Eight months after Iraq’s deadlocked parliamentary elections, the new coalition government has finally taken shape with Nouri al-Maliki yet again at the helm. As the leaked US embassy cables show however, the current sectarian power-sharing agreement may further weaken the Iraqi government and strengthen Iran’s role in the region.
The Return of Maliki
Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's formally re-elected prime minister, is reaping the rewards of being so well situated during the eight-month bargaining process for a new coalition. During his first term, he consolidated his position at the centre of government, creating a network of patronage that has truly entrenched his State of Law Coalition (SLC) among the Iraqi elite.
Although the March 2010 elections were by no means a decisive win for Maliki - former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi's nationalist, Iraqiya (Iraqi National Movement) party won ninety-one seats; a mere two seats more than Maliki's SLC [1] - it is a marked improvement compared to the 2005 election. The State of Law coalition created by Maliki in 2009 represented an ideological shift from the collective Shia-orientated National Iraqi Alliance (NIA), which was aligned to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), to a more secular and nationalist party. NIA's electoral losses in 2010 from 41 to 18 per cent is therefore a boost to the SLC: it indicates overwhelming support for national security over sectarian allegiance. [2]
Moreover, Maliki has profited on his well-cultivated image as stabiliser and diplomat. As commander-in-chief during the country's descent into militia warfare, in 2008 he asserted the power of the Iraqi armed forces to reclaim Iraq from militias in Basra, Mosul and Sadr provinces. Although militia violence is still endemic, annual civilian deaths from violence in 2009 was the lowest since the 2003 invasion, and monthly casualties are now in the low hundreds from thousands. [3]
The Death of Power Sharing
The Iraqi electorate's vote for nationalism over unstable sectarianism, however, has not emerged in the new government. The power sharing agreement has changed little from 2005: the new parliament has re-elected Kurdish president Jalal Talabani, Shia prime minister Maliki and given the parliamentary speaker role to Sunni Osama al-Nujaifi. This agreement is not a progressive representation of Iraq's diverse ethno-religious make-up. It further entrenches politicised sectarianism and will thus engender more sectarian unrest if the Iraqi economy and living conditions of Iraqi civilians continue to suffer at the hands of factional squabbling.
Maliki's intransigent refusal to relinquish power to Allawi has led him to make a political alliance with the very leader of the Mahdi army militia that he waged war on in the southern port of Basra. Muqtada al-Sadr - a militant anti-American Shia cleric backed by Iran - has become kingmaker in the Iraqi parliamentary elections: the Sadr block gave Maliki a vital forty extra seats in parliament.[4] But what favours will he have to grant in return? It is expected that the release of members of the Mahdi Army will be in the bargaining pact. In fact the Sadr camp has already made significant gains. In recent months, Maliki's government has handed security positions to veteran commanders of the militia and the Sadrists have won the deputy speaker position in parliament; this will undoubtedly affect any parliamentary debate on keeping the US troops in Iraq after the 2011 withdrawal date.[5] More worryingly, Sadr officials have claimed that Maliki's alliance has also agreed to hand over the governorship of a province on the Iranian border and a neighbouring Wasit province, which have been described as 'hubs for weapons smuggling from Iran.' [6]
Allawi has argued in the Washington Post that the deal brokered by Tehran would actively exclude non-sectarian Shias, Sunnis and non-Muslims from any representation and 'would push Iraq ever deeper into an Iranian sphere of influence. In short, it would guarantee a return to the old politics of sectarianism and violence.'[7] He has grimly predicted the death of power sharing and more 'tensions and violence' with the re-election of Talabani and the appointment of his own Nujaifi, who compromised for a position rather than battling for a more inclusive coalition. [8]
Undoubtedly Allawi is bitter about his own prospects: the role created for him as the chairman of the National Council for Strategic Policy is a mere gesture and will afford him no real power in government. But his prediction should not be dismissed. An average of seven people die a day from suicide and bomb attacks in Iraq and the past month has witnessed one of the fiercest assaults in Baghdad since the 2003 invasions, killing at least sixty three and wounding nearly 300. [9] In a deepening of sectarian violence fifty-two Christian's were massacred in a Church in Baghdad during the parliamentary sessions. [10]
Bolstering Iran
The most recent leaking of US embassy cables reinforces how sectarian governance benefits Iran. Significantly, files from the US embassy in Baghdad states that 'For Iran, a "rebellious" Maliki pursuing a more nationalist vs. sectarian agenda risks splitting the Shia vote, which in turn weakens the Shia political bloc's negotiating strength during the government formation period post-election.'[11] Maliki, however, has not been as pliable as both Iran and the US expected. The Iranians urged Maliki not to split from the SCIRI and form his own nationalist coalition before the election and attempted to derail the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that extended US troop presence to the end of 2011; he resisted both.
Given SCIRI's poor performance at the polls, Iran's only choice - and the US's only alternative given Iraqiya's association with the Ba'ath Party - was to back Maliki. Luckily for Iran, and to the dismay of the US, he did not prove too rebellious; and accepted help to secure his re-election. The surrounding Arab states are also alarmed that Iran's meddling in Iraq and development of nuclear arsenal will consolidate its power in the region. The recent leaks reveal how Kuwait and the Sunni-led Gulf states backed by Saudi Arabia fear that Iran's Revolutionary Guard will fill a power vacuum once the Americans leave, encouraging a new Shia insurgency both within Iraq and beyond its borders into the Arab states and Yemen.
