Deconstructing Russia’s Plans for Greater Eurasia: Where Theory Meets Supply Chains

The ebb and flow of summitry over the past few months has understandably focused on the much-anticipated Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska in August, followed by the tantalising prospect of a neither-confirmed-nor-denied follow-up in Budapest.

Perhaps less theatrical but potentially as revealing has been the flurry of meetings and conferences that took place in Belarus over the last few days. Ordinarily these kinds of conferences are brushed aside as a ruse to grandstand, lob criticisms towards the West and air well-rehearsed views. And while the conference in many ways showcased just this, it also demonstrated the growing military coordination between Belarus, North Korea and Russia, and so parts of the meeting merit closer dissection.

A perhaps unintended consequence of western sanctions and political isolation from the West has been the deepening of Russia’s germinating alliances with other states, such as North Korea as well as Iran and China. These relationships have become more than the theory of strategic partnerships; they are evolving as a result of the war and will continue to take shape amid Russia’s future plans for its military reconstitution.

For President Lukashenko, playing host to the relatively large conference was an attempt to highlight Belarus’s convening power. Although a country largely internationally isolated thanks to its domestic human rights violations in 2020 and support of Russia’s invasion, a conflict where Belarus only stopped short of sending Belarusian troops to the battlefield, Lukashenko has in recent months been cultivating his own relationship with President Trump – with the apparent nonchalance of Putin – and with the potential for results if he is able to capitalise on it. Lukashenko is presenting himself to the Americans as a leader with the ear of Putin, capable of conveying political messaging on the war, as well as the slightly contradictory stance of both an independent country with its own foreign policy, but also as a state so enmeshed with Russia that a study of Belarus may lead to a deeper understanding of Russia.

On the sidelines of the Minsk conference, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity, with the DPRK’s Foreign Minister engaged in several high-level meetings with her Belarusian and Russian counterparts, including a personal audience with Putin before travelling to Minsk, pointing to the seriousness with which Russia accords this burgeoning alliance. Separately and on a much lower level, Belarus and North Korea are establishing their own relationship, with an exchange of high-level diplomatic overtures earlier this year.

Initially, it was Sergei Shoigu who led on Russia’s relationship with the North Koreans, an interesting trope in and of itself. Until last year Shoigu, who managed to cultivate a personal relationship with Putin that stood independently of his office, was rotated out from his position as Minister of Defence to become a presidential aide, with many of his associates in the Ministry dismantled on corruption charges. In a turn of events unusual in Russian politics, he has swiftly reconstructed many of these networks, carving out a niche for himself by leading on Russia’s foreign policy relationships with powers like China and North Korea; in June 2025 alone he visited the DPRK twice on Putin’s direct orders. This adds a degree of personalisation to the bilateral relationship with the DPRK – but also points to its brittleness.

Political artistry aside, Belarus and North Korea are both playing relatively similar auxiliary roles in the war; North Korea as a supplier of troops to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk last year and ammunition – the amounts of which are significant but difficult to pinpoint – and Belarus as an important supplier of components, logistics and repairs of equipment that Russia has struggled to localise, since its loss of a heavy industrial base that used to be located in Ukraine during the Soviet period.

Constructing Greater Eurasia

This military-logistical activity and political framing are important steps in the relationship, but some of the discussions at the recent Minsk conference revealed the intent but also constraints of Russia’s strategy for a Greater Eurasia in more detail.

Putin’s redrawing of the globe and Russia’s place within it has taken shape over the past few years, influenced by both history and geography, and has settled on the interconnectedness of Eurasia as an overarching theme – geographically, economically and politically, and with a growing security dimension that is becoming more formalised between multiple partners. To that end, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept (published in 2023 amid the war) refers to Russia as a Eurasian Euro-Pacific power – meaning that, due to its geographical expanse, nuclear and military might, vast hydrocarbon reserves and its status as the cultural bearer of the Russian Orthodox tradition, Russia occupies a unique place in the world, justifying most of its global and regional interventions. Russia’s self-reflections notwithstanding, it is unclear that other partners such as the DPRK and China necessarily buy into this worldview – even if they are not prepared to actively challenge it.

All of this means that the unifying agenda between these nations requires other elements to be durable. Here, Russia believes it has the answer.;

If the Greater Eurasia concept is the theoretical overarching justification for Russian interventionism – and vehicles such as the SCO and BRICS are a way of advancing this politically – then interconnectivity and the construction of supply chains is the means of implementing Russia’s global ambitions. Indeed, the Minsk conference made repeated references to the взаимосвязанность (interconnectedness) of these countries in Eurasia, not just as a part of sanctions evasion – although this plays an important role too – but in emphasising the geographical importance to Russia of enduring transport corridors and supply networks for the future of its political economy.

To meet this need, Belarus and North Korea play perhaps the most important role, but one that is constrained by financial impracticalities.

Belarus and its territory are key to Russia’s strategic planning for its own military and civilian use – the construction of and investment in Belarus’s railway network after 2015 laid the groundwork for the invasion of Ukraine. But as Russian Railways (RZD’s) financial woes have accumulated – as a result of an overstrained network and lack of FDI – investment in Belarus’s infrastructure has been slashed. This comes even as Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on Belarus to service and repair its own network to move troops and cargo to the front, due to a lack of its own capacity and inability to localise production of spare parts to a high enough standard. Russia has made no room in its recently passed budget to account for its interdependency or its inability to identify unsanctioned international partners, which will seriously impact supply chains. This highlights an ongoing discrepancy that has plagued Russian governments for centuries – the mismatch between theory and practice.

Similarly, Russia has sought to cement its military relationship with the DPRK with infrastructure to boost deliveries of weapons-grade supplies and facilitate military exchanges. The DPRK in the last couple of months has sent more than 5,000 additional troops to assist Russia with its own infrastructure construction; Russia has plans to host DPRK engineers in Kursk and the Far East and, after extended COVID-related lockdowns, the DPRK and Russia resumed rail passenger traffic in June 2025,. Although there is currently only one bridge linking the two countries, the construction of a new road bridge across the Tyumen river, scheduled to be complete by 2026, could relieve pressure on the rail network. While Russia favours infrastructure megaprojects due to their political significance, the scope for kickbacks in procurement and construction industries, and the actual tangible output, these projects are ultimately usually of limited practical significance.

If both the DPRK and Belarus’s relationships with Russia are for now themed around their utility in the war, their significance will grow amid Russia’s attempts to reconstitute its armed forces in the coming 7-10 years. But if infrastructure and supply chains are the means through which Russia exacts its foreign policy plans, financial and practical constraints will hobble this. Plans for a Greater Eurasia united by interconnectivity will require some more thought.

© RUSI, 2025.

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