Bridging Blocs: The EU–GCC Summit Through the Lens of Middle East Realities

More than two years have passed since the EU unveiled its strategy to elevate relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In that time, both sides have taken steps to implement the framework, though with mixed results. Meanwhile, ongoing geopolitical shifts have demonstrated that instability in the Middle East has far-reaching consequences, particularly for Europe. These changes have underscored the growing significance of the GCC countries within the MENA region and beyond. Recognising this, the EU and Qatar – the current holder of the GCC Presidency – are set to host the first-ever EU–GCC high-level summit in Brussels on 16 October, aiming to further solidify strategic ties.

From a European perspective, the summit is an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with Gulf countries, to find a common language for international conflicts and to offset the energy imbalance caused by the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the mood in the Gulf toward the summit could be described as ‘sceptically optimistic’. While GCC capitals share the European enthusiasm for strengthening relations, the shadow of double-standard measures toward the Middle East in comparison to Ukraine remains, and Gulf decision-makers are concerned about whether pragmatic results can be achieved from the summit. 

Despite the scepticism, progress was made in EU–GCC relations from the revealing of a new strategy in the lead-up to this summit, notably in engagement and institutional relations. Several high-level engagements have taken place since 2022 to address common concerns and elevate relations, such as the Joint Council and Ministerial meetings in Brussels in 2022, which resulted in the adoption of the Joint Cooperation Programme for the period of 2022–2027 and agreement on a wide range of areas to elevate relations in. Another notable point was the appointment of Luigi Di Maio as the new EU special representative for the Gulf region, and the intensification of high-level visits conducted by officials between both regions. Therefore, this high-level summit has the potential to serve as a powerful catalyst to elevate relations to new heights and clear the fog of scepticism between the two regions. However, for the summit to yield positive outcomes, both sides need to go beyond symbolic pledges and diplomatic engagement and weigh the potential outcomes through the prism of the Middle East’s current turbulence and an equal consideration of each other’s interests. 

The summit will cover various areas of cooperation, with a primary focus on crucial issues such as trade, energy and climate, peace and security, the Ukraine conflict, and the broader geopolitical landscape in the MENA region, including Gaza, the Red Sea, Lebanon, Iran, Sudan and other critical hotspots.

Trade and Investment

One of the summit's most pressing topics is the trade and investment relationship between the EU and the GCC. Although trade liberalisation is the ultimate goal, tangible progress has been elusive. In 2023, the EU attempted to restart discussions on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which had been stalled since 2008, only to achieve minimal advancements. However, this should not hinder efforts to enhance trade relations, especially given that trade between the two regions reached €174 billion in 2022. This made the GCC the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, while the EU ranked as the GCC's second largest. Further strengthening trade relations will provide a solid foundation for deepening collaboration across the other strategic pillars entailed in the strategy, such as maritime security, people-to-people connections, energy and climate initiatives, and advancements in technology including AI. Therefore, among the main outcomes both sides should pursue in this summit – and which the GCC countries will be particularly looking forward to – is forging bilateral strategic partnerships between the EU and GCC members. The recent positive results from the EU–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements technical talks should incentivise the EU to work toward the conclusion of such bilateral formats, which will not be an alternative to the FTA, but will complement and create momentum toward the FTA’s conclusion. 

Energy and Climate

Another important pillar is energy and climate, since both regions have ambitious visions in this area. The UAE’s hosting of COP28 in Dubai intensified discussions on energy and climate between the two regions, culminating in the adoption of a pledge endorsed by over 60 countries and spearheaded by the US, UAE and EU to triple global renewable energy capacity by 2030 and enhance energy efficiency by 4% annually. Cooperation between the EU and GCC in this domain is not new, but has been ongoing since the strategy was revealed. For instance, Qatar has secured gas supply agreements with Germany, the Netherlands and France, while the UAE has sent hydrogen shipments to Germany and established a green hydrogen supply chain between Amsterdam and Abu Dhabi. Both regions understand that the COP28 pledges cannot be translated into reality without the Europeans. Meanwhile, the EU’s decoupling from Russia and efforts to forge new sustainable energy ties to offset the imbalance mean it needs the GCC countries’ cooperation. 

