Reconsidering Turkey’s Influence on the Syrian Conflict

Many observers and analysts portray Turkey as the primary winner of the Syrian war, with the greatest comparative ability to assert its influence during the post-Assad transition process. A central theme is that Russia and Iran’s declining influence would be compensated directly by Turkey as the emerging dominant power, despite the increasing engagement of global and regional powers with Syria. Observers also emphasise that Turkey has been the steadfast supporter of the Syrian opposition forces, with the strongest communication channels and enormous leverage mechanisms, without underlining the differences between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkey’s proxies like the Syrian National Army (SNA). Also, there is a common view that Turkey has led the initiative to end Assad’s rule throughout the 13-year war. 

Indeed, the rapid fall of the regime was the culmination of regional-level developments, and Turkey's changing policies played a complementary role. A closer look at the evolution of Turkey’s Syria policy reveals that Ankara has not shaped the course of developments after it lost the primary initiative to the US and Russian interventions in Syria. Since the mid-2010s, Turkey has played into the US-Russian competition to secure its military presence in Syria against non-state threats and the risk of another large influx of refugees. Turkey’s shifting alignments with these powers in the conflict field shaped the conditions amenable to the regime’s eventual fall. The HTS leadership, which will have closely monitored this process, will likely follow a similarly pragmatic approach toward foreign actors, potentially diminishing Turkey's current influence in Syria.

The Background of Turkey’s Syria Policy

In the early years of the Syrian conflict, Turkey’s policy was aligned with the US and European governments declaring that Assad must go, although Ankara adopted a tougher approach by repeatedly calling for an international military intervention. Despite some disagreements on which groups to support, US–Turkey cooperation in Syria continued until early 2015, when the two states agreed to start a train-and-equip programme for the Syrian armed opposition. Some groups joining such US-led programmes defected to or were detained by more radical and jihadist forces like Jabhat Al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS. Unlike the US – which shifted its focus to fighting radical Islamist groups – and Arab states increasingly preoccupied with their own regime security, Turkey maintained its anti-Assad policies and sustained support to the rebel groups including the SNA, its main proxy force. At first glance, then, it would appear that Ankara finally achieved its objective as rebels departing from Idlib – where Turkey has long provided a shield – subverted the Assad regime, boosting Turkey’s influence in Syria. The longer story is much more nuanced and complicated, just like Turkey’s shifting priorities concerning the Syrian battlefield.

A Growing Deadlock 

Two pivotal developments in the mid-2010s shattered Turkish-US collaboration in the conflict zone and plunged Turkey’s Syria policy into disarray. The first was Islamic State’s[Editor1]  rapid capture of Syrian territory, and the second was the start of Russia’s pro-Assad military intervention in September 2015. The US decided to rely on the Kurdish-led People's Defense Units (YPG) by arming them in the growing fight against Islamic State, while this collaboration paved the way for building a US-controlled zone to the east of the Euphrates as a counterbalance against Russia’s military influence. The expansion of YPG-controlled areas in Northern Syria was accompanied by growing attacks by the PKK terrorist organisation inside Turkey’s borders, while Turkish officials complained that the US arms delivered to the YPG were later transferred to the PKK.

Meanwhile, increasing violations of Turkey’s airspace by Russian air forces bombing Syria led to escalating tensions with Moscow, which culminated in November 2015 when Turkish air forces shot down a Russian SU-24 fighter jet. From then on, Turkey’s capacity to impact developments in Syria diminished as Moscow also increased its support to YPG forces, expanding its control along the Turkish-Syrian border. Furthermore, the Kremlin established a de-facto no-fly zone for Turkey’s air forces with the deployment of Russian air defence systems at the Khmeimim airbase in Northern Syria. 

Rapprochement with Russia and its Limitations

After getting into such a deadlock over its policies in Syria, Turkey initiated a rapprochement with Russia in June 2016 when Erdogan wrote a letter to Putin signalling a readiness to resolve the jet crisis. This process cleared the path for Turkey's military interventions in Jarablus in 2016 and Afrin, a region under YPG control, in 2018. These operations were made possible through coordination with Russia's military, opening Syria’s air space to Turkey.

Why did Russia give the green light to a Turkish military presence in Syria, which ultimately contributed to Assad’s fall – a serious blow to Russian regional influence? Firstly, Russia expected Turkey to soften its anti-regime policies in order to bring the conflict in Syria to a more manageable level, and to support Russian-led diplomatic initiatives. In December 2016, for example, Ankara remained silent on operations by the Assad regime and Russia to retake control of Aleppo, while the evacuation of thousands of civilians and fighters was implemented under a Russian-Turkish deal. Secondly, Russia sought to exploit Turkey’s rapprochement attempts to help meet its larger geopolitical objective of driving a wedge through NATO, as Ankara increasingly felt that the Alliance fell short of guaranteeing its security and that the US’s Syria policy contributed to the growth of transnational threats. Weeks before the Afrin operation, Russia and Turkey concluded a deal on the sale of S-400 air defence systems, which still represents a serious problem in Turkish-NATO relations. What Turkey expected from its rapprochement with Russia was to increase its bargaining power vis-á-vis the US and to secure a military presence in Syria that would be of benefit in an era of great power competition. 

The Astana peace process initiated in 2017 between Russia, Turkey and Iran established four de-escalation zones across Syria including the Idlib province bordering Turkey, where Ankara secured military observation points. According to the Sochi deal between Russia and Turkey, the latter committed to clear Idlib province of ‘radical’ rebel forces and heavy arms, although it was questionable whether Ankara had the capacity to achieve this in an area not under its full military control, leaving aside its interests and preferences. Despite the de-escalation agreements, the regime supported by Russia and Iran captured the first three zones and some parts of Idlib, squeezing 4.5 million people including rebel fighters and displaced civilians into a narrow strip along Turkey’s border. Turkey was already hosting more than 3.5 million refugees, with growing social, political and economic repercussions. Turkish military forces resisted attacks by the regime on Idlib along with local rebel forces, sometimes at very high cost. On 27 February 2020, the Russian-backed Syrian air forces bombed a Turkish military position in Idlib causing at least 33 casualties, shortly after Turkish troops and proxies had captured the city of Seraqib at the junction of Syria’s two strategic highways. Following these developments, Turkey's military presence in Syria faced a growing challenge given the asymmetrical nature of Russian-Turkish collaboration and Assad's expanding control over the country, creating additional pressure on Turkey's positions.

Unexpected Fall of the Regime 

By 2023, Assad's continued rule was increasingly accepted as a reality by regional actors, including Arab states, which allowed Syria's re-entry into the Arab League to decrease its dependency on Iran. Meanwhile, facing domestic political pressure to address the refugee crisis, Erdogan began calling publicly for normalisation talkswith the Assad regime facilitated by Russia. Developments towards the end of 2024 rapidly changed all involved actors’ considerations and calculations concerning Syria. Advancing from Idlib, the HTS-led rebels faced little resistance as they swiftly captured Aleppo and other cities, and ultimately toppled the Assad regime in Damascus in less than two weeks.

The rapid collapse of the regime revealed the extent of Israel’s destruction of Hezbollah and Iran’s proxy forces through its operations in Lebanon and Syria over the preceding months. In the past, these actors had played a key role in providing reinforcements to the regime’s army. Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war and its inability to provide sufficient material support to Syria through its air force and navy also had a significant impact. Yet, Russia had never been a key factor in the ground fighting and could only resort to airstrikes on the HTS-controlled cities, leading to civilian casualties as seen in the last Idlib attacks which hit a hospital. Such costly moves would have further marginalised Russia concerning the future of Syria and the Middle East, with little chance of reversing the developments. 

It seems that Assad’s rapid fall could not have been foreseen by many global and regional actors, including Turkey. Some reports suggest that Turkey was informed of the presence of an attack plan by HTS six months ago, but Ankara did not endorse it, fearing that such a move would re-escalate the war between the regime and rebel groups and lead to a growing refugee flow from Syria. According to the Associated Press, Turkish officials declared that the rebel advance starting in late November ‘was initially meant to be limited’ but was expanded as ‘Syrian government forces began retreating from their positions’. After HTS captured Aleppo and Hama, Erdogan stated that he hoped Syrian rebel forces would advance further, but also added that the resistance of terrorist organisations was continuing and represented a ‘problematic advance’ from Turkey’s point of view.

