The Coming Fight for Syria

Before sunrise on 8 December 2024, Bashar al-Assad boarded a plane and left the country he had ruled with an iron fist for so long. Curiously, he opted for the longer flight to Moscow rather than the much shorter hop to neighbour and long-term ally Iran. 

For many, Assad’s destination was inconsequential. What mattered was that the hated autocrat, who had killed at least 600,000 of his own people, was gone. But concerned pundits tempered the enthusiasm, invoking recent instances where an Arab dictator had fallen to illustrate that Syria’s future was far from bright: looting, instability and violence could be expected to follow. Optimists claimed that this time was different. Syria is not Iraq, nor is it Libya. Syria is Syria. And in Syria, it was not a foreign occupier that made regime change possible. Quite the opposite: this was the product of the Syrian people’s own blood, sweat and tears. They had finally not just removed a home-grown dictator but also freed themselves from Russian and Iranian domination. 

Both the optimists and the pessimists are right. This was the Syrian people’s triumph. Likewise, Syria has seen some looting, but nothing like the widespread anarchy after the fall of Saddam Hussein. But pessimists are right to focus on ‘the day after’. Once the celebrations end, Syrians will have to decide what kind of country they want and who should lead it. Yet Syria is not a coherent, unified state. It is made up of multiple armed groups with different goals and foreign backers. Thus, the country’s future – and which external powers will control a significant stake in a post-Assad Syria – will not be a decision that the Syrian people will make alone. 

The Former Status Quo 

Syria under Assad was neither free nor sovereign. Assad’s rule was brutal, yet his regime did not enjoy the monopoly over power within Syria’s borders that is a necessary component of statehood. Before Assad’s fall, the country was de facto partitioned: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) held eastern Syria, the Islamist Hayut Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ruled the northern Idlib province, and the Syrian National Army (SNA) was sandwiched between SDF and HTS-controlled territory. Even in areas Assad nominally controlled, such as the southern Daraa province, in practice it was local militias from the Southern Front (SF), whose loyalty flipped between the rebels and the regime, who really called the shots. 

Each of these groups has one or more foreign benefactors. The SDF are US-backed. HTS, on the other hand, are closer to Turkey than any other foreign power. But they are not a Turkish proxy; that dubious honour falls to the SNA. The SF were US- and Jordanian-backed before switching to Russia’s payroll in 2018. As HTS’s offensive gained momentum, though, many former SF groups became rebels again and reconstituted themselves as the Southern Operations Room (SOR). Assad may have fled, but none of these internal groups or their foreign backers are going to disappear anytime soon. 

Turkey Triumphant?

The most powerful external actor in Syria today is Turkey. Since the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, Ankara has perceived the conflict as both a threat and an opportunity. 

The threat is less Syrian Arab and more Kurdish. Because of the Assad regime’s weakness, eastern Syria’s Rojava – with its Kurdish majority – became an autonomous region. Rojava’s SDF government either provided shelter for PKK militants or (if one believes Turkey) is functionally indistinguishable from the group. Given that the PKK seeks to create a Kurdish state which includes the Turkish regions that border northeast Syria, Ankara sees the SDF as an existential threat. It wants to remove the SDF from its border and, if possible, destroy the group entirely. 

With the Assad regime fighting for its survival, Turkey also saw an opportunity to project its power into Syria. In 2019, it occupied a 100-mile deep ‘safe zone‘ in northern Syria and reconstituted parts of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) as the SNA. Bolstering its ranks with Turkish jihadists, who like Russia’s convict armies in Ukraine were released from jail on the condition that they serve their country abroad, Ankara turned the FSA from an ally into a proxy. Turkey also changed the SNA’s primary target from Assad to the SDF. 

Concurrently, Turkey cultivated ties to HTS, a jihadist group who seized power in Idlib in 2017. Turkey did (and at the time of writing, still does) list HTS as a terrorist organisation. But it kept HTS’s administration afloat by opening Idlib’s Turkish border for trade. It also hampered the Assad regime’s freedom to act against HTS by posting the Turkish military to Idlib and mediating with Russia to ‘de-escalate‘ the fighting. Ankara thus achieved an impressive symmetry of having a proxy (the SNA) and an ally (HTS) operating in adjacent provinces. This allowed Turkey to become more powerful in Syria than it had ever been in modern times. 