Therefore, building on previous efforts and intensifying cooperation on energy and climate is not only a shared ambition but a critical necessity. However, the EU should understand that although GCC countries are ambitious regarding the green transition, fossil fuels remain an important pillar of their economies. Moving away from conventional fuels effectively, and forging sustainable cooperation, can only happen through the inclusion of fuel firms in the discussion. 

Ukraine 

While Ukraine is undoubtedly a pressing geopolitical issue for European countries, the GCC countries face regional challenges that pose more immediate threats to their interests. Although all GCC members supported the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of territory and the illegal referendums in four Ukrainian regions, they maintain a strategic ambiguity regarding the conflict in order to protect their own interests.

Nevertheless, GCC countries have demonstrated a strong commitment to humanitarian aid and mediation efforts, particularly in facilitating prisoner exchanges. Since the onset of the war, Saudi Arabia has provided over $410 million in support for Ukraine, encompassing humanitarian assistance and oil derivatives. Meanwhile, the UAE has allocated $105 million in humanitarian aid and has contributed to initiatives to build homes for children affected by the war led by Ukraine's First Lady, Olena Zelenska. The UAE has also facilitated eight prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, resulting in the release of over 1,990 captives.

Therefore, for any efforts to find a common language on Ukraine, the EU should not only focus on garnering agreement on anti-Russian measures but also take into consideration the interests of the GCC countries and prioritise what can be quickly achieved, such as cooperation on humanitarian aid and mediation. 

Middle East Geopolitics

No meaningful progress will be made at the summit unless the dynamics of the Middle East are fully considered, as this region is as critical to the GCC countries as Ukraine is to EU member states. The geopolitical and economic realities of the Middle East will continue to significantly influence the relationship between these two blocs.

For instance, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, plans for which were signed in September 2023, exemplified potential cooperation toward shared objectives. However, the outbreak of conflict in Gaza has stalled the initiative, which was designed to mitigate instability caused by Houthi activities in the Red Sea. Now, with renewed turmoil in Gaza and Lebanon, the future of the initiative is even more uncertain. The instability on the GCC’s doorstep poses a more pressing concern to GCC countries than the situation in Europe. Therefore, the EU should lecture less and listen more to GCC countries on matters related to Middle East conflicts, and forge cooperation based on a shared understanding of the turbulence in the region.

While both regions have been broadly aligned in condemning Hamas for the 7 October attack, Israeli aggression against civilians in Gaza and the violation of humanitarian law, the EU should more effectively encourage and support the Gulf countries’ diplomatic efforts to contain the conflict in both Gaza and Lebanon. Crucially, the EU must recognise that the absence of a Palestinian state lies at the heart of the ongoing conflict; only by advocating for its establishment can a lasting resolution and cessation of hostilities be achieved, starting with a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon.

The summit presents a critical opportunity to elevate relations between the EU and GCC to unprecedented levels. Given the geopolitical dynamics at play, both regions have incentives to deepen their cooperation. The growing influence of GCC countries and the repercussions of Middle Eastern events in Europe underscore the need for strengthened interdependence. More importantly, the EU must understand that the value-imposing tone it has used previously rarely yields any results, and although it constitutes a significant economic power, it is not irreplaceable. Thus, embracing the GCC states as they are rather than how it wishes them to be is the preliminary step for cultivating sustainable partnerships. This summit could serve as a pivotal moment in redefining and enhancing transregional ties, provided both sides engage with openness and a genuine commitment to addressing shared challenges based on equal consideration of each other’s interests. 

This article was updated on 17 October 2024 to reflect the correct figure of €174 billion for EU–GCC trade in 2022, which was previously stated to be $174 billion.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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