Boycotting Hamas is not a sustainable option for the international community. There are currently several factors which could persuade Hamas to play by international norms and the European Union is well placed to enforce this.
By David Martin Abrahams for RUSI.orgÂ
The controversy surrounding the 'Freedom Flotilla' to Gaza in May emphasised, amongst other things, the international community's refusal to deal with the besieged Hamas government However, this approach of non-engagement is not sustainable.
The Flotilla controversy highlights the shift in sympathy towards the Palestinian position and a hardening of attitudes towards Israeli policy. Concurrently, Hamas and its supporters are becoming adept enough to adopt and embrace peaceful and international norms to further their objectives. This presents an opportunity to establish positive relations. If the United States is prevented from engaging in this, the European Union is well placed to take on the role. The EU has the capacity to complement the endeavours of the United States without undermining its position.
Hamas looks to non-violent protest
Many groups who the international community refused to communicate with subsequently embraced democracy and were pivotal in promoting reconciliation with former enemies. Examples range from the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the African National Congress and the Palestine Liberation Organisation now under Mahmoud Abbas.
Scott Atran, an anthropologist at France's National Center for Scientific Research and the University of Michgan, and Robert Axelrod, a professor of political science and public policy at the University of Michigan, have noted that often it was civil-society, whose make-up included private citizens ranging from clergymen and academics to scientists, who brought these groups into the fold. Direct interaction with terrorist groups is often essential as listening to them equips Western governments with an appreciation of the roots of their discontent.
It is private individuals that have caused Hamas and Hizbullah to increasingly reject violence as a policy option and instead embrace new strategies that incorporate non-violent tactics, including protests, civil disobedience, lawsuits against Israeli officials and boycotts of Israeli goods. The Gaza-bound flotilla was also initiated by private non-state actors supported by Hamas in the same manner that private individuals supported lawsuits against Israeli officials in American, Belgian, British and Spanish courts rather than committing acts of terrorism. This led Hamas and Hizbullah officials to realise that these peaceful activities, rather than violent ones. caused Israel to be subjected to the greatest pressure to ease conditions in Gaza. To this end, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah called on supporters to join the next flotilla bound for Gaza.
Hizbullah political official Ghaleb Abu Zeinab observed that, for the first time, Nasrallah embraced such tactics against Israel.
In the West Bank, the Palestinians have embraced non-violent protests that include Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's boycott campaigns against products made in Israeli settlements, to prevent them being sold in Palestinian Authority-controlled territory.
This softer form of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is 'manageable' and reveals an increasing willingness on the part of Hamas to embrace international norms. This can only assist in a future Palestinian state taking a seat in the international community.
Furthermore, Hamas's shift in tactics provides Western governments with a wide opening to engage in a peace-process between the two sides as it is challenging to engage with entities while they are firing rockets at each other. Every new attack prompts  a military response which leads to a never-ending cycle of violence.
Instead, soft forms of protests can lead to a cycle of soft tensions in which reasoning is used and deadlocks are avoided. Indeed Hamas's new approach is cutting-edge for the region today, and if swiftly taken up by the international community, a new precedent can be set for the Middle East at large. If centuries-old religious, cultural and nationalist conflicts waged throughout the region can be continued in a soft and reasonable manner, they can ultimately be resolved.
Accepting the State of Israel
In my personal experience, I found in Hamas belief in a realistic course of action where there is room for optimism. In a meeting with Aziz Dwaik, Hamas's most senior representative in the West Bank and elected speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Dwaik revealed that Hamas would be willing to recognise Israel's right to exist and to nullify its charter, which calls for the destruction of Israel.
The Jerusalem Post in 21 January 2010 further reported that Dwaik also relayed to me that other Hamas leaders, including Damascus-based leader Khaled Mashaal and Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, both expressed their support for establishing an independent Palestinian state within the pre-1967 boundaries. This scenario demonstrated that by reaching out to Hamas, we could be a moderating influence that would cause their position vis-a-vis the State of Israel to change.
Hamas's charter is over two decades old and the Hamas leadership recognises that changing their charter signals their embracing of modernity. It is precisely the EU's usage of soft power in the form of European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and its capacity to engage, that represents modernity to Hamas.
EU leadership in engaging Hamas
While the US refuses to negotiate with Hamas, the EU can engage in Track II diplomacy towards Hamas on an array of issues ranging from releasing kidnapped Israeli soldier; Gilad Shalit (to promote good will towards Israel and contribute towards an environment of recognition for both sides); strengthening civil-society in Gaza through allocating increased finances directly to civil-societal organisations; bettering the human rights conditions in Gaza and weaning Hamas away from Iranian sponsorship.
Iran's sponsorship of Hamas makes the conflict more intractable and bringing Hamas into the EU's orbit will further advance a context that is conducive to initially managing and ultimately resolving the conflict.
Not engaging Hamas further pushes it within Iran's orbit, enabling the regime to wield its proxy as it considers fit even to the extent of initiating a war with Israel. As time goes on, Hamas will become an increasingly pivotal actor in the peace process. Recently, the flotilla incident placed a tremendous amount of diplomatic pressure on Israel, and promoted Hamas as a result of Israel's easing of the blockade on Gaza. Hamas has further been strengthened by Turkey's support.
The Track II initiative towards a sub-state group is an extension of the strategy exhorted by numerous policy officials in Washington DC circles that seek to decouple Syria from Iran, promoting the strategy as being 'realistically' feasible.
Similarly, President Obama had welcomed leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to attend his speech at Al Azhar University in Cairo. Recently Al-Quds newspaper claimed that Obama Administration officials were conducting secret talks with Hamas prompting vehement denials from the White House.
Despite this, the Obama administration is indirectly providing support. It is fair to say that a Track II diplomatic initiative would receive the tacit support of the Obama administration.
The costs of non-engagement
When the international community refuses to engage Hamas and humanitarian agencies bemoan the lack of financial aid for them to develop Gaza, this results in Hamas being emboldened to develop Gaza in its own image. To this end, a black market economy has developed in which tunnels are built to smuggle goods.
Ultimately Hamas profits handsomely from this regardless of whether the international community wants to hold talks with it or not. Reengagement naturally reduces radicalism while creating an opening for liberal forces to be fostered and ultimately thrive. To this end, it is paramount for the international community to demand that civil-societal organisations including NGOs and schools are not co-opted by Hamas, but enjoy their independence, are free from incitement, learn to love their neighbour and function in security.
This is only part of a strategy that should be embraced as it will advance a viable Palestinian state. While the EU has focused on supplying humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, it must also invest in building robust liberal and transparent state institutions. This cannot be achieved without meeting with Hamas officials.
Finally, the EU can also adopt the productive position of advancing reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah. This will resolve the Israeli dilemma of not having a peace partner to negotiate with and furthermore offer a secure environment for the EU to cultivate the growth of civil-society which began with the Barcelona Process. Such a context will enable Track II diplomacy to allow municipal elections (originally scheduled for July
2010) and national elections (originally scheduled for January 2010) to take place and not be repeatedly delayed. It is only in this liberal environment that negotiations can take place between Israel and the Palestinians, coupled with achieving a positive outcome.
David Martin Abrahams is a member of the Royal United Services Institute.
The views expressed here are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.