How to Support What Remains of Russian Civil Society

Is there any real civil society left in Russia today? How one answers this question usually feeds into discussions about the accountability of ordinary Russians for the war in Ukraine, the democratic potential of Russian society, or its civic engagement. However, we might consider a different approach: what forces remain in Russia that can address the faults and flaws in the system? Who can express the discontent directed at a political leadership that diverts funds from healthcare, education, road maintenance and water services, only to throw them into the massive conflagration of the ongoing war? Supporting regional journalism and watchdog organisations is a way of restoring some agency to Russian society and ensuring that pressing domestic issues can siphon off political attention and resources from the war in Ukraine.

A substantial number of independent and democratically focused initiatives and organisations are still active across the country, working to tackle societal issues through civic engagement. They deserve recognition and support. However, many of their activities remain under the radar and are not easily discernible from the outside. Due to the harsh political pressure they face, more politicised initiatives have curtailed their visibility or gone underground, with information about their work being shared through closed channels. This presents a challenge for anyone wishing to support or collaborate with them. Furthermore, direct backing from abroad poses a significant risk for initiatives on the Russian side. The primary assistance external actors can offer at present takes the form of tools, software, security, training and ensuring that independent Russian voices are included in discussions on global matters. It is also vital to facilitate communication and experience-sharing among regional actors inside the country. The Russian leadership will view this as a hostile move, but a stronger civil society, equipped with effective watchdogs and professional journalism, will ultimately benefit the citizens of Russia as well as its neighbours. The interference of the Russian state in Western societies serves only to sow discord and undermine the institutions that uphold democracy and the rule of law. External actors should aim to bolster processes that promote self-determination and justice for the people of Russia.

Decentralisation and regional self-determination have been pivotal in the shift towards democracy across Central Europe and in fostering a sustainable democratic framework in Ukraine. The political agency that gradually began to surface in Russia during the 2000s, emerging as an undercurrent to the rising authoritarian tendencies at the state level, has been most evident among the urban middle class at the local and regional tiers. It is at this level that Russia’s future will ultimately take shape, and where a move towards pluralism, liberalisation and greater predictability can be nurtured. For many Russians today, envisioning a cohesive political community at the federal level is a challenge – their own country often feels like an unfamiliar and daunting landscape, riddled with issues that few citizens fully comprehend. In contrast, at the regional level, where an increasing number of Russians were expecting a degree of influence until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there is a glimmer of hope for a better future for themselves and their children.

The time to act is now, as opportunities to support meaningful initiatives dwindle month by month. Backing independent journalism and civil society on a regional level as future watchdogs offers a more reliable approach than engaging with what is often termed the opposition in exile. A widespread awareness of the dysfunctions and abuses within the current political system will fuel discontent and could exert pressure on any future successor to Vladimir Putin. When discussing exiled actors, it is essential to distinguish between those initiatives that provide support and build community in their current host countries and those that genuinely bolster civil engagement inside and across Russia. 

The past three years have been all about crisis management and assisting long-standing partners who are under threat from repression to find safety. Now is the time to take a clear-eyed look at the landscape of Russian actors and consider what actions and initiatives will fulfil the foreign and security policy objectives of a safer Europe and the restoration of international law. The focus should be on those operating within Russia. Initiatives and activities outside the country ought to be judged by their courage and their ability to develop concrete political visions, to tackle the most challenging issues surrounding the country’s present and its totalitarian past, and to enhance the resources and capacity of the civil society that remains in Russia, both legal and otherwise.

We recommend that strategies for cooperation with Russian civil society in Europe and North America concentrate on strengthening the capacities of regional and local information channels across Russia. These channels tend to have greater credibility owing to their proximity and relevance. The Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies has produced an evidence-based report mapping the landscape of independent initiatives in Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This map is dynamic and could help attune external support for this environment. The primary means of restoring a rules-based security order in Europe continues to be military, political and financial backing for Ukraine, alongside repressive measures and military deterrence against Russia’s aggressive policies. However, this additional, albeit smaller, tool should also be considered and utilised. The key principle is to avoid causing harm, while at the same time not becoming overly cautious and anxious – at least not any more so than Russian actors themselves. The opportunity to reinforce what remains of civic agency in Russia should not be missed. Supporting Ukraine is, and must remain, the foremost priority, but the challenges posed by Russia extend beyond the current conflict. The issue will not be resolved unless there is a change within Russia itself.

This commentary is based on a report published by the Stockholm Centre for European Studies, available here.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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