The current approach to counter-insurgency relies on a clear-hold-build axiom that has proved repeatedly unsuccessful: a different understanding of the questions underpinning the doctrine can help rectify some of its fallacies
Since the beginning of armed conflict in Syria and Iraq, thousands of militants from the Caucasus region have participated in the war. However, dislodging Daesh and a collapse of the insurgency in the North Caucasus have substantially diminished the capacities of North Caucasian jihadi groups. Nevertheless, militancy in the region has potential.
The deal to implement a ceasefire across Syria brokered by the US and Russia is a major development in the course of that country’s brutal conflict. It presents a faint glimmer of hope – the first in years – that an end may be in sight to what to date remains this century’s bloodiest conflict.
India’s Jammu and Kashmir state is no stranger to violence. But the latest bout of bloodshed and arrests is different, for it is generated by grievances from a younger and seemingly leaderless local protest movement.
As Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Daesh, recent military successes spearheaded by Chadian forces bode well for the new multilateral response to the group. But, without a longer-term domestic political and military strategy, hopes for an enduring solution to the insurgency should not be raised.
The mass internment of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs in supposed ‘re-education’ facilities as a means of combatting violent extremism suggests that Beijing lacks confidence in the effectiveness of its intelligence architecture, and by extension, its capacity to identify and eliminate actual terrorist threats.