HTS has, to say the least, also benefitted from the relationship. Despite possessing only around 20–30,000 fighters, HTS led the offensive that caused a mass rout among Assad’s forces. As such, it holds most of the cards in a post-Assad Syria. Turkey continues to constitute a vital ally for HTS. The Director of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency, Ibrahim Kalin, was the first foreign official to publicly meet with HTS’s leader, Ahmed al-Shara. Once this taboo had been broken, officials from the UK, France and Germany – among others – lined up to meet the former jihadist. 

The US, Jordan and Israel Return 

In eastern Syria, the SDF controls most of Syria’s oil, and the group were on the frontline in the fight against Islamic State fighters. Both these facts have earned the SDF powerful friends in Washington. Most of the 2,000 US troops in Syria operate in or around SDF territory and have helped shield the group from SNA and Turkish attacks. Meanwhile, in southern Syria, Jordan is working to reassert its influence. It re-opened one of its border crossings with Syria and hosted representatives from the US, EU, UN and Arab world for an international conference on Syria in December 2024. 

Israel, meanwhile, was as surprised as everyone else by the Assad regime’s fall, and as a result imported its standard failsafe policies when it feels insecure – a combination of territorial occupation and blunt military force – to Syria. Israel captured the western side of the mountainous Golan Heights region from Syria in the June 1967 ‘Six-Day War.’ Later, during the early years of the civil war, through its ‘good neighbour’ policy, Israel provided aid to civilians living on the Syrian-controlled eastern Golan. It ended that policy when the Assad regime reasserted control of the region in 2018. But with Assad’s border guards suddenly deserting after Damascus fell to HTS in late 2024, Israel returned to Syria. It sent troops to capture the demilitarised zone (DMZ) in the formerly Syrian-controlled Golan. It has since expanded its presence in Syria beyond the DMZ, generating friction with local civilians. Further, in a campaign that began as soon as Assad fell and which is still continuing in January 2025, Israel launched nearly 500 airstrikes against former regime assets throughout Syria. 

All Eyes on Rojava 

While Turkey, Jordan, the US and Israel might cooperate in other areas, in Syria they are increasingly at loggerheads as they each jostle for influence. This is not just a case of stepping on each other’s toes; in many cases their interests are diametrically opposed. 

Earlier in 2024, Turkey pursued a deal with the Syrian regime to launch a joint offensive against the SDF. When Assad proved too intransigent, Turkey lost patience and gave HTS the green light to launch an offensive of its own. Its achievements surpassed everyone’s expectations. But for Turkey, this was always a means to an end: its primary target was and remains regime change not in Damascus, but in Rojava. Because Turkey was forewarned of the HTS offensive, it exploited the situation to launch a simultaneous SNA offensive against the SDF.

This is exactly what the US wants to prevent. So far, though, its mediation efforts between its warring allies have had mixed results. The impediment is that Turkey feels empowered by its recent successes and has adopted a hardline stance. The US convinced SDF troops to withdraw from the city of Manbij in exchange for a ceasefire with the SNA. Yet the SNA’s attacks sporadically continued. Since the ceasefire expired on 16 December, fighting has escalated, while SNA and Turkish troops have begun massing for another offensive. 

Do HTS’s growing ties to Turkey mean that it, too, will go to war with the SDF? Al-Shara has previously stated that Kurds are ‘an integral part’ of Syria and have nothing to fear from HTS. But HTS recently took the city of Deir Ezzour from the SDF after its formerly SDF-affiliated Arab militias defected to al-Shara’s group. HTS has supposedly been negotiating with the SDF over a long-term ceasefire. But each side’s demands show that no-one has any illusion about who is really talking to whom. HTS has demanded that the SDF withdraw from the border with Turkey and end its ties to the PKK. The SDF, in turn, wants Turkey to end its occupation of northern Syria. As such, HTS is less a mediator and more a conduit for the SDF to talk to Turkey. 

Even if it remains neutral, a full-blown conflict in northern and eastern Syria will make HTS’s claims to represent all Syrians and to exert authority throughout the entire country look tenuous at best. It will face increasing pressure to back Turkey and the SNA. This will make it harder for Western countries, who are already suspicious of HTS, to engage with the group. Al-Shara will have to carefully balance these competing external and internal pressures. 

