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Anton
Moiseienko

Research Fellow, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies

Anton Moiseienko is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies. His current and recent work covers a range of subjects, including financial crime online, the intersection between cybercrime and money laundering, corruption in the UK and overseas, and criminal risks posed by free-trade zones.


Anton holds a PhD in law from Queen Mary University of London and a master’s degree in law from the University of Cambridge. His book Corruption and Targeted Sanctions was published by Brill. He is also a co-editor of four books on transnational crime, including the Research Handbook on Transnational Crime published by Edward Elgar. Anton’s articles have appeared in leading peer-reviewed journals such as the International & Comparative Law Quarterly and Criminal Law Review.


Anton regularly speaks at practitioner and academic events, including guest lectures at a number of UK universities.


You can find Anton on Twitter at @antonm_law.

Anton
Moiseienko
Research Fellow, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies

Contact Details

RUSI Whitehall

Research Focus

Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime, Terrorism Financial Crime

By This Author

No Body to Kick, No Wings to Clip: The Airbus Settlement and Corporate Criminal Liability

1 April 2020

As it unfolds, the Airbus corruption saga will offer yet another opportunity to reflect on whether wrongdoers are all too often able to...

Tags: Aerospace, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, International Institutions, Law and Ethics

"“The main point of the report is just to show that the magnitude of the overall problem is still so huge,” said senior GFI economist Rick Rowden, in an interview. “Each one of these value gaps represents the loss of revenue for each country, which isn’t so much a problem for the rich countries but it is a huge problem for the developing countries.” One reason for this magnitude is that it is very difficult to detect fraudulent trading activity, according to Anton Moiseienko, a research fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies. “If a client asks a bank to wire money as payment for goods, it’s very difficult for the bank to say whether that payment is adequate, too much or too little,” he said. “Because it won’t necessarily know what the goods are, what the quality is, and it can be difficult to price them anyway. So banks just don’t have enough information to be able to say, ‘this is trade-based money laundering.'” But this is different from trade financing, where banks can request more documents as a condition for financing trade, Moiseienko added. “They can ask questions about the business, about the kinds of goods that they trade. The bank has more information and so more opportunity to detect money laundering.” Because a very small proportion of trade is being financed by banks, this information is mostly unavailable. While access to the right data is a barrier in detecting this type of activity, more can also be done to empower customs officials, according to Alexandria Reid, also a research fellow at RUSI. “Good data—both in terms of quality and quantity—is a barrier to detecting TBML, but not necessarily the main barrier,” she said. “In most cases, it’s actually the fact that customs are traditionally focused on the detection of misinvoicing as a part of their revenue collection functions, so they’re not necessarily looking to detect TBML, and they’re not necessarily mandated to detect it either. This means that very few systems and processes are set up to empower customs to detect TBML.”"

Illicit finance hidden in trade numbers fed $9tn loss for developing nations: GFI

4 March 2020

Tags:
Hand pointing at virtual marketplace trolleys

Understanding Financial Crime Risks in E-Commerce

29 January 2020

This paper shows that e-commerce continues to be exploited by criminal actors. Regulators and governments can do more to prevent this.

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, Occasional Papers, UK, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime, Technology, Europe

Pages

No Body to Kick, No Wings to Clip: The Airbus Settlement and Corporate Criminal Liability

1 April 2020

As it unfolds, the Airbus corruption saga will offer yet another opportunity to reflect on whether wrongdoers are all too often able to...

Tags: Aerospace, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, International Institutions, Law and Ethics
Picture of the Colón Free Trade Zone. Courtesy of Administración de la Zona Libre de Colón/Wikimedia Commons/CC0 1.0

Free Trade Zones and Financial Crime – A Faustian Bargain?

5 November 2019

To safeguard free trade zones from criminal activities, national authorities and zone administrators must feel the pressure to do the right...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Organised Crime and Policing, Organised Crime

Have Your Cake and Trade It: Is it Possible to Promote Legitimate Commerce While Reducing Illicit Trade?

1 October 2019

Despite the formidable challenges of combatting illicit trade and trade-based money laundering, several ongoing initiatives give cause for...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Organised Crime and Policing, AML/CTF, Organised Crime
itcoin in front of a computer screen. Courtesy of Pexels/David McBee

The Heat is on Cyber-Criminals. But Are Governments Doing Enough to Tackle Rogue Cryptocurrency Exchanges?

