Coalition of the Willing? Analysing Arab Interests in Fighting the ISIS

Overnight airstrikes conducted on ISIS positions in at least five different locations in Syria point to a step change in the US led multinational operation to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ the militant organisation. Aware that defeating the group would always involve some form of military operation in Syria, the US has acted swiftly and decisively in concert with five Arab nations: Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the US appears to have acted alone against an Al-Qa’ida affiliated group known as the Al-Khorassan Brigade, comprised of individuals from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran who were under instructions to recruit fighters to conduct terror attacks in the West. Although legally ambiguous and lacking any approval from the UN Security Council, the strikes seem to have met with the approval of Bashar al-Assad, and thus do not appear to have caused any great uproar across the region at the present time.

Even the fact that Sunni Arab states (who have been fiercely opposed to Bashar’s rule in Syria since 2011) have undertaken airstrikes inside Syrian territory does not seem to have resulted in any formal protest from Damascus. The Gulf states in particular are very hesitant to discuss military matters and so it will be difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy what role they have, and will play in the military operations being conducted in Syria at the present time. It is clear that the Jordanians and Emiratis took an active military role in last night’s attacks, which aligns with their reputation as small but highly capable military regional actors. In truth the scope of the engagement of all five Arab states is a secondary issue.

On a purely military level, the United States does not need the military support of any country in the region, it possesses the resources and manpower to comfortably deploy overseas and deal with the ISIS threat alone. But in a post-Iraq invasion world, the US cannot go it alone, and politically the support of the five Arab states is a vital component to extending military operations into Syria, a country for which the US possesses no legal mandate to intervene militarily. Any state which aligns with the US on this issue can expect a high degree of political capital in exchange for the assistance provided in preventing America’s biggest state building project in the region from collapsing.

Intervening against ISIS is not as simple for a Gulf State as it might appear. Gulf countries have a history of getting cold feet when deploying far afield, and with the exception of the UAE which has contributed significantly to combat operations in Afghanistan, and more recently in Libya, none possess much experience of recent combat. Saudi Arabian operations in Yemen in 2009 and Qatari operations in Libya in 2011 have been both qualitatively and politically questionable. As such, the track record is not a happy one, and gives cause for concern in a highly fluid theatre of war such as Syria. Secondly, although they may deny it vehemently, the Gulf states have a highly problematic relationship with extreme Islamist groups in the region. Gulf citizens actively travel to Syria and certain individuals have transferred millions of dollars to groups with close links to Al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qa’ida affiliates in Iraq. Indeed the region’s clerics have exhorted followers to fight a Jihad in Syria, using sectarian slogans to describe their enemy and to whip up support for the fight against Assad and Iran. Standing up against  ISIS is difficult in a region in which there is deeper support among the general populous than many care to admit.

Even cursory reading of Gulf chit chat through the favoured medium of instant messaging reveals that not a few Gulf states consider that despite its faults,  ISIS is standing up for Sunnis against a Shia oppressor, and being punished once again by the USA, who is eager as ever to interfere in Arab affairs. Although a highly problematic ideological threat to the Gulf, ISIS does not actually an existential military threat to the Gulf at the moment. The Saudis have mobilised 30,000 troops to their northern border as a contingency, but with no naval or air assets the Islamic State would find invading the Gulf tough. It certainly could not replicate its spectacular military gains in Iraq and Syria against the far better equipped Gulf militaries, who are backed by cast iron US security guarantees. Given that there are internal social cohesion issues at play here with no immediate strategic benefit, the decision by Gulf states to intervene is quite a brave one.

Rapproachment with Iran

The additional problem of course will be that participating in this coalition will also be serving the interests of Iran and its ally Bashar al Assad, who would like nothing more than to see the ISIS and its vehement hostility to Shia Islam wiped from the region root and branch.

Some political realignment between Saudi Arabia and Iran already appears to have taken place. Firstly both countries coalesced around Hayder al-Abadi as the new Prime Minister of Iraq, after Iran’s Supreme Leader withdrew his support for Nouri al Maliki, a figure of hate in Saudi Arabia. Additionally the two countries’ Foreign Ministers met in New York on Sunday, with Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif noting that ‘we believe that the meeting will be the first page of a new chapter in our two countries’ relations’.

It is difficult to assert with any confidence that this is anymore than a convenient convergence of interests, and it should not be expected that because the Gulf’s bitter rivals have found common cause against ISIS that their enmity, or indeed the causes of it, has disappeared. But whilst the Iranians may not be comfortable with an American Sunni backed coalition operating in their back yard, the prospect of ISIS expanding onto Iran’s territory is far worse.

As for the Gulf states’ themselves, internecine squabbling over the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar’s outsized role in the region appears to have been sidelined in favour of a unified stance against the ISIS menace. Again perhaps a temporary alliance, but it is encouraging that 18 months of vitriolic intra-GCC debate appears to have abated, and a unitary security outlook governs the GCC’s outlook on the region.

We should not rush to herald a new dawn in regional affairs. A myriad of problems still exist, most notably if Iran drives toward the threshold of nuclear weapons in the next twelve months. But a multilateral alliance emerging from a divided and fractured region is a positive development that should be welcomed in Western capitals. The Gulf appears to be stepping up to its role in regional security affairs. If it is up to the task, a whole new range of options for regional stability in the post-ISIS world become available.
 

Michael Stephens is Deputy Director of RUSI Qatar