Europe’s Challenge: Trump Sirens Broader Trends in US Politics

Given the recent rhetorical and postural shifts signalled by the Trump administration with regards to the transatlantic relationship and NATO, European partners are left with more questions than answers. As they reel from what appears to be a fundamental shift in this historic alliance, they ask themselves: are these changes limited to President Trump, or do they signal a larger ideological and strategic realignment at work in the United States? To what extent do Americans support Trump’s foreign policy priorities? Is there room for dissent in the foreign policy debate that may give hope for a return to a familiar approach?

Donald Trump and Europe: ‘Art of the Deal’ or Ideology?

Donald Trump is not an ideologue operating from a grand strategy playbook. He is, however, driven by a handful of core beliefs. First, the US has made an outsized contribution to fund and underwrite the post-Second World War international order and has not benefited nearly to the level of its payments into the system. Second, alliance-based foreign policy has led to the enrichment of others, to the exploitation of America, and to the degradation of its standing in the world. Third, the economic prism functions as the primary (but not exclusive) framework for qualifying and achieving ‘America First’, a worldview characterized fundamentally by hard power with no interest in the notions of influence and credibility built by investing in soft power.

With his stated admiration for President William McKinley, Donald Trump has shown a penchant for that president’s 19th century policies of economic protectionism and territorial expansion, regardless of the historical debates ultimately questioning the efficacy of such a legacy.

If Donald Trump is more focused on transactions than on commitment to a particular ideology, he is bookended by two dominant figures – Vice President JD Vance and Elon Musk – each with expressed ideological tendencies and complimentary functions in Trump’s orbit. Both Vance and Musk share Trump’s preference for disrupting – if not dismantling – the system and ridding it of what they perceive as entrenched interests and waste.

Elon Musk has made clear his disdain for allies, universities, media, immigration, and US membership in the UN and NATO (among others) while also adopting a ‘chainsaw’ approach to gut federal spending and the federal workforce. Overseas, he has hailed right-wing movements in more than fifteen countries on six continents through vigorous public support (online or in person) for parties, figures, and causes defending nationalism, nativism, and anti-regulation in their respective lands. If there is an international ambition for the spread of ideological Trumpism, Musk is its one of its most visible and loudest proponents.

JD Vance has carved a very visible space for himself in the Trump orbit, far exceeding the image of the eternally eclipsed vice president. Through his willingness to act as Trump’s attack dog and with his full embrace of Trump foreign policy ideas, Vance is quickly positioning himself as an inevitable successor for 2028.

Supported in his political rise by Peter Thiel, Vance has come to embrace scepticism of alliances, anti-immigration sentiment, hostility for free trade, and criticism of American military engagement as being harmful to working class Americans.

Vance has been vehemently critical of Ukraine and US aid to that country’s war effort, insistent on the need for Ukrainian territorial concessions to Russia, and an advocate for a fast end to the war in Gaza. And Vance, like Musk, has been a fervent critic of Europe. JD Vance’s understanding of the inner workings of American politics, particularly the Senate, and his unhidden presidential ambitions (Elon Musk recently referred to Vance as ‘the next president of the United States’) make him a key figure in the intellectualization, institutionalization, and perennialization of Trumpian ideals both at home and abroad.

Recent statements from Trump administration officials regarding Europe (including Trump himself, but also Vance and Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth) embody at least three beliefs in Republican foreign policy circles. First, the US must finally reduce its engagements in Europe in order to shift to the Indo-Pacific (Vance, Hegseth).

The underlying assumptions are that the US cannot fight against Russia and China simultaneously and must reorient its security apparatus to better curb the rise of its new peer competitor in Beijing. Second, the US would do better to deal with European nations on a bilateral basis rather than to negotiate with the European Union, the world’s second-largest economic power.

The US would then be able to incentivize those countries who reinforce defence and economic cooperation with Washington while threatening or punishing – via tariffs for example - those that do not. Shared values do not matter in this approach, transactions do. Finally, there is a belief among many policymakers in the United States that Europe is of decreasing relevance as a geopolitical player.

The recent leaked private Signal exchanges were but the latest confirmation that Trump administration contempt for Europe runs deeper than mere public posturing ( ‘I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It’s PATHETIC.’ wrote Hegseth to Vance). Particularly JD Vance, as the nation’s second most powerful elected official, embodies criticisms that go beyond grumbling about imbalanced defence spending and emphasize societal culture war issues that fuel the MAGA movement in the US. In Munich, Vance accused European democracies and their institutions of denying free speech by regulating hate speech, of ‘civilizational suicide’ by not curbing immigration, and of ignoring voters’ concerns on these issues.

