Venezuela’s Bolivarian Nightmare Continues: What Does it Mean for the West?

Venezuela has become a real thorn in the side of Western foreign policy. After decades of diplomatic rows followed by sanctions imposed by the US, EU and UK on the regime and its leaders, Caracas’s downward spiral away from the democratic world is only set to continue.

Edmundo González – the former ambassador to Argentina and Algeria who challenged Maduro for the presidency – has been declared the loser on paper, but in reality, most observers know that the election on 28 July was bogus. The opposition claims it has voting-tally proof that it won, and anti-government protests have erupted across the country. In the past, Maduro has been able to stamp out demonstrations against him, and he will fight hard to silence the current protests. The hopes that Venezuela would eventually take a turn towards restoring democracy and, most importantly, the country’s sinking economy, have been shattered.

Maduro’s self-declared triumph will only deepen Venezuelan alignment with Russia, China, Cuba and Iran, as well as other governments in Latin America (such as Honduras, Nicaragua and Bolivia) and around the world that have cosied up to his agenda of populist foreign policy and anti-imperialist rhetoric since he came to power in 2013.

Yet, dealing with the crumbling of the Bolivarian revolution initiated by the late Hugo Chávez and its segue into autocracy will be tough on the regime. It requires dealing with a Venezuelan state that has suffered from years of damage as a result of corrupt practices and abuse of power. 

The Revolution is Short on Options

Maduro’s new government, which will start in January 2025 and last for six years, desperately needs to rescue Venezuela’s almost collapsed oil industry. Many private investors who had been eyeing the country’s potential opening for business under a González government will now have to wait or keep doing business with a Maduro regime that has always been erratic and prone to taking privately owned assets into public ownership. 

When Chávez came into power in 1999, he promised a social, political and symbolic project to Venezuelans based on a new development trajectory with oil production front and centre. Chávez’s extractivist practices failed to change the role of the state, and also underperformed economically. Redistribution and development for the poor never materialised, and the country’s political economy reached unforeseen lows. The humanitarian and economic crises are so deep in Venezuela that in 2020, more than 95% of the population were living below the poverty line. The country’s GDP declined more than 75% between 2013 and 2021.

Just like Chávez and then Maduro, many other Latin American countries have failed to deliver on promises of social change based around similar counter-West narratives and neo-developmental models of exporting their natural resources. Instead, a trend of political incapacity, authoritarianism and undoing civil liberties has taken hold. 

Maduro urgently needs to find ways to increase GDP while balancing a meagre fiscal arc that leaves him with little room to prioritise outside of a handful of policy areas. It is unclear where he will find the resources to deal with key challenges including the overall humanitarian crisis in healthcare, childcare, education, housing and job creation.

More evidently, Maduro will continue letting the economy run wild as long as he benefits from the debacle. He has no plans to reverse current migration flows, with around 8.4 million Venezuelans estimated to have left the country – more than a quarter of the country’s population in 2015. Migrants’ new living conditions have turned out to be disappointing, especially for those in Colombia, Chile, Peru or Ecuador where unskilled workers are poorly paid. A revamped labour market with reintegrated workers could boost the economy, but Maduro knows that migrants are not fond of him, and he wants them as far away as possible.

Externally, Maduro will continue with statist-oriented policies that reject the liberal international order, marking a point of no return to the trade terms of the Western community of multilateral and lender institutions. Although Maduro’s challenges at home should take up much of his attention, especially now that he’s witnessed the real power of the opposition rallying the population against him, he can be expected to push for an international agenda where Venezuela remains married in geopolitical and geo-economic terms to the counter-West bloc of countries. It is there that he will find the foreign developmental and economic support that his regime desperately needs.

Venezuela and the China–Russia Axis

Chávez and Maduro pledged to counter the US and the West. With the political support of Moscow and Beijing, Caracas nurtured an alternative security and defence architecture that firmly supported Russia and China, while reciprocating their core interest of dealing at the edge of international norms in order to prevent their regimes from falling apart.

Maduro will keep steering the ministry of foreign affairs and Venezuela’s armed forces with the aim of expanding military-to-military links with China, Russia and Iran through combined exercises, officer exchanges, military acquisitions, and technology transfers. 

National security concerns will dictate a careful manoeuvring of the authoritarian foundations in the military. Loyalist generals have been installed in public office by Maduro and remain one of the main backers of the regime. Moving forward, the defence alliance with Moscow, Tehran and Beijing will likely continue mostly through political dialogues and small-scale military-to-military exchanges. With its current adverse economic scenario, Venezuela is unlikely to see a near-term purchase of Russian, Iranian or Chinese-made military heavy equipment. Instead, Maduro will be keen to have access to drones, cyber technologies and cheap ISR systems that can be used to control the country’s porous borders while also intimidating neighbours.

The implications of Venezuela’s ongoing economic-political cooperation with Russia and China should encourage the attention of recently elected policymakers (for example in the UK) who are trying to gain influence in the Americas. Caracas’s continuing membership of the counter-West club will provide a boost to Maduro’s propaganda in key areas such as education and science, two aspects currently being supported by Beijing and Moscow.

Regional Outlook and Maduro’s Destiny

The consequences of the Bolivarian revolution leave a complex security scenario for those in the vicinity of Venezuela. Relations with Colombia have fallen sour, and if Maduro makes tough moves against organised crime (albeit only for the optics), it will force violent groups to continue moving into Colombia where they have access to drugs, goods and the trafficking routes northward to the US and eastward to Europe. Other criminals may continue finding ways to support their illicit enterprises in Venezuela by going further south to Ecuador, Peru and Chile, where transnational organisations, such as the Tren de Aragua, operate through local cells. 

Relations with Guyana over the Essequibo will continue to be hot as Maduro’s sabre rattling against the government in Georgetown over its plans to explore the economic viability of oil and gas projects in the contested region can be used again and again for political purposes. Other neighbours such as Trinidad and Tobago should see an increase in migrants arriving at their doorstep, seriously disrupting their economy and therefore their exposure to unwanted political risk. What is certain is that a less secure and more volatile Venezuela will hit most parties that are vulnerable to its exported chaos.

The remaining puzzle is what to do with Maduro. His future is bleak, and he may be the target of more sanctions and pressure from the international community where he will be unwelcome abroad and vulnerable to international arrest warrants. The US State Department accused Maduro and other senior officials in 2020 of narco-terrorism, charging him with ‘facilitating shipments of narcotics’ and offering a £12.5 million reward for information leading to his arrest. It will be up to the US government whether it enforces his arrest or not. If Donald Trump (who had a maximum pressure policy towards Venezuela) comes to power early next year, Maduro may not be able to resist US pressure as he has with Joe Biden’s gentler policy towards the regime. What should matter the most to the West, however, is that given the potential wider conflict brewing with Russia, Vladimir Putin’s access to cheap oil could be a gamechanger. The West’s recent track record in enforcing change in Venezuela is patchy, however, and much better ideas and political execution will be needed this time.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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