Turkey, BRICS and Erdogan’s Global Aspirations

During this year’s annual BRICS summit in Russia on 22–24 October, Turkey made a formal application to join the BRICS group of countries. However, the summit did not end with Turkey as a new member of the international bloc. 

Reportedly, it was India that made the objection to Turkey’s bid. However, almost every BRICS member state has reason to distrust Ankara, which will now feel isolated having also distanced itself from its traditional allies in the West. 

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes that Turkey is a global power and should be recognised as such. He has stated his intention of making Turkey a superpower. He has talked about the world being bigger than five, a reference to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as a veiled reference to Turkey’s global role. Erdogan also declared that Turkey will be a logistical superpower by 2053, a convenient year as it would mark the 130th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey. 

So back in January 2024, when Ankara saw that Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the UAE had become members of BRICS, there was no way that Ankara would not seek membership, which it reasoned would be a means to propel its international standing. Erdogan had long sought membership even before BRICS expanded. 

But unlike other BRICS members, Turkey is in NATO and the Council of Europe, and remains a candidate for EU accession. In other words, Turkey is part of the West’s defence and diplomatic architecture, and it has been for generations. 

Seeking BRICS membership is yet another example of Ankara’s distancing from its traditional allies in order to pursue greater international standing. In fact, Turkey’s policies have hampered the security of the West. Examples of this are plentiful, but a few will serve to illustrate the point. 

Turkey’s lax attitude towards its border between 2012 and 2014 allowed thousands of jihadists to enter Syria when the so-called Islamic State was on the rise. Islamic State claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist atrocities on European soil, ranging from the November 2015 Paris attacks that killed 130 people to the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing that murdered 22 individuals. Instead of making NATO states more secure, Turkey did the opposite, as it allowed a militant jihadi force to gain strength right on its doorstep. 

To make matters worse, Ankara’s subsequent interventions in Syria pitted Turkish forces against those of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which were on the frontline against Islamic State. Unconcerned, Erdogan even threatened to attack US forces in Syria who were helping the Kurdish forces battle Islamic State. 

Turkey also helped Iran to evade sanctions through a state-owned bank and avoided joining international sanctions against Russia. This was just before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed, and eased off some of the pressure Tehran was facing to be flexible during the negotiating process. 

Ankara even delayed the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO by over 18 months, and has refused to enforce international sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. To make matters worse, Turkey even purchased Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles despite repeated attempts by Washington to change Ankara’s mind as the Russian missile defence system could compromise the security of NATO hardware. As a result, in 2019 Turkey was excluded from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme. 

However, playing East against West to gain standing has achieved little for Ankara’s great power aspirations. Sure, Turkey has won kudos with Iran and South Africa for its open support for Hamas and for joining Pretoria’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. But better ties with these two countries are about the extent of Turkey’s inroads. Turkey is now viewed not only by Western countries but also by many BRICS members with distrust and suspicion. 

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, for example, is not best pleased with Erdogan’s repeated declarations that all of Ukraine’s territory should be returned. Moscow has also expressed its objection to the talk of a potential deal that involves Turkey storing its unused S-400s in NATO bases so that Ankara can receive those coveted F-35s. 

China also does not trust Turkey. Despite Erdogan holding his tongue about the persecution of the Turkic Uighur people, Beijing and Ankara have been at each other’s throats at the WTO, with tariffs and accusations being thrown at each other. 

Relations with Egypt remain strained, despite attempts at a rapprochement marked by a meeting between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Erdogan in Ankara last September. Erdogan allowed Turkey to play host to Sisi’s avowed enemies, the Muslim Brotherhood, and publicly labelled Sisi a tyrant. Ankara was also on the opposite side to Cairo in the war in Libya. It will take more than smiles and handshakes to heal relations. The same is true of the UAE, which has also clashed with Turkey over regional and ideological disputes for well over a decade. 

Finally, we come to India and its lack of enthusiasm for Turkish entry into BRICS. Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have noticed that Erdogan did not bring up Kashmir in his speech at the UN General Assembly last September; however, the leader of the world’s largest democracy certainly remembers that Erdogan has previously taken Pakistan’s side over Kashmir in every single UN address he has made since 2019, when India stripped the disputed territory of its special status. Modi is also very aware of Turkey’s strong military ties with Islamabad. 

Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdogan has been a quest to gain acceptance as a global power; however, Ankara has only succeeded in generating greater mistrust and suspicion towards itself. If Turkey continues on this trajectory and charts a direction contrary to that of its traditional allies, Western countries should urgently reappraise Ankara’s role in their strategic frameworks. 

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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