That same speech, lambasting traditional allies, amounted to implicit support for Germany’s AfD in the days leading up to elections there, just as he met with its leader Alice Weidel shortly after. Faced with pushback from this speech, Vance later doubled down: ‘The transatlantic elite have created so many institutions to silence their own people and to delegitimize the beliefs of the public.’

Vance’s rhetoric would indicate the desire to support Trumpism abroad through support for populist parties and governments that align with Trump’s societal and economic policies characterized by anti-elite, anti-immigration, and anti-regulation sentiment. This would make Vance, along with Musk, a key player in transforming an ideological worldview into real foreign policy realignments.

How does Trump Foreign Policy Fit with US Public Opinion?

Up-to-date, extensive public opinion polling on foreign policy is relatively scarce; but recent Gallup polls shows that Americans’ top preferences are not entirely out of line with the president’s overall international priorities even if they are increasingly expressing reserve about his means to achieve them. Across parties, Americans’ chief preoccupations are preventing terrorism and nuclear proliferation, securing the US’s energy supply, and promoting favourable trade policies. Values-based prerogatives like providing humanitarian assistance, building democracies, and the economic development of other countries fall to the bottom of the list.

Americans of both parties placed these issues last, but Democrats showed more support for them than their Republican counterparts. Small majorities of Americans indicated support for defending allies’ security more generally (58%), and for Ukraine specifically (50%). Regarding the method for guaranteeing US interests, about 60% of Americans surveyed confirmed their approval for acting through multilateral channels like the UN and NATO. Within that figure lies a clear division along partisan lines. In the case of both the UN and NATO, approximately 9 out of 10 Democrats were in favor compared to just 4 Republicans out of 10.

Even some of Trump’s more controversial recent decisions – freezing humanitarian aid and taking steps to gut USAID – have not created a watershed moment to crystalize public opinion against him. If around two-thirds of Americans believe that shuttering USAID will lead to death elsewhere or to more humanitarian crises, nearly half also say that Trump’s decision will allow that money to be directed to domestic problems and/or to reducing the national deficit.

That said, most Americans do not want humanitarian aid to be cut entirely, even among those who argue that the US spends too much. And generally, Americans overestimate the amount its government typically spends on such assistance. Nonetheless, this polling echoes a sentiment long in the making – Americans concerned about dire domestic issues (decaying infrastructures, the homelessness crisis) are increasingly wary of sending money far away rather than investing at home.

Beyond recent foreign policy public opinion polling, it is worth noting that Americans’ perceptions of threats and opportunities are changing. An overwhelming majority of Americans consider China to be either a threat or an enemy. And deeper, ineluctable demographic shifts are gradually turning Americans’ attention away from Europe. Young Americans (starting with Millennials) are most likely to have one immigrant parent. They are the most multicultural generations in US history. They indicate less personal attachment to Europe and look more to the East and to the South as the theater for international challenges and solutions (NB: Hispanics are the fastest growing demographic group and currently account for about 20% of the US population).

The growing distance from Europe – embodied increasingly by the sociodemographic profile of the American population – is also evident within this administration. The Trump II foreign policy team counts little European expertise but is perhaps the most experienced on Latin America.

Little Incentive for Dissent

Currently, there is little incentive within the Republican party to question Donald Trump’s stewardship of American foreign policy, and Democratic voices on international issues are not in a position to alter the political landscape. The president’s action is not misaligned with public opinion – his stated goals, particularly around the economy, energy and, to a lesser extent, terrorism are coherent with what matters to Americans.

If most Americans support multilateralism and alliances, the president’s disdain for both is nonetheless supported by his MAGA base and Republican voters. Since the president fixes the country’s foreign policy orientations, his party gives him wide berth to do just that, and Trump is no exception. In other words, there is no reason to expect meaningful and impactful dissent at this stage. And were he to face a public challenge, Donald Trump has repeatedly shown readiness to wield the threat of mounting a midterm primary challenge to dissenters, to be financed by Musk.

Even if some Republicans in Congress will discreetly indicate their continued support for the funding the Ukrainian war effort, for example, the electoral risk and political price (vis-à-vis Trump but also with regards to their voters) for open opposition is often too high for all but a handful of the most prominent Republicans.

The next major electoral moment will take place with the 2026 midterms. If voters tire of Republican Party policies, they will have the opportunity to deliver (at least partial) control of Congress back to Democrats as well as governorships and other state and local offices. Foreign policy, however, is unlikely to figure into voters’ decision-making. Instead, touchstone campaign issues – particularly the economy and inflation – will dominate their thinking. A future Democratic congressional majority would grant the opposition more authority to influence foreign policy (with their power over the budget and ability to authorize or require foreign policy actions such as sanctions), but the president will still have the power of the bully pulpit.

© Amy Greene, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

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