Flying Solo: How Australia’s JP9102 SATCOM Requirement Will Set New Standards

As space aficionados and space industry leaders rub shoulders this week at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition’s Space Hub in London, they are likely to discuss the additional £16.5 billion for the UK defence budget and, specifically, the newly launched UK Space Command. While UK space capabilities are finding a new home and vision, even bigger strides are being made on the other side of the world: Five Eyes ally Australia is seeking a sovereign satellite communications system, and has committed to spending $7 billion on its space capabilities over the next 10 years, with up to $3 billion reserved for its SATCOM.

What this new system will look like is unclear as yet. The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) launched its tender for Joint Project 9102 in April 2021, and several companies have already thrown their hat into the ring to become the new provider of Australia’s space capabilities. This tender, and with it the move to a sovereign system, is having an impact on Australia’s defence systems by changing the way the ADF operates – the aim of the project being to enable joint command and control of deployed Joint Task Forces through a system that offers greater range and capacity. The Australian Defence SATCOM System (ADSS) will facilitate real-time information for deployed troops as well as growing data capacities, thereby increasing ‘capacity, resilience, agility and flexibility’.

But the changes are not restricted to the military realm, for this update will have political implications as well. Australia’s aspiration to achieve greater self-reliance in space and to reduce its dependence on its US ally signifies the prominent position of the sector on the government’s agenda. The forces are currently covered through JP2008, which includes access to the US military’s Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) – a high-capacity communication satellite manufactured by Boeing, which is also used by Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Australia’s next-door neighbour, New Zealand. But even without access to WGS, Australia has some US-independent capabilities, which include a communications payload, as well as an ultra-high frequency communications payload on a satellite that covers the Indian Ocean region. In addition, it already operates fixed and mobile ground satellite communications infrastructure, as well as a satellite-independent high frequency network.

While these capabilities combined appear to fully cover Australia through highly capable, international systems, there is a catch: whenever the ADF needs to access WGS, it needs to ask permission, as was the case during the 2020 bushfires that ravaged the country and burned more than 11 million hectares. In the case of this emergency, aid was granted and received within 24 hours. But this does not conceal the fact that the government had to ask in the first instance, and that, on future occasions, help may be refused – for example, in the case of a major US emergency that demands full access to its capabilities.

Self-reliance is thus one of the main reasons for the procurement of a sovereign system. Another is faster access. The aspired turnaround time is within minutes; the current system can take weeks or months for the required arrangements to be in place, according to the Boeing Defence Australia JP9102 programme manager. Faster access is a priority, partly because of the evolution of threats that the ADF – and defence commands around the world – are anticipating in the future. There is currently no international legal framework on the weaponisation of outer space, while at the same time space is becoming more accessible through the development of smaller satellites. The natural conclusion is to see space as an emerging domain of its own, rather than as a mere auxiliary to land, air and sea operations. This includes attacks on satellite communications, either by taking control of a satellite (for example, lowering its orbit and causing it to burn up in the Earth’s atmosphere) or by using satellites as weapons in themselves. The potential taking over of satellites is just one of the many ways in which space intersects with the field of cybersecurity; both fields have been deemed to be undergoing ‘escalatory cycles’ of militarisation. It is clear why the Australian Department of Defence would spend its time and resources on forging a new path forward to meet these requirements. But what will that look like exactly?

Among the bidders are Airbus, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Boeing is perhaps the closest to posing as the incumbent, since it manufactures the US WGS programme – meaning the ADF is already familiar with its structures. This also means that its products would be interoperable with other Five Eyes capabilities. Boeing’s consortium includes ViaSat, whose ViaSat-3 satellite would cover the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, Airbus is proposing to install Skynet satellites, which can also be found in the UK’s space arsenal. The company has a memorandum of understanding with the Australian Space Agency and is a founding member of the SmartSat Cooperative Research Centre, a consortium of industry and research organisations developing cutting-edge technology for Australia’s space industry. In competing for JP9102, Airbus has set up Team Maier, which is cooperating with key Australian space and technology companies, including ground-control infrastructure specialist UGL and satellite ground control segment expert Clearbox Systems.

It is unclear which satellites Lockheed Martin will be proposing in its tender, but there are expectations that they will stem from its A/LM2100 family. These are already in use as GPS satellites for the US military. Similarly to Airbus, the company has teamed up with Clearbox Systems to deliver its foresight ESM (electromagnetic spectrum management) software. The goal of the software is to decrease the risk of technical difficulties.

Regardless of who wins the tender, the new system will cover Australia’s mainland, as well as the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Tactical communications for deployed forces will go through a high-mobility narrowband SATCOM, whereas fixed locations that require high data throughput, such as naval vessels and aircraft, will rely on high-capacity wideband.

The tender for JP9102 is set to close at the end of December, and industry will be watching closely to see which technology team will be providing Australia’s first sovereign satellite system. Although the details of the new SATCOM are only speculative for now, the request for a sovereign system and the government’s spending commitment are already making waves. This step highlights that space security has become a higher priority for the Australian government, thereby increasing its need for self-reliance in the field. Further, it shows the recognition of space as a domain in itself, where novel threats need to be anticipated. We can only assume that other governments will follow.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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