31 May 2019

Cyber-criminal groups are being dismantled. But more needs to be done about the enforcement of rules that bind cryptocurrency exchanges.

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Counter-Proliferation Finance, Cyber, AML/CTF, European Union, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime, Technology
UK government offices on Great George Street, London, 2011. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons/Carlos Delgado.

One Step at a Time: Limited Reform of UK’s Limited Partnerships

22 January 2019

The UK government is proposing to tighten procedures for establishing limited partnerships, in an effort to close an avenue for money...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, UK, Organised Crime

Pages

Hand pointing at virtual marketplace trolleys

Understanding Financial Crime Risks in E-Commerce

29 January 2020

Anton Moiseienko

This paper shows that e-commerce continues to be exploited by criminal actors. Regulators and governments can do more to prevent this.

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, Occasional Papers, UK, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime, Technology, Europe
People playing poker.

Play Your Cards Right: Preventing Criminal Abuse of Online Gambling

12 November 2019

Anton Moiseienko

This paper examines the criminal involvement in some online gambling activities.

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, Occasional Papers, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime, Technology

Gaming the System: Money Laundering Through Online Games

11 October 2019

Anton Moiseienko and Kayla Izenman

In-game artefacts and currencies often have real-life value and can be used to move or invest criminal proceeds. But there are no clear...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, RUSI Newsbrief

From Intention to Action: Next Steps in Preventing Criminal Abuse of Cryptocurrency

10 September 2019

Anton Moiseienko and Kayla Izenman

This paper aims to support domestic authorities that will regulate virtual asset service providers and supervise their compliance with AML/...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, Occasional Papers, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime

What's in a Name? Corruption and Fraud in the UK

17 June 2019

Anton Moiseienko and Kayla Izenman

This Occasional Paper discusses the forms that corruption and fraud take in four UK sectors: the financial sector; construction; the...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Occasional Papers, UK, Information, Securing Britain, National Security
Courtesy of Asim Iftikhar Nagi/Wikimedia

Security Through Financial Integrity: Mending Pakistan’s Leaky Sieve

23 May 2019

Tom Keatinge and Anton Moiseienko

This Occasional Paper focuses on the role of Pakistan’s financial institutions in detecting and preventing the transfer of corruption...

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Pakistan, AML/CTF, Occasional Papers

Pages

Embedded thumbnail for Financial Crime 2.0: The Decentralisation of Cryptocurrency and Financial Crime

Financial Crime 2.0: The Decentralisation of Cryptocurrency and Financial Crime

18 February 2020
Anton Moiseienko, Research Fellow, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Financial Crime 2.0
Embedded thumbnail for Financial Crime Online: Beyond Our Reach?

Financial Crime Online: Beyond Our Reach?

4 February 2020
Anton Moiseienko, Research Fellow, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies

Tags: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Financial Crime 2.0

"“The main point of the report is just to show that the magnitude of the overall problem is still so huge,” said senior GFI economist Rick Rowden, in an interview. “Each one of these value gaps represents the loss of revenue for each country, which isn’t so much a problem for the rich countries but it is a huge problem for the developing countries.” One reason for this magnitude is that it is very difficult to detect fraudulent trading activity, according to Anton Moiseienko, a research fellow at RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies. “If a client asks a bank to wire money as payment for goods, it’s very difficult for the bank to say whether that payment is adequate, too much or too little,” he said. “Because it won’t necessarily know what the goods are, what the quality is, and it can be difficult to price them anyway. So banks just don’t have enough information to be able to say, ‘this is trade-based money laundering.'” But this is different from trade financing, where banks can request more documents as a condition for financing trade, Moiseienko added. “They can ask questions about the business, about the kinds of goods that they trade. The bank has more information and so more opportunity to detect money laundering.” Because a very small proportion of trade is being financed by banks, this information is mostly unavailable. While access to the right data is a barrier in detecting this type of activity, more can also be done to empower customs officials, according to Alexandria Reid, also a research fellow at RUSI. “Good data—both in terms of quality and quantity—is a barrier to detecting TBML, but not necessarily the main barrier,” she said. “In most cases, it’s actually the fact that customs are traditionally focused on the detection of misinvoicing as a part of their revenue collection functions, so they’re not necessarily looking to detect TBML, and they’re not necessarily mandated to detect it either. This means that very few systems and processes are set up to empower customs to detect TBML.”"

Illicit finance hidden in trade numbers fed $9tn loss for developing nations: GFI

4 March 2020 Tags: