Zimbabwe’s crisis has polarized opinion and divided the global community along the fault-lines of race, class and economics. The forthcoming European Union (EU) – African Union (AU) summit in Lisbon in December 2007 is a case in point. In July, the Portuguese government, under pressure from a potential AU boycott, indicated their willingness to invite Robert Mugabe. This perceived acquiescence has infuriated the British government and created the possibility of an intra-EU split, as well as an EU-AU division. The Western community, particularly Britain and the US, have called on the African community to take a more forceful approach in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe.
Africa’s recalcitrance is primarily due to patriotic blackness. This ideology has given Mugabe succour and sustained his regime. Patriotic blackness fuses the notion of Professor Terence Ranger’s patriotic history (the Zimbabwean state’s triumphalist interpretation of post-colonial history) with the political culture of fundamentalist Pan- Africanism, which is inherently anti- Western, and which espouses African unity and black empowerment. Patriotic blackness, which is deeply embedded within the political and social culture of Africa, has been most powerfully expressed in the secular world of African foreign policy, and particularly with regard to Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe: The Internal Context
Using a panoply of ideological, military and economic resources and measures, the Zimbabwean state has since 2000 attempted to fashion an anti-colonial project within the broad aegis of patriotic blackness to gain internal and external support and to remain in power. From 2000–2004, Mugabe, was re-iconized, particularly in ZANU-PF’s rural heartland. The opposition, which had attracted support in both the rural and urban areas in 2000–2002, was forced to consolidate in the urban areas and Matabeleland as ZANU-PF used violence and the ideology of patriotic blackness to keep them out of the state’s rural heartland.
 From 2004, the in-fighting within the opposition gave the state renewed impetus. However, the reality is that within Zimbabwe, the patriotic blackness project is unravelling, for various reasons: the land redistribution has not resulted in security of tenure; many of the peasant farmers who acquired land have themselves been dispossessed by Party officials and rural poverty erodes support. Violence and crime in the urban areas are also deeply unsettling, as is the economic uncertainty. Within the security sector, there are serious factional and jurisdictional conflicts between and within the Army, Police and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). These struggles are paralleled by increasingly bitter political in-fighting within ZANUPF itself over the issue of Mugabe’s successor and resource struggles as they try to leverage political power. The key factor is that within Zimbabwe, patriotic blackness no longer has the same emotional gravitas as the emancipatory project of southern African liberation a generation ago. The protracted crisis has created a deep cynicism about politics and ideology among ordinary Zimbabweans. The personal survival instinct has created a powerful, individualist counter-culture which challenges the collectivist ‘norms’ of patriotic blackness.
Patriotic Blackness: The Regional Dimension
Zimbabwe was one of the major battlegrounds of the regional liberation struggle. In Mugabe, Zimbabwe found an iconic leader who could galvanize regional support. Zimbabwe and its leader have paid their historical dues, and thus remain protected by the historical, socio-cultural and economic blood ties of patriotic blackness and the liberation struggle. Although Zimbabwe’s neighbours are deeply perturbed by the violence and impending economic collapse, they prefer to raise their concerns in private meetings with Mugabe – the ‘sekuru’ (grand old man) – rather than publicly air disapproval.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of Government meeting in Dar es Salaam in March 2007 was notable for its dual track approach. In public, SADC demonstrated the primacy of the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention by acknowledging Mugabe as the legitimate head of state of Zimbabwe. They also endorsed his bid to contest the 2008 elections. In private, however, there were forceful remonstrations with Mugabe over violence and the issue of the Presidency. This SADC meeting was a key example of the ideology of patriotic blackness at work; having had his knuckles rapped in private, Mugabe then used the lukewarm public mandate from SADC to marginalize his rivals within the ruling party.
South Africa and Zimbabwe The African National Congress (ANC) is acutely aware of, and vulnerable to, the agenda of patriotic blackness. Since taking power in 1994, the ANC has done a great deal to reverse apartheid’s legacies. But the government has been increasingly buffeted by criticism of its performance in providing land, housing and jobs to the poor. The ANC has also endured withering broadsides over its failure to deal with crime, the HIV crisis and corruption. In the international arena, South Africa has been criticized for soft-pedalling on Zimbabwe. For instance, South Africa demurred on placing Zimbabwe on the agenda when she chaired the UN Security Council in March 2007.
President Mbeki is aware that he has to burnish his Africanist credentials at home and abroad. Zimbabwe is an Africanist issue, and Robert Mugabe is an Africanist icon. Pursuing a policy of quiet diplomacy allows Mbeki to demonstrate that Pretoria is not a pawn of London and Washington. Second, it enables him to marginalize the pro-governance bloc within the ANC – a bloc which many hardliners see as essentially white-led and neo-colonialist. Third, he may actually have little option since he cannot be seen to be forcing Mugabe out of office. There is currently a struggle for the soul of the ANC, and it is crucial for Mbeki to neutralize the populist, pro-Zuma wing, as well as the ‘good governance’ bloc. Removing Mugabe from power would leave Mbeki open to accusations from the radical populists that he had ‘sold-out’ to white liberals and conservatives, both of whom have accused him of being soft on governance and of failing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) remain integral to the defence architecture of SADC, and a strategic ally for South Africa. Indeed, there has been an increase in military and intelligence co-operation between South Africa and Zimbabwe since 2000. There has also been a tacit agreement on non-support of the ‘War on Terror’. Three Zimbabweans have died in Iraq, fighting for the British Army in what many perceive as an unjust, colonial war. There have also been a number of South African casualties, with South Africans operating as private security forces or fighting in the British Army. The South African government has passed legislation banning South Africans from fighting for ‘foreign’ states. This measure is partly a reaction to the mercenary tradition of former SADF/SANDF soldiers. But it is also a way of closing ranks and showing solidarity against perceived black collaborators and white reactionaries who fight for the colonial British and Americans. South Africa has given sanctuary to millions of destitute Zimbabwean refugees, and there is little doubt that without her largesse, Zimbabwe would have collapsed. But South Africa’s philanthropy is as much about profit as kinship. South Africa’s state and private business sectors are major shareholders in Zimbabwe’s industrial economy. South Africa’s emergent business and political elite, which is pushing the same black business empowerment agenda which Zimbabweans embraced nearly two decades ago, also have close ties with their Zimbabwean counterparts. Patriotic blackness is profitable as well as being an ideological comfort blanket.
Africa and Zimbabwe
Politically, 2007 has been a year of triumph for Mugabe. First, at the regional level, he was able to package the SADC Dar es Salaam meeting in May as a success since he received public endorsement from the region. Second, the recent AU meeting in Accra was also a triumph because despite Western pressure to put Zimbabwe on the agenda, there was no public discussion of the crisis. Indeed, Mugabe’s anti-Western tirade on the fringes of the meeting drew an appreciative audience. Third, in May 2007 Zimbabwe was elected to lead the Commission on Sustainable Economic Development (CSD) in a closely contested secret ballot. Zimbabwe’s Environment and Tourism Minister, Francis Nhema, who is currently on the EU and US sanctions list, will chair the Committee. This vote was a clear message of support for Mugabe from the African bloc and it was also a clear signal of displeasure to the EU and US from the combined African and Latin American blocs. Mugabe’s fourth triumph is his likely attendance at the EU-AU summit in December. The Mugabe issue forced the cancellation of the EU-AU summit in 2003, and the Portuguese are keen to prevent a similar debacle this year.
Reasons for Africa’s support
Many reasons explain African support for Mugabe. First, he remains a talisman of Pan-Africanism. The seizing of whiteowned farms and Mugabe’s challenge to London and Washington have an emotive, populist appeal to many Africans who see the West as a continuing problem for Africa. Second, Africa remains deeply divided over governance. The AU and African states pay lip-service to good governance, but the reality is that it is grassroots civil society which is pushing the governance agenda in Africa, often in opposition to the state. The debacles in the Middle East have also devalued Britain and America’s moral currency. Many Africans feel that the UK and US can no longer speak with any credibility about good governance. Zimbabwe has thus become a tool for African states to chisel away at American and British foreign policy pretensions in Africa. Third, the thresholds of violence are much higher in Africa than in the West. There is concern about the violence in Zimbabwe – but many Africans cynically feel that Zimbabwe’s crisis has not yet reached catastrophic levels and is thus undeserving of formal intervention. Fourth, although the AU has prioritized human security, in practice it has struggled to overcome state sovereignty and the principle of noninterference. Fifth, Africa’s growing confidence in the international economy, a result of oil and energy sector power, is fuelling the renaissance of African nationalism. Mugabe, for all his faults, is still regarded as the pre-eminent African nationalist – a link between the past and the present. Thus, African states do not want to publicly urge regime change in Zimbabwe, even though the current regime has brought the country to the brink.
The Future
No-one knows what the future holds for Zimbabwe; there are many possible scenarios, including Mugabe riding out the storm and remaining in office up to, and beyond, the scheduled March 2008 elections. Others posit him being pressured to leave office before or after the elections by a combination of internal and international pressure. A distressing certainty is that the future will not be forged without the violence that is a recurring motif in Zimbabwe’s history.
For Africa, Zimbabwe and the ideology of patriotic blackness raises troubling questions and a chance to re–examine fundamental belief and value systems. Whilst Africa’s support for Mugabe and Zimbabwe is understandable, the fetishizing of African unity implicit in patriotic blackness means that human security, good governance and development will always be sub-ordinate to notions of sovereignty and regime survival. For Africa to progress there has to be a seismic shift in the political culture of Africa, whereby contentious issues, such as Zimbabwe, are discussed openly. Whilst consensus is desirable, the ‘unity-at-all-costs’ mantra should not be allowed to prevent serious public debate on major issues. Millions of Zimbabweans are suffering, and the call to silence of patriotic blackness is an impediment. Patriotic blackness offers unity with the responsibilities of kinship, but without the accountability of governance. Also, Zimbabwe is a perfect tool for reflexive Anglophobia; but the reality is that Zimbabwe’s reconstruction will require some degree of Western financing and a pragmatic accommodation must be sought sooner rather than later. There has to be convergence from both sides.
Zimbabwe also holds foreign policy lessons for the UK and US. Democracy and good governance will remain as central tenets of British and American foreign policy, but they must both reengage with the world. Their shrill governance mantras and obsession with Islamist extremism are seen as hypocritical and passé by many Africans. China not only offers an alternative paradigm of unconditional investment and partnership, but also a model of economic capitalism fused with authoritarian government, which is deeply seductive to many states around the world, including Zimbabwe. Russia offers another example of powerful, economic-based nationalism. Whilst the Sino-African honeymoon will eventually cool, it is the West which must regain its competitive advantage in Africa and elsewhere in governance.
Patriotic blackness has been a potent tool in empowering marginalized Africans. But the world is constantly changing and this ideology has to adapt. In the US, the patriotic blackness of the civil rights era is adapting to the new strictures of postracial politics. Africa too now has to reinvent patriotic blackness. Zimbabwe would be a good place to start.
Knox Chitiyo
Head, Africa Programme
International Security Studies, RUSI
www.rusi.org/africa
The views expressed above are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI