New US Defence Strategy: Why Obama is Abandoning America's Commitment to Fight Two Major Wars

By Dr Lisa Aronsson, Research Fellow, Transatlantic Studies, RUSI

President Obama and Secretary Panetta outlined a new, over-arching defence strategy intended not only to guide the 2013 budget proposal, which the President will submit to Congress in February, but also the $450 billion - and potentially up to $1 trillion - in defence cuts expected over the next decade. The January 2012 strategy calls for a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region, more investment in cyber, space and ISR capabilities, a reduction in troop numbers for the Army and Marine Corps, and more emphasis on air and naval capabilities. Entitled the 'Defense Strategic Guidance', this document provides few details about the specific nature of the cuts, but rather defines the strategy in broad brush strokes and sets the scene decisions to be taken in the next month and over the next few years.

In the American political context, central to the new strategy is the debate over the two Major Theatre Wars (2MTWs) standard, a force-sizing construct for the superpower with roots in the Cold War, but which was defined and officially adopted only afterwards. It then functioned as the cornerstone for American defence strategy and planning for the entire post-Cold War period. In American politics and certainly in the election campaign, however, departure from the 2MTW standard is likely to be the most controversial aspect of Obama's new strategy. Republican responses and conservative bloggers have already lambasted Obama for weakening America's defences, eroding confidence among key allies and inviting aggression from adversaries like Iran or China.

Why the Two Major Theatre Wars Concept Endured

What's surprising about the two-war construct is not that is has died a slow death but that it generated a political consensus, had bipartisan support and endured for as long as it did. It was introduced into Pentagon strategy in 1993, re-affirmed in the 1996 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and it remained central through the terms of five Defense Secretaries and in the Administrations of George H W Bush, Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama. It was re-affirmed again in the 2010 QDR written by Obama Administration officials.[1]

The key challenge for defence planners is to translate strategy into guidelines for force structure, spending and investment, and to explain the purpose of US defence forces to the American public and to the world. When Cold War structures collapsed, American planners had expected a return to regional tensions, and aggression from regional enemies was considered likely: the Persian Gulf and Korean peninsula were most likely areas for Major Theatre commitments. The idea of preparing for two Major Theatre Wars survived because it was considered capable of meeting post-Cold War security needs, and because it generated a political consensus that established the rationale and parameters for defence posture.

The construct also established clarity for US force planning: to prepare for two simultaneous Major Theatre Wars, and to engage in other operations on a 'by exception' basis.[2] For at least a decade, it was uncontroversial, and many believed that it worked. Wars didn't break out in the Gulf or Northeast Asia, and many believed this was at least, in part, because potential adversaries believed the US could inflict crushing defeat on two enemies at once. The capacity may never have been perfect, but Two Major Theatre Wars strategy was considered adequate, and it was underscored as delivering deterrence in a way that a single Major Theatre War strategy never could.

Obama's 1 + 2 Strategy

President Obama claimed that under the new strategy, which has been described as 1+2, US forces will maintain the ability to 'do more than one thing at a time' and to combat any enemy, anywhere. He didn't overtly depart from 2MTW in his remarks, but he did define a new construct. Under the 1+2 construct, the US will maintain the ability to fight one Major Theatre War, to spoil adversaries elsewhere, and to conduct several smaller operations such as disaster relief or implementing a no-fly-zone simultaneously. 

The decision demonstrates a calculated and careful shrinking of the forces as well as a shift in doctrine, and it will undoubtedly be followed by cuts to key areas such as the nuclear arsenal, combat aircraft commitments, military salaries, retirement and health benefits and ground force numbers, which are expected to be reduced by 10-15 per cent. More details about the cuts, and potentially about the strategy, will be clear from the February budget proposal. The 1+2 framework acknowledges that major inter-state ground wars are not necessarily of the past, and yet it also answers some of the criticisms 2MTW faced over the last decade.

The crux of criticism to the threat-based, Two Major Theatre Wars strategy was that it was overly preoccupied with threats that were unlikely to occur, and that it failed to address the Pentagon's other business of protecting US interests overseas, building partnerships and training, patrolling difficult areas, targeting terrorists and conducting minor operations. It was also based on an assumption that forces designed for two Major Theatre Wars would necessarily be sized and structured for the normal business while maintaining peace in Europe, stability in the Middle East, in Northeast Asia and in Asia Pacific as China's power began to grow. It was beholden to Cold War thinking, and it is quite possible that the Department of Defense never really achieved it having focused on preparedness for one major war and other smaller contingencies all along. The concept endured, nevertheless, because it remained uncontroversial in partisan politics, and because nothing better was found.

Vulnerability and the 2012 Elections

Some worry that Obama's announcement and new strategy will undermine confidence among America's overseas allies and encourage aggression. Considering the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and as Andrew Krepinevich pointed out, a 'strategy of bluffing is probably the worst of all'.[3] It is sensible to re-balance the American forces geographically as well as in terms of the balance between ground forces and air and sea capabilities, and with more investment in cyber capabilities, access in the global commons and ISR capabilities. In the American political context, and amidst election campaigns, Obama will face a series of challenges as a result of this new strategy and its presentation.

In his remarks at the Pentagon, Obama argued that America is in 'a moment of transition'. The US has 'responsibly' ended the war in Iraq, and made significant progress in Afghanistan's transition, and that he had therefore decided it was time to 'turn the page on a decade of war'. Obama's implicit optimism about the future of Iraq and Afghanistan and his abandonment of the commitment to fighting two major wars at once may corner him in the 2012 election politics. His opponents have and will continue to charge him with undermining American power, alliances and defences. What was also notable about his presentation was its absence of concrete figures. The strategy reads more as an exercise in preparing or persuading public opinion of the need for cuts ahead of the February budget proposal.

The President will take also criticism from those concerned about the long term stability of Afghanistan, the viability of transition, Iraq's stability, Iran's nuclear programme, and tensions in the South China Sea and the lack of transparency around Chinese political ambitions and military build up. Small wonder, therefore, that the two frontrunners for the Republican ticket - Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum - both said they would bomb Iran if it developed nuclear weapons. The strategy is full of ambition and concepts, but President Obama, Secretary Panetta and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were evasive when it came to providing numbers. The test will come in the application of strategy, and in maintaining credibility. Obama must demonstrate that he has not put savings above security, and he must not become prisoner of his own slogans, as has happened in the past.

NOTES

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[1] 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf>, page vi.

[2] A typical MTW commitment would include 6.5 Army and Marine Divisions, 10 USAF fighter wings, and up to 4-5 carrier battle/strike groups, or roughly half of the total US Armed Forces. See Richard L. Kugler, 'Replacing the 2-MTW Standard: Can a Better Approach Be Found?', available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/jointops00/kuglar.htm.

[3] Andrew Krepinevich, quoted in the New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/us/pentagon-to-present-vision-of-reduced-military.html?pagewanted=all> 3 January 2012.