What North Korea Is not Telling Us about Denuclearisation in 2020
A new rallying cry to ‘achieve a breakthrough’ has been launched by the North Korean leader. But what this actually means is, probably deliberately, obfuscated.
Notwithstanding renewed active diplomatic efforts since early 2018, the challenge of how to pursue denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula continued to defy solution. Indeed, as last year came to an end, North Korea was expected to raise tensions once again by threatening to deliver a ‘Christmas gift’ to the US which many speculated would come in the shape of a test of an ICBM, or related technology, that would garner more attention than the shorter-range missile tests North Korea conducted during 2019.
A New Rallying Cry?
That did not happen. Instead, the year ended with the unusually timed 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (Party Plenum), which may prove to be just as impactful on the future shape of the Washington–Pyongyang relationship. During his speech that concluded the Party Plenum, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced a new rhetorical ‘offensive’, ordering the country to make a ‘breakthrough head-on’. The inference is that this was a mobilising appeal to neutralise the sanctions imposed on North Korea and deflect pressure from ‘hostile forces’ by focusing efforts on the economy. But we have no direct clues on this North Korean supposed new direction, or of what might be in store for the future of US–North Korea relations.
The Party Plenum at the end of 2019 saw Kim Jong-un declare that all efforts should be made to ‘advance the revolution’ by achieving a ‘breakthrough’. Since this announcement, state-controlled North Korean media outlets such as Korean Central News Agency (KNCA), the party daily Rodong Sinmun, and the Pyongyang Times have made frequent reference to this new line of propaganda. There have been multiple articles that reiterate this directive, as well as expressing energetic support for it (and, of course, for Kim and his guidance), and widespread reports of efforts to deliver on the appeal.
Such articles have usually referred to the implementation of this new offensive in relation to a range of activities, such as production, industrial development and furthering revolutionary ideology. However, this new party directive provides scant indication of how it will manifest itself in foreign policy, and specifically that which relates to the US, South Korea and broader stability questions on the peninsula. All that can be gleaned from North Korean so far this year is that although Kim continues to have a ‘good personal feelings about Trump