The End of Iraq

Iraq faces the prospect of descending into another sectarian civil war, six years after the last war of its kind took the country to the brink. In 2006 and 2007, the bloody conflict between Shia and Sunni communities claimed the lives of thousands and threatened to disintegrate the country. Partition was mooted as a solution and three separate regions were proposed: a Kurdish region to the north, a Sunni region in the centre and a Shia region in the south.[1]

That idea was soon dismissed, as differences started to be fought out at the ballot box and through the political process. Iraq's Sunnis, overwhelmed by Shia dominated institutions, the Shia dominated army and a mixture of different Shia death squads, opted to contest provincial and national elections, bringing Iraq's Sunnis back into government and giving Iraq a fragile but stable security and political environment.  Those who supported partition or loose federalism lost the support of the Iraqi Arab electorate and fared abysmally in elections.

However, Iraq faces the possibility of territorial fragmentation once again. Civil war this time round will be different, far bloodier and with far-reaching consequences for Iraq and the region. Continued sectarian tensions in the country, exacerbated by and combined with the conflict in Syria, means that fragmentation is likely to be a certainty, rather than a moot point, should the country go through another episode of sectarian warfare. There will, in other words, be no second chance for Iraq.

The Slide Towards Civil War

Reconciliation and sectarian divisions in Iraq started to take a turn for the worse back in December 2011. Mr Maliki unexpectedly issued an arrest warrant against the then vice-president, Tarek al-Hashimi, who fled the country and has been in self-imposed exile since. The nature and circumstances in which the arrest warrant was issued made the issue of the warrant's legitimacy a side issue. Firstly, Hashimi was a political rival to Mr Maliki and, secondly, security forces pursued Hashimi immediately after the US withdrawal from Iraq. Mr Maliki was criticised for consolidating his grip over the country and taking it toward authoritarianism.

To add insult to injury for Iraq's Sunni communities, one year later, in the same month, Mr Maliki moved once again against a prominent Sunni representative of theirs. This time it was finance minister Rafi al-Issawi's turn, whose staff and bodyguards were arrested on terrorism charges.

The December 2012 move on Issawi may have been miscalculated. Iraq's Sunnis in the north-western provinces immediately responded by initiating 'Arab Spring' style protests, demanding an end to the discrimination, persecution and marginalisation of Sunni Arabs. The protests included hardline neo-Ba'athist elements and displayed anti-Shia slogans, as well as support for Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI).

Nearly six-months on, the protests show no sign of abating. Last month, the relationship between protesters and the Iraqi government turned violent, after Iraqi forces raided a protest camp in Hawija (Kirkuk), leading to a clash that left at least fifty dead and others injured.

The Hawija incident may have been a defining moment: calls for revenge were coming across Sunni constituencies and united tribal, religious and political Sunni figures. Moderate figures have been sidelined as a consequence of the state's use of force. Some influential tribal sheikhs continue to threaten war and have established a 'tribal army' to protect demonstrators. The 'tribal army' has already gone head-to-head with the Iraqi army.

A Climate that Favours Extremists

This re-militarisation of the Sunni community has dramatically increased the chances of a civil war taking place. But the war may have already started. Terrorist attacks are being launched against separate Sunni and Shia targets. Less than two weeks ago, at least forty-one people died when two bombs detonated outside a Sunni mosque in Baquba, 30 miles north of Baghdad. The bombings came after a spate of attacks targeting Iraq's Shia constituencies across the country, two days before the attack on the Sunni mosque, when eleven blasts in one hour in Baghdad killed twenty-three and injured more than 100.

No specific Shia group has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Sunni mosque. Powerful militant Shia groups still exist in Iraq. However, AQI or other Sunni extremist groups could also be responsible, since they are not necessarily fixated on the sectarian identity of their targets.

Iraq's Shia controlled army and Shia elite have displayed restraint in resisting the temptation to strike back. That restraint, however, can only be tested so much. If terror attacks on Shia targets are sustained, the government will be unable to prevent autonomous militant groups from launching retaliatory attacks.

Much will depend on the role played by Sunni groups and leaders. It is still unclear whether they intend to strike a deal with the government to end the protests and whether this will be enough to convince more extreme elements. Moderate voices have been sidelined but will be crucial in reigning in the broader Sunni population and preventing them from joining the ranks of militant groups.

Yet, the domestic and regional climate favours the extremists.

Domestically, ethno-sectarian tensions are at their highest since the last civil war. In addition to Sunni-Shia tensions, Baghdad has also come close to armed conflict with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and remains at logger-heads with the Kurds over territorial and energy disputes.

Regionally, the ascendancy in Syria of Sunni militant, in some cases Islamic fundamentalist, groups and the flood of Gulf money going into the country is encouraging for Iraq's own militants, some of which have close ties with counterparts in Syria.

The ongoing conflict in Syria means that civil war in Iraq will yet again be regionalised but to a greater extent since the stakes are much higher. Undermining the Maliki-led government could weaken the Shia axis of powers that has so far kept the al-Assad regime in power. Iraq lies at the heart of this axis because of the close ties its Shia rulers have with Iran; it is an axis dominated by Iran but which also includes Hizbullah. Further, Baghdad has become a conduit through which Iran allegedly sends funds, arms and fighters to the Syrian regime. Iraq has also allowed (either wittingly or unwittingly) Iraqi Shia militias to join the ranks of the Syrian regime.

Triggering a civil war or launching an organised military campaign against the Baghdad government could, therefore, galvanise Iraq's Sunnis, shift the momentum in Syria to Iraq and allow for a scenario in which the Sunni Arab world reverses its post-2003 defeat or, alternatively, severely weaken Iraq's Shia rulers and the Iranian influence in the region.

The End of Iraq

A prolonged Syria-style civil war in Iraq will effectively signal the end of Iraq. Reconciliation has been given a chance, a decades' worth, since the removal of the former regime in 2003. Civil war would re-start the battle for the future of Iraq, only with negotiation and reconciliation being non-options, as both sides have already tasted what this actually means in practice.

The idea of dividing Iraq into autonomous regions, if not independent states, now has greater appeal than ever before. The first and most likely to declare independence could be the Kurds, should turmoil in Arab Iraq threaten their continued prosperity. Some Sunni provinces have already called for a Sunni region similar to the Kurdistan Region in the north, which has its own government, enjoys substantial autonomy and controls and manages its own security, energy resources and foreign relations. This month, the Sunni province of Salahaddin even went as far as unilaterally signing deals with international oil companies, without approval from Baghdad.

The creation of an autonomous Sunni region makes sense. Few, if any, of Iraq's Sunnis believe that the Shia are willing to treat them as equals. The past decade has provided ample evidence of that. A Sunni region gives them a powerful means of containing and competing with the Shia, in partnership with a potential Sunni-governed Syria that borders Iraq's Sunni provinces.

Centralism and the concentration of power in Baghdad has been a failed exercise, despite the loss of lives and the resources dedicated to it. The fragmentation of Iraq into separate autonomous regions is not a solution in and of itself. It is, however, a viable option that accommodates existing realities on the ground, that allows for a fairer balance of power between Sunni and Shia; and can be pursued through mechanisms already enshrined in the Iraqi constitution.

Ranj Alaaldin is a Doctoral Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he researches the history of Shia political mobilisation in Iraq. He is also a Senior Analyst at the Next Century Foundation.

The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

NOTE

 

[1] For more on federalism and power-sharing in Iraq, See How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity by Brendan O'Leary at http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14618.html