How Trump’s Environment and Aid Policies Undermine His Latin America Agenda

Since President Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office on 20 January, he has made it clear that Latin America is firmly in his sights. To deliver on his promise to ‘Make America Safe Again’, Trump has predominantly looked to the south of the US border, eyeing drug trafficking cartels and irregular migrants as key national security threats.

Among the torrent of Executive Orders issued by Trump immediately after his inauguration was the designation of international cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs), because of their so-called ‘campaign of violence and terror’ in the Western Hemisphere and their role in having allegedly ‘flooded’ the US with drugs and criminals. A month later, the US administration  categorised  eight Latin American organised crime groups (OCGs) under this umbrella, including the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua; the Salvadoran Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13); and the Mexican Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cártel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Cártel de Golfo, and Cárteles Unidos. 

The exact implications of the FTO designation remain unclear. The designation could be purely symbolic, given that earlier calls to implement this move were struck down on the basis that cartels are already on sanction lists and that the designation would strain resources and provide no added value. However, the designation has raised concern that the Trump administration plans to conduct extraterritorial operations against cartels, prompting Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to warn the US against taking any unilateral action that violates Mexican sovereignty. Regardless of its actual intention, the FTO designation indicates that weakening Latin American OCGs as a strategy to stem the flow of drugs and people to the US is a key strategic priority.

Turning a Cold Shoulder

Despite Trump’s clear intent to restore US interests in the country’s historical ‘backyard’, his approach so far has been to present regional allies and trade partners with ultimatums to receive migrant deportation flights and impose tougher measures against organised crime, or else face crippling tariffs. This approach risks alienating regional leaders, which could encourage them to build stronger ties with US geopolitical rivals such as China and reduce regional appetite for cooperation with the US on combatting transnational organised crime.

Furthermore, on 20 January Trump ordered a ‘90-day pause in United States foreign development assistance’ to reassess the alignment of aid disbursements with US foreign policy, on the basis that much aid was ‘antithetical to American values’. This order suspended aid for Department of State and USAID programmes globally, creating confusion and uncertainty across the development sector. 

This measure – while currently only temporary – is at direct odds with Trump’s stated interests in Latin America, which in 2023 received more than $2 billion in US foreign aid. According to the Congressional Research Service, over the last decade much of this funding has been dispersed to programmes that address the underlying drivers of migration in Central America, combat drug production and facilitate peace accord implementation in Colombia, tackle illegal drugs and strengthen the rule of law in Mexico, and resolve humanitarian crises in Haiti and Venezuela. Other pockets of funding have gone towards reducing violence against women and girls and combatting human trafficking. In other words, the funding has largely sought to promote security in the region, weakening organised crime and reducing push factors for northward migration.  

While a reassessment of the efficacy of these programmes is not necessarily a bad thing – for example, punitive US-funded counternarcotics strategies in the region have had concerning human rights implications for the rights of communities, while having no fundamental impact on drug supply – turning off the aid tap without warning leaves a concerning vacuum for organised crime to fill and is likely to exacerbate migration to the US.

In Denial

Concurrently, in actions reminiscent of Trump’s first presidential term, the new US administration has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Accords, reversed much of what Trump has dubbed ‘Biden’s policy of climate extremism’, ordered federal websites to remove any mention of climate change, and reneged on support for scientific research that references the climate crisis. These measures prompt the question of whether foreign aid projects that promote climate and environmental security will be reinstated. 

This undermines Trump’s Latin America strategy in two ways. Firstly, from droughts devastating Ecuadorian hydroelectric power to floods sweeping across Brazil, citizens are facing increasing vulnerability to climate change, which has already had visible impacts on migratory movements. For example, studies have found that extreme weather such as tropical storms and irregular rainfall has played a significant role in driving undocumented migrants from agriculture-dependent parts of Mexico to the US. 

Secondly, the growing scarcity of natural resources over the last decade has led Latin American OCGs to increasingly diversify their revenue streams from ‘traditional’ illicit markets such as drug trafficking to the illegal trade of natural commodities – such as tropical timber, endangered wildlife, and critical minerals – enabling OCGs to strengthen their organisational resilience and deepen their footholds in strategic territories.

In Mexico, OCGs traditionally committed to drug trafficking have expanded their activities into illegal logging and illegal fishing. For example, in their areas of presence, the Cártel de Sinaloa and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación have monopolised control of fisheries, imposing rules on and extorting local fishermen and other actors in the supply chain. In the Amazon basin, OCGs such as the Brazilian Primeiro Comando da Capital, the Colombian Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and other non-state actors have co-opted a range of illicit extractive activities including illegal gold mining, illegal fishing and illegal logging, using a similar method of extortion and rulemaking in their areas of operation, exploiting the absence of a robust state presence. These activities often complement the original business lines of OCGs. For example, drug proceeds are invested in illegal fishing or mining operations as a means of laundering illicit funds. In other cases, drugs have been used as an alternative payment to cash, entangling local communities in criminality and driving drug dependency. 

Environmental crime depletes wildlife harvested for local subsistence and contaminates vital water sources, creating economic uncertainty for communities that depend on these natural resources. These factors may drive vulnerable populations to engage in criminality themselves for lack of alternative options, or else seek access to the US, often along treacherous smuggling routes that put them at the mercy of OCGs. Overlooking the environment is thus counterproductive to achieving Trump’s main objectives: dismantling violent OCGs and deterring northward migration.

Taking Measure

Latin America has retaken centre stage in US national security priorities. The FTO designation of OCGs indicates that the second Trump administration seeks to adopt a punitive, deterrence-first migration and organised crime policy. However, such policies are reminiscent of the ill-fated ‘war on drugs’ that has long been widely perceived as ineffective for tackling drug-related organised crime and highly detrimental to the rights of vulnerable communities in the region. The effectiveness of migrant deterrence strategies has been similarly critiqued, given that they fail to consider the root causes of migration.

The Trump administration’s blanket suspension of foreign aid and apparent disdain for environmental policies indicates a disregard for the socioeconomic factors driving OCG expansion and irregular migration in Latin America, which is likely to ensure their continuity and proliferation. To meet its national security priorities, the US will need to be attuned to the interconnected risks of crime and environmental degradation and consider holistic, preventative approaches instead of reactionary policies that fail to address the root causes of organised crime and migration flows. 

Furthermore, US foreign policy in Latin America cannot be one-sided. Trump’s engagement with the region so far has pushed an ‘America First’ approach without an appreciation for the country’s longstanding partnerships in the region. Beyond concerns about crime and migration, imposing unilateral counter-crime measures on the region and freezing aid without first consulting and respecting these partners risks exacerbating Trump’s other major security concern: China’s increasing influence on the world stage. If the US fails to demonstrate its willingness to work with Latin American leaders to build mutual security, they are likely to seek out China as an alternative option.

© RUSI, 2025

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