Building Partnerships with China ‘for a New Era’

Hungary joined an exclusive club in May of this year, when it elevated its ties with China to the level of an ‘All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era’. At least 147 countries have established some level of formal partnership with China, but only around eight, including Russia and the Solomon Islands, have a partnership ‘for the new era.’

‘New era’ has been introduced to the language of partnership diplomacy only recently, along with the term ‘community of common destiny’. In the same month that Hungary established a ‘new era’ partnership with China, Serbia also became the first European country to declare a ‘community of common destiny’ with China. 

The circle of countries that have formally established a bilateral ‘community of common destiny’ with China is slightly larger than the ‘new era’ countries, numbering 22, but both phrases are equally important markers of alignment with Beijing.

Many countries use the nomenclature of partnerships, but few have such an extensive, complex system of partnerships as China. Besides a 1961 treaty with North Korea, Beijing does not have any formal alliances. In the spirit of its historical commitment to non-alignment, it has concentrated on establishing non-committal ‘partnerships’ instead.

Beijing prefers to keep its foreign policy loosely defined in order to provide flexibility, and China’s partnership system is no exception. Beijing’s partnership hierarchy has not been officially delineated, although certain adjectives carry consistent meanings, many of which have been explained by Chinese think-tankers and officials.

Partnerships are either ‘strategic’ or not, with strategic partnerships carrying more significance. Generally, strategic partnerships progress to ‘comprehensive strategic’ partnerships, and at the top of the partnership hierarchy are ‘all-weather’ partnerships. Within this hierarchy, Beijing leaves room to tailor-fit partnership descriptors, and there are at least 42 unique combinations.

The UK, for instance, is the only country to have established a ‘Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century’ with China. The fact that this relationship is both ‘comprehensive’ and ‘strategic’ already signifies its importance, and the unique add-ons are a mark of appreciation. 

However, countries are never demoted through the ranks of the partnership hierarchy, meaning that high-level designations do not necessarily reflect a current state of friendliness or significance. Such is the case with the UK, which established its high-level partnership with China in October 2015, during the so-called ‘golden-era’ of UK–China relations presided over by former UK Chancellor George Osborne. 

At the time, Xi Jinping expressed China’s hope that the UK would ‘fulfil its aspiration to be “China's strongest advocate in the West” with concrete action’. Clearly, this advocacy did not continue for long, and relations between China and the West have significantly worsened over the past decade.

Like the Sino-Finnish ‘Future-Orientated New-Type Cooperative Partnership’, the UK–China partnership ‘for the 21st century’ was established as a model for Western relations with a newly powerful China – ‘future-orientated’ and ‘for the 21st century’ in the sense that they understood the new balance of power in the world and would build close ties despite differences in values. 

‘For the 21st century’ echoes the ‘for the new era’ now being introduced to the lexicon of Chinese partnership diplomacy alongside ‘community of common destiny’. Both are already well established in Chinese Community Party (CCP) ideology. 

‘New era’ is even included in the full name for that ideological framework: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Written into the CCP constitution, the term is shorthand for Chinese development under Xi Jinping. It describes a period of national rejuvenation and a shift in the global balance of power in China’s favour.

Now translated into English as ‘community with a shared future’ in order to avoid deterministic connotations, the phrase ‘community of common destiny’ predates Xi, but has become central to his foreign policy doctrine. It describes a utopian vision for a Chinese-led ‘global village’ in which ‘all human beings are one big family.’ The concept is light on detail, and largely defined in opposition to a negative caricature of the international order established by the West.

A much bolder version of ‘for the 21st century,’ a partnership ‘for the new era’ implies that the relationship is geared towards a post-US international order. This is clear from the fact that Russia was the very first country to establish a ‘new era’ partnership with China.

Opposition to US hegemony is the bedrock of the Sino-Russian relationship. Not long after Russia had emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union, it issued the 1997 Joint-Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order with China. The shared goal has remained consistent, but with the invasion of Ukraine, this anti-Western axis has come into sharper focus.

By comparison, the establishment of a ‘community of common destiny’ with China is a little more benign, and this is reflected in the larger grouping of countries that have signed up to one. There are global, regional and bilateral communities of common destiny. The big-picture concept is the ‘community with a shared future for mankind’, which Beijing seeks to insert into every official communication alongside the Belt and Road Initiative and other high-level concepts like the Global Development Initiative. 

Beijing began establishing bilateral communities of common destiny in the vein of the China–Serbia partnership around 2016, when China and Laos signed a joint statement that the two countries ‘are a community of common destiny with strategic significance’. 

Pakistan is the closest China gets to a real ally, and it established a community of common destiny with China in November 2018, when the two sides agreed to ‘build a closer China-Pakistan community of shared future in the new era’. 

Beijing really began expanding the community of common destiny concept in 2022, the same year that it began adding multiple countries to the exclusive ‘all-weather’ designation previously reserved for Pakistan. 

Like ‘new era’, the establishment of a community of common destiny also indicates support for China’s global vision, but more broadly, and perhaps less boldly. It also indicates a genuine sense of close cooperation and connectivity between China and the partner country.

The fact that Hungary has a ‘new era’ partnership and Serbia a ‘community of common destiny’ illustrates the difference. While Serbia is more deeply integrated with China, Hungary’s role as an EU member state and Viktor Orban’s international influence make it a more strategically valuable partner in the ‘new era’.

Both concepts mark an expansion in Beijing’s use of partnership diplomacy in recent years. Facing ongoing economic challenges and tensions with the West, Beijing has doubled down on efforts to expand its circle of friends and to find international endorsement for its foreign policy concepts, particularly among countries in the Global South.

© Jacob Mardell, 2024, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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