This does not mean Maliki is at the beck and call of Iran, certain divisive bilateral issues such as maritime borders and sovereignty over oil-fields means Maliki will turn to the US and the rhetoric of Iraqi nationalism for support. Iran's occupation of an oil field on the two countries' border last year is a case in point. Tensions flared in Eastern Maysan when eleven Iranian soldiers took control of the Fakka oilfield last year, raising the Iranian flag in a flagrant 'violation of Iraqi sovereignty.' The then Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani told al-Arabiya TV: 'Iraq will not give up its oil wealth, no matter the reason,' and strong demands were made that the Iranians leave.[12] Despite the so-called eight month impasse since the election, Maliki continued to formalise oil contracts with Iran's rivals and assert its own sovereignty. By the end of the year, Iraq is set to sign a $12 billion deal between its South Gas Company and Royal Dutch Shell to capture flared gas at southern oilfields, and an initial deal with Turkey's TPAO and Kuwait Energy Company to develop the Siba gas field in Basra was signed earlier this month.[13]
Stability in the Future
Barack Obama is committed to fulfilling the pledge that brought him such popularity during his presidential campaign: to disengage from Iraq during his first term. US military commanders, however, have repeatedly spoken of the possibility of extending the US military's stay well into the future to prevent an escalation in violence.[14] A fundamental obstacle is the Iraqi military. Iraq's most senior officer, Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari, said that the Iraqi army would be unable to cope without backing from US forces and is not in a position to assert its role.[15] The authority of the Iraqi state itself in relation to the Kurdish population is another vital issue. The question of whether Kurds feel a deeper connection to being Kurdish or being Iraqi, and what is being done to encourage a more national approach, is significant. It will affect whether a withdrawal of peace keeping forces will incite violent Kurdish land disputes, an issue which must be settled by the new government.
If, as a US official ahead of the Lisbon Summit claimed, 'Iraq is a pretty decent blueprint for how to transition in Afghanistan,' Obama has great cause to be concerned.[16] NATO has similar hopes to be able to hand over security work to Kabul by the end of 2014, a prospect that that received a blow by the Afghanistan elections: more than 1.3 million votes have been disqualified for fraud and the vote-rigging has been described as worse than the 2009 presidential poll.[17]
Most importantly, if Maliki is to stay true to his word that 'the coming government will be committed to reconstruction and providing services,' so vital to Iraq's future he must deliver what he has failed to so far: improved basic services, security and job prospects. A continued negligence of public services, water shortages, poor electricity and low employment will only encourage local militias to flourish and fill a power vacuum not offered by a factional Iraqi state.
By Lida Mirzaii for RUSI.org
NOTES
[1] See: Timothy Williams and Rod Norland, 'Allawi Victory in Iraq Sets Up Period of Uncertainty', New York Times, 26 March 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/middleeast/27iraq.html?_r=1> accessed 26 November 2010 and Martin Chulov, 'Iraq's leaders back fragile power sharing deal', The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/11/iraq-leaders-back-fragile> accessed 26 November 2010
[2] For a breakdown of election results see: The Majlis, 'Iraqi Elections 2010', >, accessed 26 November 2010, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/> accessed 26 November 2010
[3] Iraqi Body Count, 'Documented Civilian Deaths', <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/> accessed 26 November 2010
[4] Martin Chulov, 'Iran backs Maliki for second term as Iraqi PM', The Guardian, 18 October 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/18/iran-iraq-maliki-ahmadinejad-sadr accessed 27 November 2010 and Andrew England, 'Maliki struggles for consensus', The Financial Times, 19 October 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3606f16-db26-11df-a870-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 27 November 2010
[5] LA Times, 'Sadre sees star rise again in Iraq', 25 November 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/25/world/la-fg-iraq-sadr-20101125> accessed 26 November 2010
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ayad Allawi, 'How Iraq can fortify its fragile democracy', Washington Post, 10 June 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060903807.html> accessed 26 November 2010
[8] Arwa Damon, 'Allawi: 'Power-sharing is dead now'', CNN, 12 November 2010, <http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-12/world/iraq.allawi_1_allawi-iraqiya-power-sharing-agreement?_s=PM:WORLD> accessed 26 November 2010
[9] See Op.Cit., Iraqi Body Count and The Guardian, 'Iraq: Unfinished business', 12 November 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/12/iraq-unfinished-business-editorial> accessed 26 November 2010
[10] Adrian Blomfield, 'Iraqi Christians put to the sword', The Telegraph, 12 November 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/8128161/Iraqi-Christians-put-to-the-sword.html> accessed 26 November 2010
[11] The Guardian, 'US embassy cables: Iran attempts to manipulate Iraq elections', 28 November 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/234583> accessed 29 November 2010, and Simon Tisdall, 'Fear of 'different world' if Iran gets nuclear weapons', The Guardian, 28 November 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/united-states-iran-nuclear-weapons> accessed 29 November 2010
[12] Suadad al-Salhy and Mohammed Abbas, 'Iraq demands Iran withdraw troops from oilfields', Reuters, 18 December 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BH1Y920091218> accessed 26 November 2010
[13] Reuters, 'Iraq gas deal with Shell seen by year end', 26 November 2010, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6AP0S620101126?pageNumber=2> accessed 27 November 2010
[14] Nick Turse, 'Pentagon digs in deeper', Asia Times, 20 November 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LK20Ak03.html> accessed 27 November 2010
[15] Matthew Weaver, 'Iraqi army not ready to take over until 2020, says country's top general', The Guardian, 12 August 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/12/iraqi-army-not-ready-general> accessed 26 November 2010
[16] M.K. Bhadrakumar, 'An apparition at NATO's Lisbon summit', RIA Novosti, 18 November 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/international_affairs/20101118/161392288.html> accessed 26 November 2010
[17] Ben Farmer, 'Afghanistan elections thrown into turmoil after illegality claim', The Telegraph, 25 November 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8157790/Afghanistan-elections-thrown-into-turmoil-after-illegality-claim.html> accessed 27 November 2010