The Components of Russia’s Undeclared War Against the West

At the end of the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western politicians are increasingly expressing their opinion on certain conditions for its conclusion. This is undoubtedly facilitated by the election of US President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly promised that he will stop the war immediately after taking office. At the same time, the Russian side is increasingly emphasising that it sees no prerequisites even for a ceasefire, and continues to increase the size of its Armed Forces and weapons production. In addition, the number and audacity of Russian operations carried out against Western countries themselves is increasing. All these indicators point to the intensification of Russian efforts not only to militarily seize Ukraine, but also to destabilise and capture the West. Western leaders are stubbornly trying not to notice this, to some extent imitating the behaviour of their Ukrainian colleagues on the eve of the Russian invasion. However, an analysis of Russia’s intentions and investments in acquiring the capabilities necessary to overthrow the West leaves no room for disagreement. Russia is waging an undeclared war against the West and is enjoying significant success in this war.

Despite the fact that Russia has not declared war on the West, this war is well known to Russian citizens. Russian media, opinion leaders, civilian and even military representatives of the Russian government have repeatedly stated that Russia is waging war against NATO in Ukraine. And it is waging it in the literal sense, since, according to statements by Russian officials, they are opposed on the territory of Ukraine by Polish, Romanian and other NATO member states’ troops. Moreover, representatives of the Russian elites are also convinced that the war is being waged against the West, and not against Ukraine, which is only an obstacle on this path. Russian expansionism, which is the basis of modern Russian state ideology, is of an absolutely global nature, the goal of which is to establish a new world order in which Russia will be able to claim hegemony. In Alexander Dugin's famous book Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia – which was written at the request of the Russian General Staff in 1997 and is still actively used in the training of Russian military personnel, intelligence officers, diplomats, and other civil servants – among other extremely interesting things, there is a definition of Russia's geopolitical goal: ‘Russia's struggle for global dominance is not over’. The consonance of this thesis with Vladimir Putin's famous statement that Russia's borders do not end anywhere is no coincidence.

Of course, achieving such dominance in one iteration is not possible. In this regard, the strategic partnerships that Russia is building with other authoritarian countries that seek to change the existing status quo – and primarily with China, which has the necessary economic and industrial base for this – are of great importance. The biggest obstacle to such changes remains NATO, which personifies the united West, and the war in Ukraine is viewed by Russia as a strategic crisis designed to destroy this unity. With the war in Ukraine, Russia is trying to prove the inability of the West to defeat Russia, the unwillingness of the US to protect Europe and, as a result, the pointlessness of NATO. The destruction of the Western collective security system through its complete discrediting may become a much easier task than it seems at first glance. Undoubtedly, Russia is not ready to go to war with the forces of a united Europe, but it has sufficient potential to take on individual, even relatively large, countries. Russia's future behaviour will be determined by its militarisation. A country that has devoted virtually all of its national resources to the means of war has no alternative to war. If the only tool you have is a shotgun, the only business you can start is robbery.

By effectively exploiting and fuelling the fear of armed conflict with Russia and demonstrating the West’s inability to protect itself or others, the Kremlin is also managing to ensure the steady rise in popularity of its own political proxies in NATO and Eastern Partnership countries, who advocate various forms of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with Russia – all of which are essentially just euphemisms for capitulation. A prime example of the effectiveness of using such intimidation to seize power is the outcome of the parliamentary elections in Georgia in October 2024. The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party, which controls the government, openly stated in its political campaigning that voting for pro-Western parties would mean an inevitable invasion of Georgia by Russia, and used photographs of destroyed Ukrainian cities. As well as spreading fear of Russia, Russian influence operations in Europe are actively aimed at undermining the popularity of the US, NATO and the EU, which are portrayed as the main factors in a possible military escalation. A significant proportion of the pro-Russian political forces in Europe openly advocate the need to reduce their countries’ participation in international security organisations in order to avoid war with Russia, which would further divide and weaken the West. Russian soft power under the current conditions is not soft, and offers to choose peace in exchange for concessions most resemble the offer to choose life in exchange for a wallet during the robbery mentioned above.

It is debatable how much the popularity of pro-Russian parties in Europe has increased and whether they have a real chance of forming governments in the most important member states, but elections are not the only way to gain power. The expansion of the 161st GRU Specialist Training Center, known as Unit 29155, to three units; the formation of the Special Activities Service on its basis; and the promotion of the unit’s head, General Andrei Averyanov, to the rank of deputy head of Russian defence intelligence clearly indicate a growing demand in the Kremlin for unconventional warfare tools that can be used against the West. The unit’s main specialisation has always been operations for political destabilisation and the seizure of power by force, attempts at which are known for certain in Montenegro, Moldova, Armenia and Spain. Strengthening the unit's capabilities, along with the mass recruitment of former high-ranking officers of the armed forces and intelligence services of NATO member countries, as well as active communication with extremist organisations of various ideological orientations in these countries, forms a set of tools that can be used for a wide range of unconventional operations, from riots and terrorism to armed separatism and coup d’état’s.

Preparations for war against the West can be observed not only in strategic units, but also in the Russian Spetsnaz, for which another deputy head of the GRU, General Vladimir Alekseev, is responsible. Thus, according to information available to the European intelligence community, at the end of 2023, a new unit was created under Alekseev – the 236th Specialist Training Center, the purpose of which is to conduct sabotage operations on the territory of NATO countries, which were previously carried out by their colleagues from the Special Activities Service. This indicates both the need to focus the efforts of Averyanov's subordinates on more strategic tasks, and plans to seriously scale up sabotage operations. Under modern conditions, when even low-level criminals are actively used to conduct such operations – often recruited remotely – the requirements for the qualifications of recruiters are significantly lower than in the past, and Spetsnaz officers can easily cope with such tasks. Considering that the total strength of Spetsnaz units is between 15,000 and 20,000 people, the lower quality of operations can be fully compensated by their number. For more complex operations, officers of the 322nd Specialist Training Center (Unit 92154), known as Senezh, can be used. Sabotage actions have three goals. In addition to causing direct damage, these are the internal destabilisation of Europe and the undermining of trust in governments that are unable to effectively counter them, as well as preparing opportunities for the mass destruction of military and civilian infrastructure during a Russian military invasion.

Thus, despite investing significant efforts in preparing the conditions for both legal and illegal changes to the political landscape in Europe and bringing politicians to power who serve its purposes, Russia is also actively building networks that will only make sense in the event of a direct military invasion. As in the case of Ukraine in 2014 and probably Georgia in 2025, this suggests that the internal destabilisation that such a change in the political landscape will inevitably entail, regardless of its success, is viewed by the Kremlin not as an end goal but as a prerequisite for possible military aggression. Russia’s undeclared war against the West is already underway, and the stubborn refusal to acknowledge this fact by most Western leaders makes the West’s defeat only a matter of time.

© Oleksandr V Danylyuk, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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