The Arab Spring Redux? The Egyptian Revolution returns with a vengeance

By Shashank Joshi, Associate Fellow, RUSI

The Arab Uprisings, like a series of waves moving at different speeds, have always been part of a larger common force and, at the same time, variegated by the terrain over which they've moved. Now, those waves have crashed onto a series of rocks, bringing the events of the spring vividly back into focus.

In Egypt, thirty-five people have been killed within the last week. The root cause is praetorian overreach. The Egyptian army, buoyed by its apparent role as saviour of the revolution, judged that it could manipulate the democratic transition to keep its privileges intact. Its vision was a democratic veneer over a 'deep state', run by the same generals and business elites who had dominated Hosni Mubarak's government.

Counter-revolution

In February, the author warned that 'the military establishment stands to suffer enormous losses, in both financial and political terms, from genuine democratic reforms'.[1] Fearing just that, Egypt's ruling body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has re-imposed martial law, engaged in arbitrary detention and torture, and sharply curtailed rights of assembly and freedom of expression.[2] In November, these counter-revolutionary moves reached fever pitch. Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ali al-Silmi, most likely with the approval of the high command, released a set of 'supra-constitutional principles' that would have imposed tight limits on the scope of Egypt's new constitution.[3]

These principles accorded the military the status of 'protector of constitutional legitimacy', which was - quite reasonably - interpreted as a 'right to launch coups'. SCAF was to be given the exclusive right to scrutinise its budget, the right to manage 'all the affairs of the armed forces' without accountability to elected legislators, and a veto over any laws pertaining to military affairs. The constitutional principles also specified who could participate in the 100-member constituent assembly - something that Egypt's new parliament was supposed to decide for itself.

Prior to this bout of protests, SCAF had also set out a timeline that would see presidential elections take place only in 2013, thereby leaving a military junta in charge of the country for two full years after the apparently successful completion of the revolution.

In short, SCAF, led by the increasingly mistrusted Field Marshal Tantawi, wishes to create a political model resembling the Turkey of the 1980s or Pakistan of today - an eviscerated democracy with no control over its national security policy, weighed down by a bloated and self-serving military-industrial apparatus.

Concessions and grievances

Tantawi, in an attempt to subdue the latest round of protests, eventually promised that presidential elections would take place sooner, in July of next year. He also offered a controversial referendum on the army's role in the interim. Tantawi invoked a 'silent majority' of Egyptians who opposed the protests, desired stability, and were content with military stewardship of the transition - implying that a majority of Egyptians would ask SCAF to stick around until July.

It is important to understand how these concessions relate to the various grievances driving protest. The demands of Egyptian protesters, though difficult to pin down, might be simplified as fourfold: early presidential elections; an even earlier transition to civilian administration; a genuine transition, in which all powers are vested in civilian (and eventually elected) authority rather than an unelected army; and accountability for officials, particularly those in the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for violence against protesters.

The protests have secured a concession on the first of these, the timing of presidential elections. But it's far from clear whether they can secure the other three.

Protests and public opinion

The first problem is whether Tantawi is right on the issue of a 'silent majority'. One poll has found that '75 per cent of the Egyptian public are in favour of a civil government, with ... only one per cent approving of military rule'.[4] Whereas the military's approval rating in the spring was 90 per cent, now '43 per cent now believe that the military is working to reverse the gains of the revolution, while only 21 per cent believe that they are working to advance it'.[5] These suggest that the protests are firmly-rooted in a major segment of the population, and will have a corresponding endurance or stamina.

But anecdotal evidence also suggests that: many outside Tahrir Square did not approve of further protests, were deeply concerned by the economic consequences of further instability, and considered Tantawi's concessions to be sufficient if imperfect.[6] Ever since protesters re-occupied Tahrir Square in the summer, the centre ground of public opinion has been less ambitious and more risk-averse than the protest movement.

Issandr El-Amrani, a Cairo-based journalist, has described an 'ambience of martyrdom' in Tahrir Square, in which 'the fighting is being sustained by the protestors, not by the police'.[7] Although protesters' desire to physically occupy the space around the Ministry of Interior is understandable, this assertiveness may yet leave the crowds distant from mainstream opinion, or at least from the 57 per cent of polled Egyptians who do not perceive SCAF to be intentionally retarding the revolution.  

Liberal dilemmas and the Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt's liberals and secularists also face two other problems.

