows across the Mediterranean. Down the line, Ankara may claim that it received assurances that those returning would not face any criminal prosecution, and that moderate Syrian opposition voices would be granted political representation. In reality, Ankara will have little or no influence over the fate of Syrian returnees, and such proposals ignore the fact that Syrians in regime-controlled pockets continue to flee Syria, while those outside the country cite Assad’s uninterrupted and brutal rule as the reason for not returning. 

The Impact of the War in Gaza on Turkey–Syria Ties

Syria is effectively a proxy state of Iran, serving as a lifeline for the transit of weapons and fighters travelling onward to reach Hizbullah in Lebanon. Since 7 October, Syrian territory has been regularly targeted by Israeli airstrikes against Iranian proxy military infrastructure. The killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander in charge of Iran’s Syrian and Lebanese operations in the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus in early April led to the barrage of over 300 rockets and missiles that Iran launched at Israel in retaliation on 13 April. 

The rapidly deteriorating regional security situation between Israel and Iran-backed armed proxies will alter Turkey and Syria’s baseline demands and the normalisation timeline, as will the results of the November US presidential election. Even before the double killings of Hezbollah senior commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh, the political chief of Hamas, in Tehran, it was unlikely that the Turkish security establishment saw strategic value in a full-scale withdrawal from northern Syria. Now, a substantial Turkish force withdrawal is less likely given that Ankara would see this as destabilising northern Syria at a time when Iranian proxies there and in Iraq may escalate a multi-front confrontation with Israel and regional allies.

Syria’s vulnerability in the crossfires of the proxy war between Israel and Iran has pushed Assad to remain on the sidelines as much as possible, while trying to balance Russian interests. Should the Israel–Lebanon border heat up further, Assad may prefer the Turkish status quo in the north to the expansion and entrenchment of Iranian-backed forces. At the same time, ties between Turkey and Iran are evolving. While Iranian infiltration inside Syria has historically restrained Turkish objectives there, common solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza has inched Ankara closer to Tehran.

Like Russia, Turkey seeks to assert a role over the post-war Syrian political economy, and will look to balance its interests with and against US and European positions depending on the trajectory of the conflict. Turkey’s renewed leverage strategy in Syria should also be read alongside growing Russian and Chinese claims and interests in the Middle East. 

International actors may have no choice but to engage with Assad to address the ongoing threat posed by extremist and terrorist groups such as Islamic State, as evidence suggests that the group is exploiting the current volatility to reconstitute. Moreover, calibrated cooperation with Assad could be viewed as a necessary evil to address the plight of the Syrian civilian population, who face dire prospects under crippling US and European sanctions which have had little impact on the Assad system’s resilience. Turkey’s own calculus aligns with these considerations, but extends beyond them given the complex history of Turkey–Syria relations.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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