Israel and Gaza: A Ceasefire, not Peace

The war in Gaza between Hamas and Israel is finally over. Or is it? Sadly, probably not. But for the coming weeks at least, there is a chance to change the Middle East for the better, should the new US president choose to take it.

The long-awaited ceasefire finally came into effect on 19 January 2025, 470 days after the terrorist atrocities committed by Hamas on 7 October 2023 triggered one of the most devastating reprisals enacted on a civilian population in recent times. While statistics are unreliable, it is thought that about 50,000 people have died in the war between Hamas and Israel. In retaliation for the brutal murder of 1,706 Israelis, the Israeli military has killed at least 46,000 Palestinians, 70% being women and children, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. Many others, including humanitarian aid workers and journalists, have also died in the fighting.

The world is celebrating the stop in the fighting, which continued up to the last moment. In the three-hour delay to the ceasefire’s implementation, more Palestinians lost their lives in Israeli attacks. The delay was due to Hamas failing to provide a list of the Israeli hostages who would be released. 

It is, of course, right to welcome the cessation of military action. The release of innocent civilian hostages held for 15 months is also cause for rejoicing, not just in Israel but in any country that believes in the sanctity of human life and protection of the innocent from barbarism and terrorism. 

That said, it is important not to confuse the ceasefire with the start of a renewed peace process for the Middle East. The clue is in the label: ceasefire means just that, nothing more. A stop to fighting. What happens when the guns fall silent holds the key to whether this is just another pause in the cycle of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians – as witnessed repeatedly over the last eight decades – or the start of something different, a rupture with violence and a political process leading to sustainable peace and security. For the moment, such an outcome seems a long way away and hard to envisage. 

What the Ceasefire Means: Differing Viewpoints

One issue standing in the way of lasting peace is the fact that each party is interpreting the ceasefire differently. 

The government of Prime Minister Netanyahu seems to have been forced into accepting an agreement by its most important foreign backer. After the Israeli government repeatedly ignored the public demands for de-escalation issued by then-US President Joe Biden, the intervention of incoming President Donald Trump seems to have been impossible to ignore. Trump made clear that the fighting should stop before he became president on 20 January. It is unclear what threat underpinned the demand – a suspension of arms sales or military support, perhaps – but whatever it was, it worked. 

So for the time being, Netanyahu has to toe the line, even at the risk of losing support from his far-right settler coalition partners, including in the cabinet. While complying with the terms of an agreement that has been on the table since last May, Netanyahu has made it clear that he is ready to break the ceasefire and return to war at the slightest provocation. Indeed, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) activity and Palestinian deaths in the West Bank have continued unabated since the ceasefire.

Hamas has been in no position to push for anything apart from a ceasefire for months. It has lost its leadership, decapitated by audacious Israeli assassinations in Gaza and Tehran. Yet Hamas still exists, and though it has lost many of its fighters, it is clear – not least from the footage of Hamas fighters handing over hostages – that Netanyahu has failed to achieve his primary stated objective for the war: to eradicate Hamas. 

Unsurprisingly, Hamas’ backers in Iran have been quick to interpret the ceasefire as a defeat for Israel. The Iranian Foreign Ministry claimed that the ceasefire was a historic victory. According to the commander of the Al Quds Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces in Iran, Esmail Qaani, the ceasefire was a moment of ‘shame, disgrace and the greatest loss for the Israeli occupation’. 

So, while neither side seems ready to see this ceasefire as more than an interlude, and international diplomats recognise that the agreement is a fragile and political sticking plaster, it is better than the killing and destruction that came before. It also offers an opportunity to create something more lasting, and avoid condemning another generation of Israeli and Palestinian children to a violent future. 

What Happens After Phase One? 

The first phase of the ceasefire, which will last 42 days, is detailed in the agreement: fighting will stop; humanitarian assistance will be allowed into Gaza; there will be an exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners; and the Israeli military will start to withdraw from Gaza. Phases two (a permanent end to the war) and three (the reconstruction of Gaza) are, by contrast, thin on detail, which means that all is still to play for as negotiations on the detail restart at the beginning of February.

Though Netanyahu and Israeli extremists may be itching for a return to conflict, most Israelis seem to prefer peace. So do most Palestinians, tired of the despotic rule by Hamas in Gaza and the corrupt and ineffective Fatah in the West Bank. The people want something different, and this may be their chance to achieve it.

Much will depend on the international community – in particular, whether Trump will be prepared to back Netanyahu once phase one is over and Trump is once again well-ensconced in the White House. Trump is uniquely placed to turn the ceasefire into a political process, as demanded by the US’s allies and other countries: specifically, to create a roadmap towards an independent state for the Palestinians and a lasting peace and security for the region. Along with the Palestinian people, the Israelis would be the biggest beneficiary of such a process and normalisation with their neighbours. The Europeans and other countries in the Middle East – particularly the Gulf states – are ready to support that change, both politically and with funds for rebuilding.

Iran and its allies – such as Russia, with which it signed a new mutual defence pact just before the ceasefire – would accept such a process out of an interest in self-preservation, despite its historical opposition to the existence of Israel. The Islamic Republic will not want to risk giving Netanyahu and Trump an excuse to increase the pressure, and even strike it militarily. It has rarely been weaker, both domestically and internationally. So, while the rhetoric will continue, Iran encouraging Hamas to attack Israel seems highly unlikely. Rather, it will be pleased that its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, though militarily defeated and degraded, have managed to remain in existence with the potential to rebuild strength over time.

For now, the world will suspend disbelief and pray that the ceasefire will last. However, the likelihood must be that the lack of trust and genuine political belief in turning this into a last peace will result in a renewal of conflict. Netanyahu may have won the battle for Gaza, but the war is far from over. In fact, a new battalion of potential anti-Israel terrorists may have been created among the 19,000 Palestinian children that the UN estimates have been orphaned in the past 15 months. 

Netanyahu’s own political future is precarious, as he has presided over arguably the worst security failure in Israel’s history. He knows that his own position will be stronger if the war reignites. Whether Trump will care enough to prevent that, embrace the once-in-a-generation opportunity and provide the strong, visionary leadership needed to pave the way for a new era in the Middle East will be decisive. If the new US president wants – as some suggest – to win a Nobel Peace Prize, this is probably the best chance he will ever have.

© Nicholas Hopton, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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