Beyond Ukraine: Russia’s Foreign Policy Challenges in 2025

President Donald Trump’s inauguration and promises to end the Ukraine war have naturally trained the spotlight back on the three-year conflict. But even if a negotiated end to the war is sought, Russia has several other burgeoning security and political issues that a new US administration may have to contend with. Putin’s behaviour and key events around Trump’s inauguration threw these considerations into sharp relief. 

Putin’s first two acts on the day Trump was sworn in were to have a call with President Xi, and then hold a meeting with his own Security Council. Putin and Xi’s call was more than just symbolic – they went into detail about some of the cargo transport issues between Russia and China, as well as how to engage with the new US administration. For all Putin’s attempts to downplay the importance of Trump’s inauguration, his hawkish Security Council prioritised discussing the potential impact of the new US administration on Middle Eastern stability. And all of this took place against the backdrop of tightly controlled presidential elections in Belarus, where Moscow loyalist and long-serving strongman Alexander Lukashenko extended his presidency by another five years. 

All these discussions and events highlighted three important current areas of foreign policy concern for Russia: its ability to project military and political power in the Middle East since Assad’s removal; its trade relationship with China, upon which its exports depend; and its relationship with client state Belarus, a key player in regional security and in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.  

The Impact on Russia of Syria’s New Leadership

Following Assad’s ousting in Syria, the likely loss of Russia’s long-standing lease on its Tartus military base, formerly the jumping-off point for Russia’s interests in Africa, would have a serious impact on its ability to project power in the Middle East. But there is a domestic angle to this.

Putin has been careful to tone down some of his initial criticism of the new leadership in Syria, HTS, and to maintain contact with as many interest groups as possible. While this keeps Russia’s political options open, the Kremlin is being careful not to overplay its role in Syria, cautious that the emergence of radical Islamist groups amid the chaos could cause blowback on Russia. Russia has experience of domestic terrorism from Islamic State-led groups based in its own North Caucasus – Russia’s military intervention in Syria’s civil war in 2015 prompted a swathe of attacks within Russia, including the downing of a Russian passenger jet over Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in 2015, which Islamic State claimed was in response to Russian airstrikes in Syria. 

Russia also might lack some of the domestic security resources to deal with the emergence of additional radical groups. The Kremlin’s prioritisation of security and political resources in service of its war in Ukraine – and in pursuit of its political opponents – has created something of a security gap. This was epitomised both by the March 2024 bombings of Moscow’s Crocus City Hall (for which Islamic State claimed responsibility and in which almost 150 people were killed), and the fact that Russia is currently not in control of its southern border with Ukraine. 

The Kursk border region has been a particularly stark indicator that the Kremlin may have dropped the ball on its own domestic security. Even though Russia’s southern border had been breached over 18 months before in another incident, little serious assistance to shore up the border was given until late into 2024. The Kremlin belatedly initiated crisis management in December, with Putin replacing the head of the Kursk region again – resulting in the third governor in a year – to try to control both the volatile border and the local protests of internally displaced residents from the region, who have been calling for an end to the war. The introduction of thousands of soldiers from North Korea to push back the Ukrainian army has borne little fruit, and instead serving to highlight Russia’s lack of ground forces available to protect the border.  

China’s Importance to Russia’s Economy

The Ukraine war has exacerbated Russia’s economic dependence on China and a new US administration makes this relationship more important than ever, particularly if Trump follows through on his threats to further sanction Russia’s oil and gas industries. 

As ever since Soviet times, continued hydrocarbons exports, both overland and seaborne, are the key to Russia’s economic growth. Russia’s continued ability to export its oil, to not only China but also India and Middle Eastern countries such as the UAE, remains the cornerstone of its economy. 

While not necessarily booming, the Russian economy is far from coming apart at the seams, with IMF growth forecasts raised to 3.2% in April 2024 from an initial projection of 2.6% earlier that year, due to both strong oil export revenues and high hydrocarbon prices even amid western sanctions. The importance of oil to Russia’s economy is evidenced through Russia’s use of a shadow fleet to transport it and evade the Western oil price cap; huge investments in transport corridors with Iran for oil; and upgrades to Russia’s eastern rail network towards China to the tune of $4 billion. 

Capitalising on its already increasing trade with China will be difficult for Russia, with overloaded rail infrastructure, idling railcars, bottlenecks and insufficient port storage all contributing to long delays at the borders. Russia is aware of these issues, but without significant investment – particularly foreign direct investment – to improve the situation, statements about increasing trade are likely to repeatedly encounter these stumbling blocks. 

Belarus: Russia’s Client State

Perhaps one of the most underrated aspects of Russia’s foreign policy is its relationship with neighbouring Belarus, which was briefly returned to the spotlight by the recent presidential elections. Russia’s plans for deeper political, security and economic integration with Belarus under the banner of the Union State have progressed quietly in the background over the past few years, since 2018. President Lukashenko’s return to the presidency means Moscow has little to fear from an imminent change of power, unlike in 2020 when protests appeared to test domestic stability in Belarus – but has been since tightly repressed. 

Capitalising on increasing trade with China will be difficult for Russia, with overloaded rail infrastructure, idling railcars, bottlenecks and insufficient port storage all contributing to long delays at the borders

But Russia’s unprecedented use of Belarus as a launchpad for its offensive into Ukraine, the significant dependency of the Belarusian economy on Russia for exports, and Russia’s permanent military presence in Belarus all continue to pose a risk to both Russia’s economy – it has already had to postpone Belarus’s debt repayments – and European security more broadly, as Russia is likely to retain a permanent military presence there, even if the war comes to an end. 

Putin’s foreign policy concerns and their domestic implications are likely to drive some of Russia's engagement – positive and negative – with the new US administration. But these issues indicate that even an end to the war would reveal a Russia that has changed significantly, with a trade infrastructure that has orientated itself eastwards, and burgeoning security issues that could have consequences for the rest of Europe. 

© RUSI, 2025

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