Shopping for Mass Destruction: North Korea’s Illicit Procurement Networks

Despite successes in its nuclear and missile programmes over the past few years, North Korea still relies on external sources of technology to supply its weapons programmes and will continue to do so in the long term. Procurement networks with tentacles all around the world have been used by the country to obtain technology from willing exporters and naive businesses, and to dupe those trying to comply with export controls over the past decades. These networks will continue to be key to the sustainment of North Korea’s programmes and further technological progress. 

This paper analyses North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in view of North Korea’s programmatic successes and recent geopolitical shifts in Russia’s relationship with North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine. The paper draws on underexploited source material to offer an overview of North Korea’s procurement networks over the past five years. It finds that North Korea’s networks are active and will remain so, and are likely seeking to make up for the slowdown in procurement during the period of Covid-19-related border closures, and to fulfil recent Russian orders for missile technology. 

The networks are largely focused in China and Russia, where North Korean operatives – trading company personnel, diplomats, intelligence officers, and scientists and researchers – have been able to operate largely unhindered, allowing them to establish supply chains. However, there are still some needs that see North Korea looking to manufacturers in the US, Europe, Japan and other markets to fulfil. North Korea’s renewed relationship with Russia is perhaps the most important factor that will shape the future of the country’s procurement networks. Any formal offer of strategic technologies by Moscow to Pyongyang, or actions that see North Korean operatives openly purchase on a larger scale from Russian providers, would be bountiful for North Korea’s procurement needs.

Other factors will also shape the nature of North Korea’s procurement networks into the future, including evolving needs and greater requirements for highly specialised technologies provided by a smaller number of niche suppliers. Overall, the paper concludes that despite North Korea’s successes, seeking to prevent the country’s access to, and procurement of, technology is still valuable. It makes 10 recommendations to those seeking to counter North Korea’s illicit procurement.