RUSI JournalVOLUME 170ISSUE 2

Violent Resistance in Occupied Ukraine: Assessing Network Capabilities

An explosion on the Crimean Bridge in October 2022. In Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea Oblasts, the guerrilla component appears to be more effective, with multiple examples of ambushes, sabotage and assassinations taking place outside of the urban areas. Courtesy of Sipa US / Alamy

An explosion on the Crimean Bridge in October 2022. In Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea Oblasts, the guerrilla component appears to be more effective, with multiple examples of ambushes, sabotage and assassinations taking place outside of the urban areas.


Ongoing experience in the war in Ukraine provides NATO with useful examples of how resistance networks can contribute to defence strategy.

As NATO continues to integrate unconventional warfare capabilities within its defensive strategy, assessment of resistance networks operating in Russian-occupied territory provides unique insight into their utility within a contemporary operating environment. In the case of Ukraine, while geographic dispersion and attack methodology demonstrate a broad range of network capabilities and access, disproportionate targeting of Russia’s illegitimately installed government over conventional military objectives has reduced their overall utility. To fully realise their potential within Ukraine’s ‘active defence’ strategy, resistance activity should be synchronised with conventional plans to create tactical and operational opportunities for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to exploit.

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WRITTEN BY

Jon Armstrong

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