Ones to Watch: Israel, Russia and Iran 

In southern Syria, Israel is a ‘good neighbour’ no more. Israel’s leaders initially claimed that its expanded occupation was temporary, whereas its strikes would target former regime chemical weapons and long-range missile facilities. These explanations are increasingly implausible. Israel has expanded its strikes to everything from airports to seaports. It has gone beyond the DMZ to occupy over 450 square kilometres of Syrian territory, including the al-Wahda dam, which supplies electricity to Syria, and the Yarmouk basin, a river which carries water to Jordan. It has also expelled Syrian civilians from their homes. The Golan is supposed to be Israel’s buffer zone. It is now demanding a buffer zone to protect its buffer zone, while its control of Yarmouk and al-Wahda will cause anxiety in Jordan.

This looks less and less like a prudent and preventative security measure. At best, it is a flawed attempt to mitigate instability that will only create more instability. At worst, it is a deliberate provocation. Al-Shara publicly stated that Syria has no desire to fight Israel; he even called for UN peacekeepers to return to the demilitarised zone. Israel, though, is having none of it. Jerusalem believes that the West is as naive as ever and that Al-Shara is a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’. Turkey’s ties to HTS might allay Western policymakers’ fears about the group’s Jihadist origins. But for Israel, the opposite is true, given its long-fraught relations with Turkey. This is one reason Jerusalem is acting so forcefully. It feels that the clock is ticking – Syria will soon become a Turkish protectorate, and Israel will lose its freedom of action – and so it is seeking to maximise its future agency by creating facts on the ground now.

Finally, Russia and Iran are down, but not out in Syria. Supporting Assad was always a means to more important ends for both these powers. This is exemplified by Russia’s bases in Syria’s Tartus and Hmeimim. The former is a naval base that gives Russia its only access to the Mediterranean Sea. The latter serves as part of Moscow’s supply line for its forces and allies in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, all of which have recently adopted pro-Russian stances. Iran, in turn, maintained its unlikely friendship with the secular Assad regime primarily because it needed a land bridge to Hezbollah. Tehran values Hezbollah over Assad because the former has long held disproportionate influence over Lebanon and supposedly acts as a deterrent against Israel attacking Iran. While Assad has fled, Iran’s long-established and intricate network of weapons and drug smugglers has stayed put. Similarly, Russia hopes to keep its bases. 

Conclusion 

The revolution against Assad was Syrian-led. Likewise, Syria is a Russo-Iranian protectorate no more. But that does not mean that Syria is free from foreign control, nor is it united. Instead, it is transitioning from Russian and Iranian hegemony to being ‘in play’. Turkey and HTS are currently on top, but they do not hold a monopoly on power. Multiple internal and external players have divergent and often competing interests inside the country. Everyone talks of Syrian unity, but beneath this rhetoric they all have their own, distinct visions for the country. 

Syria is now occupied by at least three foreign powers: Turkey, Israel and the US. Turkey and Israel’s actions are destabilising. The US, by contrast, is trying to de-escalate a potential SNA/Turkish/SDF conflict, while tentatively engaging with HTS. But it must do more. It must convince or compel Israel to stop its strikes and cease expanding its occupation. It should also back a beefed-up UN presence in the DMZ and work with Jordan to get the SOR back on its feet in the area, so that Israel has no excuse for its actions. 

Trump’s imminent return, however, does not bode well for Syria. It was his botched attempt to withdraw all US forces in 2019 that prompted Turkey to occupy northern Syria. It also allowed Russia to take over several US positions and cultivate ties to the SDF. Trump has recently claimed that Syria is ‘not our fight’; he later suggested that Turkey should ‘rule’ the country. Vice President-elect JD Vance has argued that the US should withdraw from the Middle East and let Israel ‘police’ the region. But police are supposed to defend the status quo. In Syria, Turkey and Israel are not only revisionists, but also increasingly see each other as a threat. Furthermore, Islamic State has recently exploited the chaos to increase its activity in Syria, and it still has 50,000 former members in SDF jails. The group will surely exploit any SDF collapse. 

In sum, the fight against Assad is over, but the battles over who controls Syria and what the country will look like are only just beginning. It is unreasonable to believe the US could stay out of this, particularly given that it is one of the only (and perhaps the only) external force that is currently trying to de-escalate tensions and promote post-conflict reconstruction. 

© Rob Geist Pinfold, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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