As Shadi Hamid has argued 'there is little doubt that Islamists, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, will dominate next week's elections' (though this does not mean a majority).[8] Therefore the Brotherhood - just as it did in January and February - is sitting out the violence in Tahrir Square, much to the irritation of other groups. The Brotherhood did stage a demonstration against the supra-constitutional principles, and that proved to be the spark for further unrest. But it is now loath to do anything that would jeopardise next week's elections. It is also highly attuned to the sensibilities of non-activist voters.

The second constraint is that the liberal groups are deeply divided. These protests are, like earlier incarnations, leaderless. One significant contrast between these protests and those of January is that no single party is eager to demonstrate leadership. This stems from their recognition that, when all is done and dusted, they will have to engage productively with the armed forces. Working in concert will be important to mitigate this fear. But, as one recent study noted, 'parties founded by young activists have struggled to get off the ground. Some have been unable to collect the 5,000 members required to register officially as a party'. The 'Egyptian Bloc' - an electoral coalition of liberal and leftist parties - splintered over the question of whether former members of the NDP, Mubarak's party, were appropriate candidates.[9]

In contrast to the Brotherhood, the Egyptian Bloc's position is that SCAF should form a unity government now, before elections.[10] The crowds may agree. But if this bloc remains divided within, and detached from both popular opinion and the Muslim Brotherhood, it could find itself isolated in the weeks ahead. That will leave it lacking parliamentary clout - particularly if it chooses to boycott the elections - and therefore broad-based legitimacy.

The Path to Stability

What is the way out of this?

Postponing elections carried great risks - it would deeply alienate Islamist groups, who would interpret any delay as an attempt at electoral exclusion. It would also be pointless unless a popular team of civilian rulers was waiting in the wings, which doesn't seem to be the case, despite Mohamed el-Baradei's earlier manoeuvrings. The election of a parliament would have created a powerful new political force that would have been able to challenge the specifics of military rule more forcefully. It would also have provided a firmer basis for a unity government to precede presidential elections.

But if elections are marred by violence, or liberal groups stay away, that legitimacy may not be forthcoming, perpetuating the violence of the last week.[11] There would also be fears that a Brotherhood-dominated parliament might cut deals with SCAF - after all, the Brotherhood might calculate that its political power is greater under SCAF than a popularly-elected and possibly liberal president.

More important than postponing elections is restoring faith in government. In all likelihood, this cannot be done with piecemeal concessions from SCAF. One doubts that the army could, even if it wanted to, give credible assurances about the integrity of a constitution-drafting process. The optimal solution may be to delay elections by two weeks (but no more), and use the time to bring political groups together. More likely, SCAF will take a gamble by holding firm until elections, and then reiterating its offer of a referendum in the hope of isolating the protesters.

The Role of the United States

Perhaps the most neglected factor in all of this is the United States. It has demonstrated remarkable policy myopia in calling for 'restraint on all sides', as if blame for the present crisis can be apportioned to all parties equally. The United States is repeating its flawed diplomacy from January, when it consistently sought to prioritise 'stability' over reform, thereby getting neither, and falling far behind events in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians.

The use of American tear gas in Tahrir Square has become a deeply sensitive issue, which will likely compound many Egyptians' distrust of US foreign policy. Washington continues to provide billions of dollars in assistance to the Egyptian army, which constitutes nearly a quarter of the Egyptian military budget.[12]

This is not easy leverage to use, as Egyptians do not want to see a foreign power micromanage domestic Egyptian politics. Nor would the United States wish to sever aid that is perceived to underwrite the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. But behind-the-scenes diplomacy has clearly failed to work, and greater pressure should now be placed on SCAF to cease violence and issue guarantees of a full and complete transition. The experience of Pakistan, amongst others, shows that, as tempting as it is to deal directly with military authorities, the long-term political health of Egypt will require civilian control over the armed forces.

It should also be noted that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have - as in Libya - contributed significant amounts to Islamist groups, out of both ideology and in recognition of Egypt as a strategic bulwark against Iran. These states will also wield influence over Egypt's trajectory over coming months.[13]

Transition on the Rocks

Egypt's transition actually falls along the middle of a spectrum that ranges from Kuwait, where bubbling protests have taken place inside the region's first elected parliament; to Yemen, where President Saleh's intransigence has led to a parcelling out of Yemeni territory to various powerbrokers; all the way to Syria, where a brutal crackdown has engendered a full-fledged rebel movement operating from Turkish and Lebanese soil.

