The Chinese Communist Party's Strategic Engagement in South Asia

In the first two weeks of 2025, Vice-Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC) Sun Haiyan met with the Bangladeshi and Nepali ambassadors to China. This was in line with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deploying an increasingly sophisticated party-to-party diplomatic strategy across South Asia, revealing a comprehensive approach to regional influence that extends beyond traditional state-to-state relations. Through the IDCPC, which is also known as the International Liaison Department, Beijing has developed a systematic framework for building and maintaining influence through party-level relationships in South Asia, demonstrated by an intensive series of diplomatic engagements throughout 2024. 

The IDCPC, established in 1951, serves as the CCP's primary organ for conducting relations with foreign political parties and organisations. While technically separate from China's state diplomatic apparatus under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IDCPC plays a crucial and complementary role in advancing Chinese foreign policy objectives. The department maintains contacts with hundreds of political parties across the globe and has evolved from its original focus on communist and socialist parties to engage with a broad spectrum of political organisations. Under Minister Liu Jianchao's leadership, the IDCPC has taken on an increasingly prominent role in China's international engagement strategy, particularly in developing regions like South Asia where party-to-party relationships offer unique channels for influence building. 

The IDCPC's organisational structure reveals a carefully calibrated approach to diplomatic engagement. At the helm, Liu handles strategic-level interactions, while Vice-Minister Sun manages regular diplomatic engagements across the region. Liu, appointed in 2022, has taken a more active diplomatic role than his predecessor and could become the country’s next foreign minister. Sun spent the majority of her career at the IDCP. Prior to her appointment as the first female vice-minister of the IDCPC in 2023, she was the Chinese ambassador to Singapore.  

This two-tier system enables China to maintain both high-level strategic dialogue and consistent working-level engagement. For instance, when engaging with Pakistan, Liu led the China–­­­­Pakistan Political Parties Forum and the third meeting of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Political Parties Joint Consultation Mechanism, while Sun handled regular interactions with delegations from various Pakistani political parties.  

China's multi-party engagement strategy is particularly noteworthy. Rather than focusing solely on ruling parties, the IDCPC maintains active relationships across the political spectrum in each country. In Nepal, for example, Sun engaged with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), the Nepali Congress Party and the Rastriya Swatantra Party. Furthermore, in November 2024, a month after India and China reached a border agreement to ease tensions since the deadly clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 which led to a downward spiral in bilateral relations, Sun met a visiting delegation from the All India Forward Bloc, a left-wing nationalist political party. This approach ensures relationship continuity regardless of electoral outcomes and builds comprehensive networks of influence within each country's political system. Through this mechanism, China has also had a meeting with the foreign secretary of Bhutan despite the two countries not having formal diplomatic ties. 

The cultivation of next-generation leadership represents another crucial aspect of China's party diplomacy. The IDCPC regularly hosts young political leaders from across South Asia, organising specialised programmes and study visits. This was evident in the delegation of young cadres from Bangladesh's Awami League visiting the Museum of the Communist Party of China in June 2024 and in Sun meeting with a delegation of young cadres from the Nepali Congress Party, led by Sita Gurung, leader of the Party and Member of the House of Representatives of Nepal, emphasising cooperation in infrastructure, tourism and cultural exchange. 

China's approach to the Maldives provides a compelling case study of its opportunistic and comprehensive diplomatic strategy. After Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu's state visit to China in January 2024, Sun quickly followed with a visit to Male, where she engaged with multiple stakeholders including the president, parliament speaker and foreign minister. This engagement coincided with the announcement of a $130 million grant and the signing of 20 bilateral cooperation agreements, demonstrating how party diplomacy complements and enhances state-level relations. 

The IDCPC has also developed a sophisticated approach to media engagement and public opinion management. In October 2024, Sun met with Pakistani social media influencers and media workers in Changchun, China, emphasising the need to ‘show the Pakistani people, especially the Pakistani youth, a real, three-dimensional and comprehensive China’. Similar engagement occurred with Nepali media influencers, led by the general manager of Nepal Television, highlighting China's recognition of the importance of public opinion in maintaining regional influence.

Economic integration forms a central pillar of China's party diplomatic strategy. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) features prominently in discussions with all regional partners. In Bangladesh, for example, discussions frequently centred on the Bangladesh­­­­­­–China friendship bridges and other infrastructure projects. During meetings with Bangladeshi officials, including Mohammad Tofazzel Hossain Miah, the principal secretary to the former prime minister, emphasis was placed on expanding cooperation in agriculture, food processing, communication technology and climate change. 

Security cooperation represents another crucial dimension of party diplomacy. China consistently seeks endorsement of the ‘One China’ principle and assurances against ‘anti-China activities’ on partners' territories. This was particularly evident in exchanges with Nepal, where multiple political parties explicitly committed to preventing any anti-China activities on Nepali soil. Similar assurances were sought and received from other regional partners, demonstrating how party diplomacy serves broader security objectives.

Knowledge transfer and governance experience sharing feature prominently in China's engagement strategy. The IDCPC regularly organises study visits and seminars focusing on China's development experience. For instance, when meeting with Bangladeshi young cadres, Sun emphasised how both countries ‘share many similarities’ in their development journeys and face similar challenges, positioning China as a model and mentor for development.

China's party diplomacy in South Asia represents a sophisticated and multi-layered approach to regional influence. The systematic nature of these engagements, combined with their broad scope and strategic focus, suggests that party-to-party relations are becoming an increasingly important tool in China's foreign policy arsenal. The IDCPC's activities demonstrate a long-term approach to relationship building that transcends traditional diplomatic channels and creates durable mechanisms for influence across the region.

This comprehensive strategy carries significant implications for understanding and engaging with Chinese foreign policy. As China continues to expand its influence in South Asia, understanding the role and effectiveness of party diplomacy is becoming increasingly crucial for both regional actors and the broader international community. The IDCPC's systematic engagement across political, economic and social dimensions reveals a sophisticated approach to regional influence that merits careful study and consideration in developing responsive diplomatic strategies. 

© Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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