Besides the YPG, HTS is also included in Turkey’s official list of terrorist organizations. Although HTS’s existence as the strongest rebel group in Idlib has run parallel to Turkey’s pragmatic interest in preventing Assad’s military operations, the organisation has never fallen under Turkey’s authority. Indeed, Turkey tried to weaken HTS’s dominance by following a divide-and-rule policy between radical and more pragmatic factions. However, Muhammed al-Jolani, HTS’s leader, preserved the autonomy of the rebel group and continued to behave independently from Turkey and its proxy forces. By 2022, HTS had defeated or co-opted many groups in the armed opposition, and asserted its control over Idlib, with the aim of ensuring a military hegemony over different factions of the SNA. The HTS-led march towards Damascus did not include the SNA, Turkey’s key ally, which moved towards the east to seize territory from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition including the YPG as its armed wing.

The Future of Syria and Turkey’s Political Influence

The history outlined above reveals how Turkey's changing policies and positions in Syria – driven by its concerns about non-state threats and the refugee issue – shaped dynamics conducive to Assad’s eventual fall, rather than directly orchestrating it. Recognising this can also help us to make more accurate predictions about the future of Syria and Turkey’s political influence.

Having captured Damascus and set up an interim government for Syria’s transformation, the HTS leadership will play a central role in the country’s future. Turkey has a great stake in limiting the radical Islamist tendencies of the group. HTS’s failure to lead an inclusive political transition accommodating Syria's diverse religious, ethnic and ideological groups would risk the re-escalation of civil war, mirroring the destabilisation witnessed in post-Gaddafi Libya. Such a development would likely exacerbate the refugee crisis along Turkey’s borders and lead to heightened international support for the SDF/YPG forces against extremists, intensifying Turkey’s concerns over non-state threats. Therefore, the more instability that emerges in Syria as a result of renewed conflicts, the less capable Turkey will be of shaping developments in line with its priorities and interests.

Turkey might be considered to be in a relatively advantageous position that would allow it to have some impact on HTS’s decisions given the maintenance of contacts established in Idlib. The US and Western powers have already sought to leverage Turkey's contacts with HTS to transmit their warnings and expectations concerning the transition process and the risk of extremist resurgence. However, the main initiative during the transition process will be in the hands of the HTS leadership. As the prime minister of the interim government, the HTS appointed Mohammed al-Bashir, previously the prime minister of HTS's Salvation Government in Idlib. Almost all officials of the interim government are linked to HTS and its previous ruling body in Idlib. The interim government – which excludes members of other opposition groups including the pro-Turkish SNA – currently assumes all functions and responsibilities in the political transformation process, without any checks or balances. If there were to be a resurgence in HTS’s radical tendencies, it is not clear how Turkey could assert control over HTS’s course of action beyond providing advice and recommendations. 

Nevertheless, HTS has adopted a pragmatic stance, showing signs of de-radicalisation and moderation since the advance towards Damascus, which have led to a favourable reception by Western powers and some regional actors. While these powers naturally seek to impact the developments in Syria, the HTS leadership needs to establish political, economic and diplomatic links with the world to remain in power. The US holds effective bargaining chips vis-á-vis HTS, as it could ease Syria's isolation and remove sanctions on the condition that the HTS leadership takes constructive steps both domestically and internationally, particularly in its interactions with local US allies like Israel and the SDF. Although Arab states are concerned about HTS’s radical origins and the risks of extremism and instability in the region, they also have to engage with the de facto rulers to manage such risks and their interests. Likewise, HTS needs economic cooperation with regional actors for Syria’s reconstruction. Even Russia has moderated its stance towards HTS to avoid further marginalisation in Syria, with Russian state media beginning to refer to HTS as ‘armed opposition’ instead of a ‘terrorist group’. Despite the background, HTS may also soften its approach towards Russia given its status as a permanent UN Security Council member with veto power on key decisions concerning international security and sanctions. 

Regional developments since the Arab Spring show the increasing flexibility of ad hoc and short-term alignments in the Middle East, as traditional military alliances remain too cumbersome to deal with transnational threats arising from regional conflicts and failed states. Since the mid-2010s, Turkey has efficiently played into the competition between the US and Russia to manage transnational threats and its refugee problem. The HTS leadership will have observed all these developments which have contributed to its rise to power more closely than international analysts and academics. Now, foreign powers are establishing contacts with the new regime in Damascus, marking a shift from the previous situation in Idlib where Turkey provided HTS’s sole opening to the world. If the HTS leadership is to survive in power, it must follow a similar pragmatic policy exploiting the regional interests of foreign actors and the competition between them. This will naturally pose a limit on Turkey’s influence in Syria in the longer term. 

© Murat Güneylioğlu, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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