In Bahrain, the regime has largely suppressed the protest movement, but at grievous cost to its own legitimacy. A government-commissioned panel has found that Bahraini security forces used excessive force, and reforms have been promised. But government attacks on protesters continue, and the regime - like its counterparts across the region - is likely to offer the minimum necessary reforms that paper over more deep-seated issues.

The prognosis is worst for Syria, where President Assad has repeatedly accepted and then ignored deadlines set by the Arab League and Turkey, insulated by Russian and Chinese vetoes in the UN Security Council. The uprising will become increasingly militarised, with inevitable spill-over into Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. The question is whether the result will look more like a civil war, or Yemen's fraught standoff between various armed groups. The Syrian army is unlikely to be able to pull off Tantawi's trick, and would probably split before being able to swing behind a reconstituted government without Assad.

The Long View

Is this the feared Arab autumn? The tragic culmination of a revolutionary wave that was always going to go awry? It would be remiss not to note the successful completion of the Tunisian elections. Similarly, Libya has formed a new interim government, managing to appease various regional groups and still keep a number of technocrats. Militias need to be disarmed, but the darkest predictions have been belied. And Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco are likely to follow much smoother paths to reform, even if that could take many years.

It is important, above all, to consider the counterfactual in Egypt. As Shadi Hamid points out, Algeria's 1992 elections were cancelled after it became apparent Islamists would dominate. The ensuing civil war resulted in up to 200,000 dead.[14] If external powers had stuck with Mubarak in January, and Egyptian soldiers had followed their Syrian or Libyan counterparts, the situation would be worse today. And in very few countries can a powerful military establishment be dissolved overnight - in Turkey, it has taken decades of strong and slow boring of hard boards.[15] Moreover, as Jay Ulfelder observes, 'since 1955, the average life span for a democratic regime is just 16 years, and a substantial majority of the democratic episodes that began in the past half-century have ended with a return to some form of autocracy'.[16] In other words, these struggles are not just typical, but will likely have to be repeated.

The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI. 

NOTES

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[1] Shashank Joshi, Viewpoint: Too earl to celebrate in Egypt?, BBC News, 12 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12438007

[2] Amnesty International, Broken Promises: Egypt's Military Rulers Erode Human Rights, 22 November 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/053/2011/en/47be269e-b67a-42f4-835b-787f91044e04/mde120532011en.pdf

[3] Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, 1 November 2011, http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2011.11_-_constitutional_principles_document_english.pdf

[4] Gihan Shahine, Al-Ahram, 17-23 November 2011, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1072/eg2.htm

[5] Shibley Telhami, 2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey, October 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2011/1121_arab_public_opinion/20111121_arab_public_opinion.pdf

[6] Tom Perry, Egypt army may seek "blank cheque" with poll, Reuters, 23 November 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL5E7MN0Y920111123?sp=true

[7] Issandr El Amrani, Tahrir: What Next?, The Arabist, 22 November, http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/11/22/tahrir-what-next.html

[8] Shadi Hamid, Don't Postpone Egypt's Elections, The Atlantic, 21 November 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/dont-postpone-egypts-elections/248848/

[9] Nate Wright, Egypt's Intense Election Eve, Middle East Reserch and Information Project, 10 November 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero111011

[10] Issandr El Amrani, Chart: who stands where in Egypt, The Arabist, 23 November 2011, http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/11/23/chart-who-stands-where-in-egypt.html

[11] For a similar argument, see Marc Lynch, The Egypt game has changed, Foreign Policy blogs, 22 November 2011, http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/22/the_egypt_game_has_changed

[12] Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt in Transition, Congressional Research Service, 18 November 2011, http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Egypt-in-Transition-CRS-Report.pdf

[13] Dina Ezzat, Changes in Egypt-Gulf Relations, Al-Ahram, 15-21 September 2011, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1064/eg03.htm

[14] Shadi Hamid, Don't Postpone Egypt's Elections, The Atlantic, 21 November 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/dont-postpone-egypts-elections/248848/

[15] Gareth Jenkins, Continuity and change: prospects for civil-military relations in Turkey, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2, March 2007

[16] Jay Ulfelder, Prospects for New Democracies in the Arab World: Chronicles of Deaths (and Rebirths) Foretold, The Monkey Cage, 26 April 2011, http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/04/26/prospects_for_new_democracies_/