Countering Chinese Influence in Central and Eastern Europe: An Exclusively Regional Approach Is Not the Answer

Since the conclusion of the fifth summit of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) – a forum of 12 European states extending from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black seas – which took place in Tallinn in October, this format of cooperation, initially designed to provide an additional layer of connectivity and infrastructure support between newer EU member states, is apparently about to acquire an added significance as a potential response mechanism to China’s efforts to gain greater influence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). At least if the team advising US President-elect Joe Biden has anything to do with it.

Suggestions from Biden’s transition team have indicated a desire from the incoming administration to present the 3SI as a counter-offer to China’s own so-called ‘17+1’ format of largely former communist countries in Europe, as well as Beijing’s grander infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Different Parentage, Similar Institutional Challenges

Eleven of its 12 members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria; the exception being Austria) are also part of the 17+1 format and all are in one way or another part of Beijing’s plans for the BRI’s path into Europe. In contrast, the 3SI has emerged as a major component of US engagement in the CEE region.

However, beyond producing eye-catching summits and political declarations, a close look at the formats’ functioning and policy outputs should caution against an overstatement of their relevance for the broader geopolitical competition in the CEE region. The main challenge lies in national capitals instead. On paper, it might appear attractive to pitch regional cooperation formats as part of a geopolitical tug-of-war. However, this misconstrues the function they play in the foreign policies of their member states.

Regional cooperation in CEE is largely driven by existing consensus, not around attempts at building consensus. The 3SI’s role in addressing the question of Russia is a case in point. While energy supply diversification is a major common theme within the 3SI, not all member countries share actual security concerns about Russia as a supplier; some merely seek to improve pricing through competition. Despite active US involvement in encouraging countries to diversify away from dependence on Russian energy supplies, the 3SI has also not changed minds.

Similarly, the uneven enthusiasm towards 17+1 among its member states had mostly been determined by their pre-existing views on China. Indeed, rather than drawing the CEE region towards Beijing through 17+1 frameworks, national perceptions of cooperation with China deteriorated, undermining the format instead. In turn, despite increasing US rhetoric in the run-up to and during the October Tallinn Summit promoting Washington’s so-called ‘Clean Network’ programme, which calls for ensuring that existing telecommunications networks are not allowing access to potentially malign actors, the Hungarian government announced a new Huawei investment soon after the 3SI summit was over. The episode should serve as a reminder that the countries of the CEE region have agency and make policy choices. These choices can be influenced by external pressure. Yet despite the hype, regional cooperation formats alone rarely perform the role of perfect transmission belts for either Chinese or US interests.

Tackling Rising Chinese Influence Efforts

Instead, substantial and relevant developments in tracking Chinese influence efforts in the region take place on the national and, occasionally, bilateral levels. And for a simple reason: it accords much more with the way China actually operates in the region. The MapInfluenCE project, led by the Czech think tank AMO, highlights how China does not use a uniform approach in its dealings with countries in the region but instead applies instruments tailored to individual national contexts.

The degree to which local political and business elites embrace cooperation with China is also driven by the particular interests and circumstances of the national political and economic context. Thus, it is not productive to significantly rely on a large regional cooperation format to further Chinese influence. In turn, the US has successfully promoted its Clean Network programme in the CEE region, which is explicitly aimed at Beijing. Washington did so through a series of bilateral joint declarations on 5G security. The 3SI offered a forum to mention the initiative in speeches, but the format provided no substantive added value to US efforts.

3SI-supported infrastructure projects can serve as an alternative to BRI offers, especially connecting to the more economically vulnerable Western Balkans region. And, after last year’s 17+1 summit in Dubrovnik, there were indications that there might be competition between Western and Chinese investment in Adriatic ports. However, even if all the expectations of the 3SI investment fund are eventually met, this will only be able to complement national and EU funds that will remain decisive for the region.

In any case, the China-inspired 17+1 format has significantly lost steam. Interest among CEE members is dropping, and it is possible to discern even the first signs that some countries may consider withdrawing from the framework altogether. None of this diminishes the fact that China’s influence operations in CEE pose a clear security risk for the region, and by extension to the whole transatlantic alliance. However, regional cooperation formats in the region, in their current form, are not providing added value, neither in substantially promoting nor countering Chinese influence. Calls on the countries of the region to ‘speak with one voice’ often fail to take into account that one cannot speak with one voice if one is of two minds. And this applies to the 3SI as much as it does to the EU. As Biden’s people will surely discover, regional cooperation, as of now, is not changing minds; working with national capitals remains key.

Łukasz Janulewicz is a research fellow at the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.